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Abstract 
This thesis contributes to the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science. It 
introduces and explores a triangular scheme for understanding the relationship 
between rationality and two key abilities: pragmatics – roughly, inferring implicit 
intended utterance meanings – and learning from sources. The thesis argues that 
these three components – rationality, pragmatics, and sources – should be considered 
together: that each one informs the others. The thesis makes this case through 
literature review and theoretical work (principally, in Chapters 1 and 8) and through 
a series of empirical chapters focusing on different parts of the triangular scheme. 
Chapters 2 to 4 address the relationship between pragmatics and sources, focusing on 
how people change their beliefs when they read a conditional with a partially reliable 
source. The data bear on theories of the conditional and on the literature assessing 
people’s rationality with conditionals. Chapter 5 addresses the relationship between 
rationality and pragmatics, focusing on conditionals ‘in action’ in a framing effect 
known as goal framing. The data suggest a complex relationship between pragmatics 
and utilities, and support a new approach to goal framing. Chapter 6 addresses the 
relationship between rationality and sources, using normative Bayesian models to 
explore how people respond to simple claims from sources of different reliabilities. 
The data support a two-way relationship between claims and source information and, 
perhaps most strikingly, suggest that people readily treat sources as ‘anti-reliable’: as 
negatively correlated with the truth. Chapter 7 extends these experiments to test the 
theory that speakers can guard against reputational damage using hedging. The data 
do not support this theory, and raise questions about whether trust and vigilance 
against deception are prerequisites for pragmatics. Lastly, Chapter 8 synthesizes the 
results; argues for new ways of understanding the relationships between rationality, 
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pragmatics, and sources; and relates the findings to emerging formal methods in 
psychology.  
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 5 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ........................................................................................... 5	
List of Figures .............................................................................................. 11	
List of Tables ................................................................................................ 16	
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................... 19	
1	 Theory Chapter ....................................................................................... 20	
1.1	 The Rationality Debate ..................................................................... 22	
1.1.1	 Psychological Positions on Rationality. ..................................... 23	
1.1.2	 Detecting (Ir-)rationality in Experiments ................................... 34	
1.2	 Pragmatics and Rationality ............................................................... 37	
1.2.1	 Defining Pragmatics ................................................................... 37	
1.2.2	 Pragmatics and Theories of Rationality ..................................... 45	
1.2.3	 Pragmatics and Experiments on Rationality .............................. 47	
1.3	 Sources .............................................................................................. 64	
1.4	 Prospectus ......................................................................................... 72	
2	 Conditionals and Testimony .................................................................. 74	
2.1.1	 Conditionals in the psychology of reasoning ............................. 76	
2.1.2	 Conditionals in Psycholinguistics .............................................. 82	
2.1.3	 Conditionals and Pragmatics ...................................................... 82	
2.1.4	 Testimony ................................................................................... 86	
2.1.5	 Towards an experimental method .............................................. 87	
2.2	 Experiment 2.1: effect of assertion ................................................... 90	
2.2.1	 Methods ...................................................................................... 90	
2.2.2	 Results & Discussion ................................................................. 93	
2.3	 Experiment 2.2: replicating the effect of Assertion .......................... 97	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 6 
2.3.1	 Method ....................................................................................... 97	
2.3.2	 Results & Discussion ................................................................. 99	
2.4	 Experiment 2.3: effect of source expertise ...................................... 104	
2.4.1	 Method ..................................................................................... 104	
2.4.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 106	
2.5	 Experiment 2.4: replicating the effect of source expertise .............. 109	
2.5.1	 Method ..................................................................................... 109	
2.5.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 110	
2.6	 General Discussion .......................................................................... 114	
3	 Conditionals, Testimony, and Interval Estimates ................................ 120	
3.1	 Experiment 3.1: Assertion and Interval Estimates .......................... 120	
3.1.1	 Method ..................................................................................... 120	
3.1.2	 Results and Discussion ............................................................. 123	
3.2	 Experiment 3.2: Expertise and Interval Estimates .......................... 130	
3.2.1	 Method ..................................................................................... 130	
3.2.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 130	
3.3	 General Discussion .......................................................................... 137	
4	 Independent Testimony, Priors, and a Model of Testimonial Conditionals
   ........................................................................................................ 140	
4.1.1	 Multiple Testimony .................................................................. 140	
4.1.2	 Priors ........................................................................................ 142	
4.2	 Experiment 4.1: Independent testimony ......................................... 144	
4.2.1	 Method. .................................................................................... 144	
4.2.2	 Results ...................................................................................... 145	
4.2.3	 Discussion ................................................................................ 146	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 7 
4.3	 Experiment 4.2: Priors, Assertion, and the probability of the 
antecedent ............................................................................................. 149	
4.3.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 149	
4.3.2	 Results & Discussion. .............................................................. 151	
4.4	 Experiment 4.3: Priors, Expertise, and the probability of the 
antecedent ............................................................................................. 154	
4.4.1	 Method ..................................................................................... 154	
4.4.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 154	
4.5	 Experiment 4.4: Priors, Assertion, and the probability of the 
consequent ............................................................................................ 157	
4.5.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 157	
4.5.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 158	
4.6	 Experiment 4.5: Priors, Expertise, and the probability of the 
consequent ............................................................................................ 160	
4.6.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 160	
4.6.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 161	
4.7	 General Discussion .......................................................................... 163	
4.7.1	 Modelling testimonial conditionals .......................................... 166	
4.7.2	 Probabilities and Beyond ......................................................... 180	
4.7.3	 The meaning of the conditional ................................................ 182	
5	 Framing and utility conditionals .......................................................... 188	
5.1.1	 Prospect Theory and the Asian Disease Paradigm ................... 189	
5.1.2	 Towards goal framing .............................................................. 190	
5.1.3	 Goal framing: the empirical data .............................................. 194	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 8 
5.1.4	 Towards an experimental paradigm: utilities in argumentation 
and pragmatics ..................................................................................... 201	
5.2	 Experiment 5.1 ................................................................................ 206	
5.2.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 208	
5.2.2	 Results ...................................................................................... 211	
5.2.3	 Discussion ................................................................................ 216	
5.3	 Experiment 5.2 ................................................................................ 218	
5.3.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 218	
5.3.2	 Results ...................................................................................... 219	
5.3.3	 Discussion ................................................................................ 225	
5.4	 Experiment 5.3 ................................................................................ 230	
5.4.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 231	
5.4.2	 Results ...................................................................................... 232	
5.4.3	 Discussion ................................................................................ 236	
5.5	 General Discussion .......................................................................... 239	
6	 Testimony and Source Reliability  ....................................................... 244	
6.1.1	 Introducing Testimony ............................................................. 244	
6.2	 Experiment 6.1: Belief change ........................................................ 254	
6.2.1	 Method ..................................................................................... 254	
6.2.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 258	
6.3	 Experiment 6.2: Replicating belief change ..................................... 263	
6.3.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 263	
6.3.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 264	
6.4	 Experiment 6.3: Reliability change ................................................. 266	
6.4.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 266	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 9 
6.4.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 267	
6.5	 Experiment 6.4: Replicating reliability change ............................... 269	
6.5.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 269	
6.5.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 269	
6.6	 Experiment 6.5: Story version ......................................................... 272	
6.6.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 274	
6.6.2	 Results & Discussion ............................................................... 275	
6.7	 General Discussion .......................................................................... 278	
7	 Evidential Language ............................................................................. 287	
7.1	 Experiment 7.1 ................................................................................ 290	
7.1.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 290	
7.1.2	 Results ...................................................................................... 292	
7.1.3	 Discussion ................................................................................ 294	
7.2	 Experiment 7.2 ................................................................................ 294	
7.2.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 295	
7.2.2	 Results ...................................................................................... 296	
7.2.3	 Discussion ................................................................................ 298	
7.3	 Experiment 7.3 ................................................................................ 298	
7.3.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 298	
7.3.2	 Results ...................................................................................... 299	
7.3.3	 Discussion ................................................................................ 301	
7.4	 Experiment 7.4: Shield Hedges ....................................................... 302	
7.4.1	 Methods .................................................................................... 302	
7.4.2	 Results ...................................................................................... 303	
7.4.3	 Discussion ................................................................................ 305	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 10 
7.5	 General Discussion .......................................................................... 305	
7.5.1	 Conclusions .............................................................................. 311	
8	 General Discussion ............................................................................... 313	
8.1	 The Experimental Data Recapitulated ............................................ 313	
8.1.1	 Conditionals and Testimony .................................................... 313	
8.1.2	 Utility Conditionals .................................................................. 315	
8.1.3	 Testimony and Source Reliability ............................................ 317	
8.1.4	 Evidential Language ................................................................. 317	
8.2	 Redefining the relationships ............................................................ 318	
8.2.1	 Pragmatic intrusion into argumentation ................................... 321	
8.2.2	 Argument in pragmatics ........................................................... 327	
8.2.3	 Pragmatics as rational social action ......................................... 338	
8.3	 Conclusions ..................................................................................... 343	
Bibliography ............................................................................................... 345	
 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 11 
 
List of Figures  
Figure 1.1. The Triangular Scheme ............................................................................ 21	
Figure 1.2. Crupi's model ........................................................................................... 34	
Figure 2.1. Mean rating of P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................... 94	
Figure 2.2. Mean rating of P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................... 95	
Figure 2.3. Mean rating of Conditional Probability by condition; error bars of 
standard error ............................................................................................................. 96	
Figure 2.4. Mean P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error ............ 99	
Figure 2.5. Mean P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error .......... 101	
Figure 2.6. Mean Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................. 102	
Figure 2.7. Mean P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error .......... 106	
Figure 2.8. Mean P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error .......... 107	
Figure 2.9. Mean Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................. 108	
Figure 2.10. Mean P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error ........ 110	
Figure 2.11. Mean P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error ........ 112	
Figure 2.12. Mean Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................. 113	
Figure 2.13. Simple Bayesian belief network for a conditional ............................... 117	
Figure 3.1. Illustrative slider for exact estimate of P=.5 .......................................... 121	
Figure 3.2. Illustrative slider for uncertain estimate ................................................ 122	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 12 
Figure 3.3. Mean point value of P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard 
error .......................................................................................................................... 123	
Figure 3.4. Mean slider range by condition; error bars are standard error ............... 124	
Figure 3.5. Mean point values of P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard 
error .......................................................................................................................... 125	
Figure 3.6. Mean range of P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................. 126	
Figure 3.7. Mean point values of Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are 
standard error ........................................................................................................... 127	
Figure 3.8. Mean range of Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are 
standard error ........................................................................................................... 128	
Figure 3.9. Mean point values of P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard 
error .......................................................................................................................... 131	
Figure 3.10. Mean slider ranges for P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are 
standard error ........................................................................................................... 132	
Figure 3.11. Mean point values of P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are 
standard error ........................................................................................................... 133	
Figure 3.12. Mean slider ranges for P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are 
standard error ........................................................................................................... 134	
Figure 3.13. Mean point values for Conditional Probability by condition; error bars 
are standard error ...................................................................................................... 135	
Figure 3.14. Mean slider ranges for Conditional Probability by condition; error bars 
are standard error ...................................................................................................... 136	
Figure 4.1. Mean Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................. 145	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 13 
Figure 4.2. Effect of Assertion and Prior on P(Antecedent); error bars are standard 
error .......................................................................................................................... 151	
Figure 4.3. Effect of Prior and Expertise on P(Antecedent); error bars are standard 
error .......................................................................................................................... 155	
Figure 4.4. Effects of Prior and Assertion on P(Consequent); error bars are standard 
error .......................................................................................................................... 158	
Figure 4.5. Effects of Prior and Expertise on P(Consequent); error bars are standard 
error .......................................................................................................................... 161	
Figure 4.6. Bayesian belief network from Bovens and Hartmann (2003) ............... 166	
Figure 4.7. Baseline Bayesian belief network for experimental data ...................... 169	
Figure 4.8. Comparison Bayesian belief network for experimental data ................. 174	
Figure 5.1. Argument convincingness by frame; error bars are standard error ....... 211	
Figure 5.2. Descriptive data by Utility and Frame. Circles are data points for positive 
frames; triangles are data points for negative frames. The solid line is the regression 
for positive frames; the dotted line for negative frames. Shading represents the 
standard error. .......................................................................................................... 215	
Figure 5.3. Descriptive data by Utility and Frame. Circles are data points for positive 
frames; triangles are data points for negative frames. The solid line is the regression 
for positive frames; the dotted line for negative frames. Shading represents the 
standard error. .......................................................................................................... 220	
Figure 5.4. Posterior distributions of mean utilities of taking medicine (left) and not 
taking medicine (right) ............................................................................................. 222	
Figure 5.5. Posterior distributions of mean utilities of undergoing surgery (left) and 
not undergoing surgery (right) ................................................................................. 223	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 14 
Figure 5.6. Posterior distributions of means of utilities for risk of minor infection 
decreasing (left) and not decreasing (right) ............................................................. 224	
Figure 5.7. Posterior distributions of mean utilities for risk of major illness 
decreasing (left) and not decreasing risk (right) ...................................................... 224	
Figure 5.8. Mean utilities by condition; error bars are standard error ..................... 232	
Figure 6.1. Mean belief change by reliability; error bars are standard error ........... 261	
Figure 6.2. Posterior distribution of effect size of beilef change from reliable sources. 
ROPE from -.1, to .1; dotted lines are 95% HDI ..................................................... 261	
Figure 6.3. Posterior distribution of effect size of belief change from unreliable 
sources. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI ...................................... 262	
Figure 6.4. Mean belief change by reliability; error bars are standard error ........... 264	
Figure 6.5. Posterior distribution of effect size of belief change from reliable sources. 
ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI .................................................... 265	
Figure 6.6. Posterior distribution of effect size of belief change from unreliable 
sources. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI ...................................... 265	
Figure 6.7. Mean change in reliability by expectedness; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................. 267	
Figure 6.8. Posterior distribution of effect size of reliability change from expected 
claims. ROPE is -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI ............................................ 268	
Figure 6.9. Posterior distribution of effect size of reliability change from unexpected 
claims. ROPE is -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI ............................................ 268	
Figure 6.10. Mean reliability change by expectedness; error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................. 270	
Figure 6.11. Posterior distribution of effect size of reliability change from expected 
claims. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI ....................................... 270	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 15 
Figure 6.12. Posterior distribution of effect size of reliability change from 
unexpected claims. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI .................... 271	
Figure 6.13. Mean belief by expectedness; error bars are standard error ................ 276	
Figure 6.14. Posterior distribution of effect size of difference between expected and 
null conditions. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI .......................... 277	
Figure 6.15. Posterior distribution of effect size of difference between unexpected 
and null claims. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar is 95% HDI .................................. 277	
Figure 6.16. Posterior distribution for effect size of difference between expected and 
unexpected conditions. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depics 95% HDI ............... 278	
Figure 7.1. Mean change scores by condition; error bars are standard error ........... 293	
Figure 7.2. Mean change scores by condition; error bars are standard error ........... 297	
Figure 7.3. Mean change score by condition; error bars are standard error ............. 299	
Figure 7.4. Mean claim strength; error bars are standard error ................................ 301	
Figure 7.5. Mean change scores by condition; error bars are standard error ........... 303	
Figure 7.6. Mean claim strength (manipulation check); error bars are standard error
 .................................................................................................................................. 304	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 16 
 List of Tables 
Table 2.1. Truth table of material conditional ................................................................. 77	
Table 2.2. Defective truth table ....................................................................................... 78	
Table 2.3. Fixed effects of Assertion on P(Antecedent) ................................................. 95	
Table 2.4. Fixed effects of Assertion on P(Consequent) ................................................ 96	
Table 2.5. Fixed effect of Assertion on Conditional Probability .................................... 97	
Table 2.6. Fixed effect of Assertion on P(Antecedent) ................................................. 100	
Table 2.7. Fixed effect of Assertion on P(Consequent) ................................................ 101	
Table 2.8. Fixed effects of Assertion on Conditional Probability ................................. 103	
Table 2.9. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Antecedent) ............................................... 107	
Table 2.10. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Consequent) ............................................. 107	
Table 2.11. Fixed effects of Expertise on Conditional Probability ............................... 108	
Table 2.12. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Antecedent) ............................................. 111	
Table 2.13. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Consequent) ............................................. 112	
Table 2.14. Fixed effects of Expertise on Conditional Probability ............................... 113	
Table 3.1. Fixed effects of Assertion on point values of P(Antecedent) ...................... 124	
Table 3.2. Fixed effects of Assertion on slider ranges of P(Antecedent) ..................... 125	
Table 3.3. Fixed effects of Assertion on point values of P(Consequent) ...................... 126	
Table 3.4. Fixed effects of Assertion on slider ranges for P(Consequent) ................... 127	
Table 3.5. Fixed effects of Assertion on Conditional Probability ................................. 128	
Table 3.6. Fixed effects of Assertion on ranges for Conditional Probability ............... 129	
Table 3.7. Fixed effects of Expertise on point values of P(Antecedent) ....................... 131	
Table 3.8. Fixed effects of Expertise on slider ranges for P(Antecedent) .................... 132	
Table 3.9. Fixed effects of Expertise on point values for P(Consequent) ..................... 133	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 17 
Table 3.10. Fixed effects of Expertise on slider ranges for P(Consequent); error bars 
are standard error ........................................................................................................... 134	
Table 3.11. Fixed effects of Expertise on point values for Conditional Probability ..... 135	
Table 3.12. Fixed effects of Expertise on slider ranges for Conditional Probability .... 136	
Table 4.1. Fixed effects of Assertion on Conditional Probability ................................. 146	
Table 4.2. Fixed effects and confidence intervals of single assertion for the point-
estimate studies ............................................................................................................. 147	
Table 4.3. Fixed effects of Prior, Assertion, and Interaction ........................................ 152	
Table 4.4. Fixed effects of Assertion at low prior ......................................................... 152	
Table 4.5. Fixed effects of Assertion at high prior ....................................................... 153	
Table 4.6. Fixed effects of Prior, Expertise, and Interaction on P(Antecedent) ........... 155	
Table 4.7. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Antecedent) at low prior ............................ 156	
Table 4.8. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Antecedent) at high prior ........................... 156	
Table 4.9. Fixed effects of Prior, Assertion, and Interaction on P(Consequent) .......... 159	
Table 4.10. Fixed effects of Assertion on P(Consequent) at low prior ......................... 159	
Table 4.11. Fixed effects of Assertion on P(Consequent) at high prior ........................ 160	
Table 4.12. Fixed effects of Prior, Expertise, and Interaction on P(Consequent) ......... 162	
Table 4.13. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Consequent) at low prior ......................... 162	
Table 4.14. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Consequent) at high prior ........................ 163	
Table 4.15. Conditional probability table for Bovens Hartmann network .................... 167	
Table 4.16. Conditional probability table for node B ................................................... 170	
Table 4.17. Conditional probability table for node Rep X ............................................ 170	
Table 4.18. Conditional probability table for Rep X .................................................... 174	
Table 5.1. Utilities for goal frames. .............................................................................. 206	
Table 5.2. Fixed effects of Frame on Convincingness .................................................. 213	
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 18 
Table 5.3. Counts for antecedent utilities ...................................................................... 213	
Table 5.4. Counts for consequent utilities; 'Minor Protection' is protection against a 
minor infection, 'Major Protection' against a life-threatening illness ........................... 214	
Table 5.5. Fixed effects of Utility, Frame, and Interaction on Convincingness ........... 216	
Table 5.6. Fixed effects of the full additive model ....................................................... 216	
Table 5.7. Fixed effects of Frame, Utility, and Interaction ........................................... 221	
Table 5.8. Fixed effects for full additive model. ........................................................... 221	
Table 5.9. Parameters for model with interaction ......................................................... 234	
Table 8.1. Dialogue types according to Walton (2008, p. 8) ........................................ 322	
 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 19 
 
Acknowledgements 
Some words of thanks are due. Firstly, thanks are due to Professor Ulrike 
Hahn for her tremendous supervision over the past three years – for her remarkable 
support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor Mike Oaksford for 
helpful discussion of the results of data from Chapters 2 to 4. Since these chapters 
resulted from collaborative work, I would like to thank these collaborators: Dr 
Karolina Krzyżanowska and Professors Stephan Hartmann and Gregory Wheeler. Dr 
Jean-François Bonnefon provided invaluable suggestions during the planning of the 
studies in Chapter 5, and gave stimulating feedback on the results in that chapter. 
Chapter 6 resulted from collaborative work with Dr Ylva von Gerber and Professor 
Erik Olsson; they, also, deserve thanks. I have benefitted from fruitful discussions on 
both conditionals and pragmatics with Drs Karolina Krzyżanowska and Niels 
Skovgaard -Olsen, and from helpful advice on mixed-effects modelling from Dr 
Henrik Singmann and Danielle Pessach. Ruben Zamora gave invaluable help and 
advice with the web experiments, and Joe Miele, of MTurk Data, posted the web 
experiments on Mechanical Turk with great efficiency. I also gratefully acknowledge 
financial support from the Bloomsbury Doctoral Training Centre and experimental 
funding from the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Swedish Research 
Council. Last – but by no means least – I thank Matt Evans for constant love and 
support, and for well-timed advice to ‘Have a word with [myself]!’ 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 20 
 
1 Theory Chapter 
The question ‘How rational are we?’ has stimulated a rich debate in cognitive 
science. Cognitive scientists argue over the norms that define optimal behaviour; 
over whether we form and revise our beliefs optimally; over whether we act 
optimally to achieve our goals; and over whether we are educable (Stanovich, 2012). 
This thesis will contend that rationality is inextricably linked with two abilities: 
pragmatics - our ability to interpret utterances, including their implicit speaker-
intended meanings; and our ability to respond to information that we receive from 
sources, where sources are understood as other people or institutions that are 
intentionally giving information. The novelty is not in suggesting a role for 
pragmatics and sources: the existing literature has already suggested as much. The 
novelty is, rather, to stress the deep relationship among the three components: 
rationality, pragmatics, and sources. The thesis will contend that much can be learnt 
by treating these components together: indeed, that we lose valuable insights if we 
consider the components separately.  
Throughout, this thesis will refer to a triangular scheme to guide discussion. 
Figure 1.1 shows this scheme.  
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Figure 1.1. The Triangular Scheme 
The figure represents the three components and the two-way relationships among 
them. The arrows can be taken to represent both conceptual connections and 
strategies: for example, because rationality and pragmatics are fundamentally linked, 
the study of rationality is illuminated by considering pragmatics and, likewise, the 
study of pragmatics is illuminated by considering rationality.  
This thesis will present both conceptual arguments and empirical data to 
make the case for this triangular scheme. The thesis is structured around four sets of 
experiments. The experiments offer novel data which illustrate a different aspect of 
the triangular scheme. The experiments also contribute to four independent debates 
in cognitive science: on learning conditionals from testimony; on utility conditionals; 
on models of testimony; and on evidential language. The experiments are tied 
together by the triangular scheme. 
This introductory chapter will introduce the rationality debate in cognitive 
science and how the two other components, pragmatics and sources, bear on this 
debate. The chapter will inevitably be slanted towards topics on which there is 
extensive data: principally, rationality in general, and the relationship between 
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rationality and pragmatics. This slant reflects the state of the literature, not the 
importance of the components.  
1.1 The Rationality Debate  
Rationality arises as a topic across psychology. Given this wide potential 
range, some focus is needed. Consider, for instance, ideal observer models of 
perception, where formal models of optimal performance are specified and compared 
with human behaviour (for discussion, see Hahn, 2014). Similar rational models 
exist for numerous other domains, such as categorization (Anderson, 1991b) and 
language acquisition (Perfors, Tenenbaum, & Regier, 2011). Rationality also bears 
on the definition and treatment of mental disorders (Graham, 2014). But its most 
familiar territory is a cluster of related sub-disciplines: the psychology of judgment 
and decision making (see, e.g., Newell, Lagnado, & Shanks, 2015); the psychology 
of reasoning (see, e.g., Manktelow, 2012); and the psychology of argumentation (see, 
e.g., Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). It is these disciplines which will be the focus of this 
thesis.  
When assessing rationality – whatever normative standards we choose – the 
crucial evidence is not momentary successes and failures but systematic rationality 
or irrationality. In other words, the key question is our underlying competence. 
Establishing our competence requires abstracting away from performance imitations, 
such as memory capacity1, tiredness, and so on (Stein, 1996). Contemporary 
psychology seems to assume what Stein (1996, p. 12) calls the Irrationality Thesis: 
                                                
 
1 Note the tension with accounts which factor in computational limitations (see the 
section on Bayesianism and Rational Analysis). One way to try to reconcile these 
approaches is to distinguish between hard computational limits, such as absolute limits on 
working memory, and contextual problems, such as those caused by tasks with heavy 
working-memory load.  
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our competence systematically diverges from normative principles. The meat of the 
debate is the extent of this divergence.  
1.1.1 Psychological Positions on Rationality.  
We can classify the most prominent theories by the normative frameworks 
that they endorse2 and their degree of optimism about rationality (V. Crupi, personal 
communication, September 5, 2016).  
 The Standard Picture.  
Probably the dominant normative framework is the ‘Standard Picture’ (Stein, 
1996): the correct norms are the ‘rules of logic, probability and so forth’ (Stein, 1996, 
p. 4). The Standard Picture has shaped much of the literature surveyed below. 
Implicit in the framework is the understanding that ‘logic’ and ‘probability’ refer to 
classical accounts: classical propositional and predicate logic, and probability 
governed by the Kolmogorov axioms  (Kolmogorov, 2013; for discussion of 
classical probability and an alternative, see Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012). Implicit, too, 
is the inclusion of prescriptions from decision theory: in particular, the maximization 
of expected utility. For Stein (1996) refers extensively to a decision-making 
literature which typically proceeds by assessing adherence to the axioms of choice, 
full adherence to which would imply maximization of expected utility (Stanovich, 
2016).  
Bayesianism. There are many and varied Bayesian models within cognitive 
science: too many to address individually. But many of these models are drawn 
                                                
 
2 This section is inspired by Vincenzo Crupi’s lecture series, ‘Norms versus 
Reasoning’, delivered from September 5th to September 9th, 2016, at the International 
Rationality Summer Institute, in Aurich, during which Crupi identified the leading relevant 
theories and classified them according to the norms endorsed and the degree of optimism 
about rationality. I largely preserve Crupi’s choice of theories, but add my own analysis of 
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together in the account of Oaksford and Chater (e.g. 2007, 2009), which they call 
‘Bayesian Rationality’. Bayesian Rationality assumes the Standard Picture of 
rationality. Norms are stated in terms of probabilities, understood as subjective 
degrees of belief (Oaksford & Chater, 2007; on different interpretations of 
probability, see, e.g.,  Hacking, 2001). This preference for probability does not imply 
a conflict with logic-based approaches, since probability and logic are tightly 
connected (see, e.g., Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012). Indeed, the Bayesian probabilistic 
account can be seen as a generalization of logic to handle real-world uncertain 
reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 2009b). With this broader account, Bayesian 
Rationality allows a unified treatment of judgment, decision making, inductive and 
deductive reasoning, and argumentation (Oaksford & Chater, 2009a,b).  
Bayesian Rationality draws heavily on the program of rational analysis (see, 
e.g., Anderson, 1990, 1991a). As presented in Oaksford and Chater (2007, p. 32), 
rational analysis comprises the following steps:  
1. Specify precisely the goals of the cognitive system.  
2. Develop a formal model of the environment to which the system is 
adapted.  
3. Make minimal assumptions about computational limitations.  
4. Derive the optimal behaviour function give 1-3 above. (This requires 
formal analysis using rational norms, such as probability theory and 
decision theory).  
5. Examine the empirical evidence to see whether the predictions of the 
behaviour function are confirmed.  
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6. Repeat, iteratively refining the theory.  
The framework has a crucial normative component, but judges norms only after 
considering goals, environment and computational limitations.  
Bayesian Rationality makes a largely optimistic assessment of rationality. In 
various domains, after rational analysis, people’s competence is said to approximate 
rational principles (e.g. Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2009). For instance, there have 
been striking reassments of apparent irrationality in deductive and syllogistic 
reasoning (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000) and 
informal argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). Nevertheless, irrationality is not 
simply explained away. Indeed, it is explicitly acknowledged that ‘people’s ability to 
deal with verbally (or, in the case of probabilities, numerically) specified reasoning 
problems…is extremely limited and subject to error’ (Oaksford & Chater, 2007, p. 
13) and that their probabilistic reasoning is primarily qualitative rather than 
quantitative (Oaksford & Chater, 2009). Consequently, there is no need to dispute 
classic findings demonstrating irrationality, such as conservativism in belief revision 
(e.g. Phillips & Edwards, 1966), in precisely the domains where one might expect a 
rational Bayesian agent to excel. Rather such findings arguably show that, in 
Bayesian terms, people respond to evidence in qualitatively appropriate, but 
quantitatively inappropriate, ways (Hahn & Harris, 2014). Thus, in Stein’s (1996) 
terms, even optimistic Bayesianism is a variant of the Irrationality Thesis.  
Mental Logic and Mental Models. These two approaches are both inspired by 
classical logic, and largely focus on the psychology of reasoning. Mental logic takes 
a syntactic (i.e. rule-based) approach to reasoning, developed from natural deduction, 
                                                                                                                                     
 
rationality. This assessment should not, therefore, be taken to reflect Crupi’s own views.  
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a method of formal-logical proof (e.g. Braine & O’Brien, 1991; Braine & O’Brien, 
1998; Rips, 1994; on natural deduction, see, e.g., Arthur, 2011). Although mental 
logic assumes formal logic as a standard, there is no direct correspondence between 
formal and mental logical rules. Unlike formal logic, for instance, Braine and 
O’Brien’s (1991) mental logic does not license modus tollens (if p then q; not q; 
therefore not p). Such inferences still occur, but through strategic thinking by able 
reasoners (Manktelow, 2012). Other differences occur because of processing 
constraints: reasoning can break down because of schema complexity (Braine & 
O’Brien, 1991) or the number of rules called on (Rips, 1994). Similarly, contextual 
information can change the accessibility of rules. For example, when the context is 
permission being granted, denial of the antecedent becomes more accessible (‘if p, 
then q; therefore if not p, then not q’; see Braine & O’Brien, 1991).  
Mental Models Theory takes a more semantic (or content-based) approach. 
The theory resists summary, because it continues to undergo substantial changes3. 
But a stable point is that Mental Models Theory assumes classical logic as a 
normative standard: ‘to be rational is to be able to make deductions – to draw valid 
conclusions from premises. A valid conclusion is one that is true in any case in 
which the premises are true’ (Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin (2015, p. 201). 
Non-normative patterns routinely arise, the reasons for which recall Mental Logic 
above. Firstly, there are differences in representation. Mental models are concrete 
representations of particular situations, and are economical. People initially represent 
only true information, leaving them prone to certain fallacies, known as illusory 
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inferences (Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015). People may flesh out 
models fully, but this ability depends on factors such as age, intelligence, and 
working-memory load, the latter being a function of the number of models invoked 
(Manktelow, 2012). Reasoning is also modulated by content, context and knowledge 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, & Goodwin, 2015). 
People can add information to models, such as causal relations between the 
antecedents and consequents of conditionals (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), and 
they can use their background knowledge to eliminate models. For instance, on 
representing ‘Pat visited Milan or she visited Italy’, people will eliminate the 
possibility that Pat visited Milan and not Italy (Johnson-Laird, Khemlani & Goodwin, 
2015). Actual concrete reasoning can be far richer than the prescriptions of formal 
logic (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).  
Dual-process Theories. It has been a dominant trend in the psychology of 
judgment, decision making and reasoning to posit two types of processing, referred 
to as Type 1 (System 1) and Type 2 (System 2). This approach assumes the Standard 
Picture, and argues for considerable mismatch between norms and actual behaviour. 
The distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 plays a major role in accounting for this 
mismatch. The distinction can be fleshed out in numerous ways (for discussion, see 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013, and especially Stanovich, 2012). There are, however, 
some emerging commonalities (Stanovich, 2012). Type 1 thinking corresponds to 
The Autonomous Set of Systems (Stanovich, 2005): systems which operate 
autonomously, have their own triggering stimuli, and are not under higher level 
                                                                                                                                     
 
3 Compare, for instance, the treatment of logical connectives in  Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne (1991), Johnson-Laird & Byrne (2002) and Johnson-Laird, Khemlani, and Goodwin 
(2015)(see, also, Baratgin et al., 2015, and Evans & Over, 2004, for critical discussion). 
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cognitive control (Stanovich, 2012). Type 1 processing also tends to be fast and 
computationally cheap, and can operate in parallel (Stanovich, 2012). In contrast, 
Type 2 processing is not autonomous, and tends to be slow, computationally 
expensive and serial (Stanovich, 2012).  
For dual-process theories, individual differences are key to assessing 
rationality. Type 1 processing is largely uniform, excepting pathological variation, 
such as autism, agnosia and alexia (Stanovich, 2012). Type 1 processing provides a 
baseline of (ir-)rationality: behaviours that work well in some contexts but give rise 
to systematic biases in others (for discusion of these contexts, see Kahneman & 
Klein, 2009). In contrast, Type 2 processing is markedly varied. People can show 
profound differences in fluid intelligence, that is, in their ability to solve novel 
problems (Stanovich, 2012). They also show profound differences in reflective 
thinking: for instance, in their tendency to gather information and think extensively 
before reaching a conclusion; judge degrees of evidence and avoid absolute 
judgments; and predict consequences and consider their likely costs and benefits. 
These thinking dispositions – and fluid intelligence – are given much credit for 
determining an individual’s rationality, since both contribute independently to 
performance on standard decision and judgment problems (Stanovich, 2012). But 
crucial, too, is the balance between Type 1 and Type 2 processing4. On this, the 
literature differs, but leading accounts emphasize that Type 2 processing is slow, 
effortful, and lazy (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2012; 
Stanovich & West, 1999).  
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
4 Note, though, that some accounts, such as Thompson (2010), caution that 
normative responses can result from Type 1 or Type 2 processing.  
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Beyond the Standard Picture.  
By no means all psychological theories cleave to the Standard Picture of 
rationality. There are ample opportunities to diverge from classical logic, probability 
and decision theory.  
Stenning and van Lambalgen. A leading theory gives logic, or rather logics, a 
central role in the psychology of reasoning (Stenning & Lambalgen, 2012), but these 
are not the classical logics of the Standard Picture. Logical reasoning is taken to be 
‘simultaneously formal and relative to a domain’ (Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2012, 
p. 19). Logical reasoners must first reason to an interpretation of the task in hand, 
and then reason from that interpretation. Reasoning to an interpretation amounts to 
parameter setting, the parameters being a choice of formal language, its semantics, 
and its definition of validity (Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2012, p. 25). For example, 
the interpretation would be classical logic if the chosen formal logic is recursive and 
truth-functional, with a bivalent semantics, and with validity understood as true on 
all models (Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2012). But bivalence could be dropped, 
resulting in a trivalent or even fuzzy logic (Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2012). 
Reasoning from an interpretation amounts to deriving valid conclusions as defined 
by the selected logic.  
For Stenning and van Lambalgen (2012, p. 7), ‘reasoning is everywhere’ and 
interpretation is key. Consequently, many cases of apparent irrationality can, in 
principle, be explained away by invoking a different logic. The use of these logics 
can be empirically supported by evidence from, for example, Socratic questioning 
(for discussion, see Stenning and van Lambalgen, 2012). It is less clear that these 
different logics can be normatively supported. We might suggest, for instance, that 
reasoning can be modelled in many contexts as deductive reasoning with exceptions: 
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that is, reasoning of the form ‘If P and No Exceptions, then Q’. But if such a logic is 
to be normatively binding, it will need a comprehensive normative theory of what 
counts as an exception. We do not have a promising theory (Hahn & Hornikx, 2016). 
 Stenning and van Lambalgen (2012) are comparatively optimistic about 
human reasoning, but acknowledge the following failings. Firstly, we may fail to 
reason consistently from our own interpretation. Secondly, our primary skill may be 
in credulous reasoning – that is, in identifying a single interpretation that would 
make a speaker’s utterances true, as in discourse comprehension. Although we can 
be good at more sceptical reasoning – that is, in identifying conclusions which are 
true on all interpretations – we may require supportive contexts, which are absent in 
typical experiments on reasoning (for discussion, see Stenning & van Lambalgen, 
2012, p. 357). Thirdly, we may be unaware of the interpretive process – of our 
ability to manipulate interpretations – and may consider too few interpretations.  
Fast and Frugal Heuristics. This approach, pioneered by Gerd Gigerenzer 
and colleagues (see, e.g., Gigerenzer, 2000, 2010, 2015; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002; 
Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999), focuses on judgement and decision making and, 
like Stenning and van Lambelgen (2012), rejects a role for content-free norms. The 
research program aims to identify people’s ‘adaptive toolbox’, their stock of 
‘heuristics’ or simple solutions to a problem which require little information 
(Gigerenzer, 2010). While standard economic models assume that, for a given 
decision, people have a utility function which they attempt to optimize, heuristic 
models assume that people satisfice, that is, find a solution that is just good enough 
(see, e.g., Gigerenzer, 2010; Katsikopoulos, 2014). Heuristic models are assessed for 
their ecological rationality: the researcher asks when – in what environments – the 
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heuristics are successful. In other words, the implied standard is simply what works 
in context.  
The program is largely optimistic about rationality because of the apparent 
ecological rationality of heuristics, but it is a qualified optimism.  An especially 
successful heuristic is the 1/N heuristic: the common investing strategy to divide an 
investment equally into a certain number of assets. This heuristic was tested against 
14 optimization models in a simulation study (DeMiguel, Garlappi, & Uppal, 2009). 
No optimization model consistently outperformed the heuristic. To outperform it, the 
optimization models needed 3,000 months’ data for a portfolio with 25 assets, and 
6,000 months’ data for a portfolio with 50 assets (DeMiguel, Garlappi & Uppal, 
2009). Nevertheless, there are limits to rationality. At least under conditions of 
uncertainty, satisficing requires less information, does not need an optimal solution 
to exist, and is computationally cheaper (Gigerenzer, 2010). However, there may be 
circumstances (principally, decision making under risk5) where more classical 
strategies, such as optimization, are appropriate (Gigerenzer, 2010). Here, the 
program would have to accept that people may fail to optimize: that they fall short of 
normative behaviour.  Even in decision making under uncertainty, though, the 
program implicitly acknowledges a shortfall. The research program has an applied 
dimension - the design of novel heuristics for helping people to solve problems 
better (Gigerenzer, 2010) – which presupposes that people are not perfectly rational.  
 
                                                
 
5 In his lecture, ‘The Ecological Rationality of Heuristics’, at the International 
Rationality Summer Institute, Gigerenzer (personal communication, September 6, 2016) 
recently stressed that the conclusions of the ‘Fast and Frugal Heuristics’ program apply 
principally to decision making under uncertainty, and not to decision making under risk. 
Gigerenzer argued, however, that decision making under uncertainty is the larger, more 
significant domain.  
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No Norms.  
As we have seen, there are diverse positions, in psychology, on how to define 
rationality and how rational people are. This diversity has led some to question the 
usefulness of the rationality debate. Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue for a 
reorientation of cognitive science away from norms and towards pure description of 
people’s behaviour. Elqayam and Evans complain of an arbitration problem: for 
(almost) any single experimental test of rationality, there will be competing norms 
available; and the choice between these norms is both not obvious and not obviously 
part of psychology. Take, for instance, the Wason selection task, in which people are 
asked to test a rule such as ‘If there is an A on one side of a card, then there is a 2 on 
the other side’ (Wason, 1960). Should we apply the norms of propositional logic or 
of Bayesian information selection (see, e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1994)? This 
question does not seem intrinsically psychological. Elqayam and Evans argue, 
further, that a focus on norms has led to damaging biases in research on thinking, 
such as the historical focus on logic and deduction in the psychology of reasoning. 
Norms, they suggest, may only be of interest if we aim, not just to study, but to 
improve thinking.  
This position has, unsurprisingly, proved controversial, and has been met 
with persuasive responses. A straightforward response is that norms are debated in 
precisely those areas which we most likely want to improve: our judgments, decision 
making, reasoning and so on. It is no coincidence that research in these areas has 
heavily influenced ‘nudge’ programs internationally (for discussion, see Bonnefon, 
2013; Gigerenzer, 2015; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). More substantively, there is a 
robust argument that norms are, in fact, stimulating and productive. Douven (2011), 
for instance, gives the example of belief revision. If our goal is long-term accuracy, 
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then we should update our beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. Do we do so? And if not, 
why not? Here, considering norms suggests a distinctive research program. Similarly 
Hahn (2011, 2014) argues that norms can guide our interpretation of behaviour. A 
given behaviour is compatible with many possible models. We can narrow the search 
space for these models if we make the reasonable assumption that ‘the cognitive 
system is trying to do something sensible’ and consider optimal models and 
approximations to them (Hahn, 2014, p. 10). A useful analogy, here, is with ideal-
observer analysis in the study of perception, where an optimal model is specified, 
compared with human behaviour, and then refined iteratively by building in capacity 
limitations (Hahn, 2014).  
This thesis will take the position that considering norms and rationality can, 
indeed, be richly productive, especially when using the framework in the following 
section. The thesis will also adopt Crupi’s (personal communication, September 5, 
2016) response to the arbitration problem. We can grant that the study of rationality 
involves frequent cases of clashing norms. We can grant, too, that psychology is not 
the natural place for deciding between these norms, this being more naturally the 
business of philosophy (Crupi & Girotto, 2014). But a solution to the problem is 
implicit in the way this section has been framed: as the rationality debate within 
cognitive science. Cognitive science is inherently interdisciplinary, and includes both 
psychology and philosophy. Through interdisciplinary work and a division of labour, 
empirical research on rationality can proceed alongside conceptual work on the 
arbitration problem. The following section will outline Crupi’s model for how such 
research can proceed. Crupi’s model also prepares the ground for the introduction of 
pragmatics.  
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1.1.2 Detecting (Ir-)rationality in Experiments 
In his lecture series ‘Norms versus Reasoning’, Vincenzo Crupi sketched a 
framework for assessing rationality in experimental tasks (see, also, Crupi & Girotto, 
2014). The framework links norms and behaviour in a way that will prove invaluable 
for this thesis. Consider Figure 1.2 below.  
A 
A* C* 
C 
Theory 
Observation 
 
Figure 1.2. Crupi's model 
The framework distinguishes between an observational and a theoretical level. At the 
observational level is the actual experiment. Participants are presented with a set of 
premises - the experimental instructions and materials - which they interpret in some 
way. These interpreted premises correspond to A in the diagram above. From these 
premises, participants derive conclusions and make their response using the options 
supplied in the experiment (e.g. a rating on a Likert-style scale, the selection of a one 
option in a forced choice, and so on). This response corresponds to C in the diagram 
above. The descriptive task is to develop a model to account for the transition from 
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premises, A, to response, C.  The theoretical level is where rationality is determined. 
Here there are premises, A*, and conclusions, C*. The normative task is to assess 
whether C* can correctly be derived from A*. To assess this, we need a normative 
system, generally specified in a formal language such as classical logic or the 
probability calculus. Consequently A* and C* are specified in the chosen formal 
language. In many cases, there will, as Elqayam and Evans (2011) observe, be a 
choice of norms; there will, in other words, be an arbitration problem. This choice 
will generally require philosophical, rather than psychological, argumentation (Crupi 
& Girotto, 2014).  
In the Crupi framework, to adjudicate on rational behaviour in an experiment, 
we must consider the following questions (for discussion, see Crupi & Girotto, 2014). 
Has the appropriate normative framework been selected (the arbitration problem)? 
Assuming these norms, have they been correctly applied? Is there (mis-)match 
between participants’ and experimenters’ understanding of the premises (task 
instructions and materials)? Is there (mis-)match between participants’ and 
experimenters’ understanding of the conclusions (responses)? As Crupi and Girotto 
(2014) argue, these questions have generated productive debate in the psychological 
literature. We saw above that the arbitration problem has arguably stimulated 
considerable research and aided in the selection of correct models. Considering norm 
application has stimulated research on pseudo-diagnosticity (e.g. Crupi, Tentori, & 
Lombardi, 2009; Tweney, Doherty, & Kleiter, 2010). Considering premise (mis-
)match lies behind Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) analysis of the Wason selection 
task: they suggest that participants interpret the conditional rule as referring to the 
conditional probability, not as a material conditional (for discussion, see Crupi & 
Girotto, 2014). Lastly, considering conclusion (mis-)match lies behind the extensive 
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debate on the conjunction fallacy and how people interpret the apparently simple 
sentences ‘Linda is a bank-teller’ and ‘Linda is a bank-teller and a feminist’ (e.g. 
Hertwig, Benz, & Krauss, 2008; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999; Jarvstad & Hahn, 
2011; Tentori & Crupi, 2012; Tentori, Crupi, & Russo, 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983).   
The Crupi framework highlights the importance of interpretation. 
Researchers do not generally present participants with premises and conclusions, 
stated in some formalism, and assess which conclusions participants endorse. Instead, 
researchers typically present experiments in natural language, and even tasks that are 
primarily non-linguistic need instructions in natural language (for discussion, see 
Lee, 2006). Interpretation features in the diagram above in the linking of A and A*, 
and C and C*, with arrows. These arrows reflect an evidential requirement for 
studies on rationality: the interpretations of participant and experimenter should 
match. Importantly, interpretation is neutral with respect to the chosen norms. That is, 
whichever norms a researcher might select, s/he must consider whether his/her 
interpretation of the task, premises and conclusions matches that of participants.  
The Crupi framework raises the question of what interpretation means. In a 
broad sense, to interpret the language in an experiment, participants must apply 
much of their linguistic competence. At a minimum, they must map the written or 
spoken words onto morphology, word meanings, and syntax. Having such 
competence is a basic prerequisite for performing an experimental task, but this 
dependence is somewhat trivial. More interesting is the dependence on 
understanding the meaning of the utterances that comprise the experimental 
materials. At this point we introduce the second component in the triangular scheme: 
pragmatics.  
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1.2 Pragmatics and Rationality6  
1.2.1 Defining Pragmatics 
What do utterances mean? Meaning is typically separated into two 
components: semantics and pragmatics. The latter is especially important to 
rationality. Defining the two terms is not a simple matter (for discussion, see, Huang, 
2007; Levinson, 1983), but a single watertight definition is not crucial for this thesis. 
It will suffice to adopt a working definition, constructed from the following common 
distinctions.  
Sentence meaning vs. utterance meaning: semantics concerns the meanings 
of words and how these meanings compose to form the meanings of sentence, 
whereas pragmatics concerns the meaning of utterances.  
When a sentence is issued in an actual context, it becomes an utterance (Levinson, 
1983, p. 18). Trivially, the sentence ‘It will rain today’ acquires a different meaning 
when uttered on different days. But what aspects of the context are particularly 
important? Utterances are actions at a given time and place and they are, crucially, 
intentional actions by a speaker, which gives rise to the second distinction.  
Sentence meaning vs. speaker meaning: semantics is sentence meaning; 
pragmatics is speaker meaning.  
Although the sentence ‘This thesis is fascinating’ expresses a high degree of interest 
in a particular thesis, it can be intended ironically and, cued by appropriate 
intonation, the opposite meaning will be understood (example based on Levinson, 
1983, p. 17). Mention of irony brings us to a third distinction (for discussion, see, 
e.g., (Korta & Perry, 2015) .  
                                                
 
6 The text on the definition of pragmatics is adapted from Collins and Hahn (2016).  
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Literal vs. non-literal meaning: semantics is literal meaning; pragmatics is 
non-literal meaning.   
This distinction has intuitive appeal, although a formal definition of literalness is far 
from straightforward (Recanati, 2004). By ‘non-literal’ is meant not just figurative 
language, such as metaphor and irony, but any meaning which goes beyond the 
content of what is said. A final distinction draws on differences in the abilities 
underlying semantics and pragmatics (for discussion, see B. Clark, 2013; Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995).  
Decoding vs. inference: Semantics is decoding meaning; pragmatics is 
inferring it.  
This distinction takes the hearer’s perspective; for the speaker’s, replace ‘decoding’ 
with ‘encoding’ and ‘inferring’ with ‘implying’. These four distinctions are 
complementary, and can straightforwardly be combined into the following working 
definition:  
Semantics: decoding (encoding) the meaning of words, sentences, and 
utterances7.  
Pragmatics: inferring (implying) the implicit, speaker-intended meaning of 
an utterance. 
The definition of pragmatics excludes non-literalness because of the complexities of 
defining the term robustly (Recanati, 2004). In many cases, pragmatic meanings will 
be intuitively non-literal.   
This working definition makes pragmatics heavily reliant on theory of mind, 
a point which already indicates the close relationship between pragmatics and 
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information about message sources (speakers). It has been a widespread view since 
Grice (1957) that successful communication depends on intention recognition. The 
intention in question is the speaker’s intention towards an addressee: for instance, in 
the case of assertion, the speaker intends the addressee to believe the asserted 
proposition. This intention is overt: it is supposed to be recognized by the hearer. 
How to formalize such communicative intentions is widely debated (see, e.g., 
Breheny, 2006; Clark, 1996; Grice, 1957; Schiffer, 1972; Sperber & Wilson, 1995; 
Strawson, 1964). By consensus, though, overtness is paramount (Korta & Perry, 
2015), and communication is taken to depend on at least first-order, perhaps also 
second-order, theory of mind (Breheny, 2006; Sperber & Wilson, 1995).    
Although intention recognition helps to pin down communication, it does not 
explain how people actually go about deriving pragmatic meanings. Grice (1975) 
offered a plausible account, which gives insight into how experimental materials 
might be understood. The Gricean account comprises an overarching Cooperative 
Principle and attendant Maxims of Conversation. The following principle and 
maxims can be construed as descriptions of both how a hearer expects the speaker to 
behave and of a speaker’s conversational aims.  
Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contribution such as is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction 
of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (Grice, 1975, p. 45)  
Maxims:  
Quantity:  
                                                                                                                                     
 
7 Including ‘utterances’ here may seem surprising, but semantics must presumably 
be involved in utterance interpretation: pragmatics needs linguistic content to operate on.  
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1. Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange)  
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than required.  
 
Quality: Super-maxim, “Try to make your contribution one that is true”  
1. Do not say what you believe to be false  
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence 
 
Relation: Be relevant  
Manner: Super-maxim, “Be perspicuous”  
1. Avoid obscurity of expression 
2. Avoid ambiguity  
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)  
4. Be orderly  
(Grice, 1975, pp. 45-46)  
A speaker can choose to observe or ostentatiously flout the maxims to generate an 
implicit proposition, or implicature. For example: 
Maxim Observed  
A: I’ve just run out of petrol. 
B: Oh, there’s a garage just around the corner.  
Implicature: A may obtain petrol there.  
Maxim Flouted  
A: Let’s get the kids something to eat.  
B: Okay, but I veto I-C-E-C-R-E-A-M. 
Implicature: B would rather not mention ice cream directly in case the 
children then demand some. 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 104).  
Although Grice’s (1975) framework is suggestive and influential, it is 
imperfect. The imperfections suggest a more minimal, psychologically plausible 
account. Grice himself does not appear to have viewed his account as definitive (B. 
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Clark, 2013) or psychological (Noveck & Reboul, 2008). His framework can 
account well for qualitative data (for discussion, see Huang, 2007; B. Clark, 2013); 
but it does so at the expense of some vagueness (B. Clark, 2013). For instance, Grice 
does not define relevance here. Even so, pragmatic analyses tend to cite the Maxim 
of Relation or the Maxim of Quantity to the exclusion of the other maxims, giving 
rise to accusations of redundancy (B. Clark, 2013). Consequently, prominent 
successors to Grice have reduced his framework by fleshing out the notion of 
relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) or quantity (Horn, 1984, 1989, 2004). While the 
original Gricean framework has inspired psychological research (e.g. Surian, Baron-
Cohen, & Van der Lely, 1996), more minimal, more psychologically specific 
successors have proved more stimulating (e.g. Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 2013; 
Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; Geurts, Katsos, Cummins, Moons, & 
Noordman, 2010; Noveck & Reboul, 2008; Noveck & Sperber, 2004). There are 
numerous other theories in pragmatics (e.g. Levinson, 2000) and semantics (e.g. 
Jaszczolt, 2007; Kempson, Meyer-Viol, & Gabbay, 2000), but these also tend to be 
more minimal than Grice’s framework. For present purposes, we do not need to 
decide on a pragmatic theory; it suffices simply to note the kind of mentalistic 
assumptions that underpin pragmatics.   
While pragmatic theories have become more streamlined, the purview of 
pragmatics has increased considerably. Pragmatics intrudes still further into the 
interpretation of any utterance, including experimental materials. For Grice, 
semantics contributed what is said8  - the conventional content of an utterance – and 
pragmatics largely contributed what is implicated (B. Clark, 2013). In other words, 
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although pragmatics could leak into conventional content, through reference 
assignment for indexical expressions, such as pronouns, and the resolution of 
ambiguity, pragmatics’ primary business was calculating implicatures9 (see, e.g., B. 
Clark, 2013; Grice, 1975). Subsequently, researchers have argued that pragmatics 
contributes far more profoundly to what is said. For instance, a commonplace word 
such as ‘fresh’ can have a great many meanings, as witnessed by collocations such as 
‘fresh shirt’, ‘fresh vegetables’, ‘fresh bread’, ‘fresh air’, and ‘fresh idea’ (Wilson & 
Carston, 2007). One response is that words are radically ambiguous and require 
heavy pragmatic work to disambiguate them; another, perhaps more plausible 
response is that word meanings are adjusted ad hoc (Wilson & Carston, 2007). This 
issue will receive a more detailed treatment in Chapter 2, where potential effects on 
reasoning are discussed.  
As we have seen, pragmatics connects with sources (speakers) through theory 
of mind, at least in the relative shallow sense of interpreting utterances using 
somewhat generalized assumptions about speakers’ behaviour (e.g. conversational 
maxims). Deeper social knowledge is also implicated, drawing pragmatics and 
sources still closer together. This social knowledge can take the form of facts about 
social institutions such as promises, marriages, courtroom behaviour, and so on (see, 
e.g., Austin, 1965; for discussion, see Korta & Perry, 2015). More importantly, for 
present purposes, recent theories suggest that, when hearers interpret an utterance, 
they also refer to deeper, more stable attributes of the speaker. Hilton (1995) 
suggests that Gricean maxims are linked to character traits, providing information in 
                                                                                                                                     
 
8 For theoretical discussion of ‘what is said’, see Carston (2008) or Recanati (2002, 
2004).  
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both directions. For example, respecting the maxims makes a speaker appear 
cooperative; and knowledge about the speaker’s character can help the hearer decide 
whether a speaker is respecting a maxim. Hilton gives the example of an 
underwhelming reference for a job. Should we infer that the reference is meant as a 
non-recommendation? This inference will likely be strengthened if we know that the 
referee is usually helpful and generous with praise. But the referee’s pragmatic 
behaviour may, in turn, affect our assessment of their cooperativeness, likeability, 
and so on.  
More recently still, two theories have proposed a strong link between 
pragmatics and source reliability. This link will be especially prominent in 
subsequent chapters. Sperber et al. (2010) argue that pragmatics is supported by a 
tendency towards epistemic vigilance. Hearers take an initially trusting stance, being 
prepared to update their beliefs in response to speakers’ statements; but they monitor 
speakers’ trustworthiness, and the content of messages, to guard against deception 
and misinformation. In formal linguistics, McCready (2014) makes a similar case, 
arguing that pragmatics depends on cooperation, which in turn depends on trust. On 
his view, speakers are careful to manage their reputations, to maintain sufficient 
levels of cooperation. If speakers’ reputations and trust drop low enough, then 
cooperation – hence, pragmatics – ceases.  
 These considerations suggest an important link between pragmatics and the 
stable attributes of a speaker: in the terminology of this thesis, between pragmatics 
and sources. This link is underexplored, with one notable exception. Empirical work 
                                                                                                                                     
 
9 We can understand ‘implicatures’, here, to include both metaphors and irony, 
though see, for example, Wilson and Carston (2007) for an alternative pragmatic account of 
metaphors.  
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has tended to focus on shallow theory of mind, in which intended meanings are 
inferred using rather generalized assumptions about speakers’ behaviour. A different 
approach is taken by Harris, Corner, and Hahn (2013). They explored the 
phenomenon of ‘damning with faint praise’, taking the example, familiar from above, 
of an underwhelming reference. If a reference describes an applicant for a 
mathematics course only as ‘polite and punctual’, then it would certainly be 
underwhelming: so underwhelming, in fact, that it could be taken as a warning not to 
admit the applicant. Harris, Corner, and Hahn formalized this example as an 
argument from ignorance: since there is no evidence to show that the referee thinks 
that the applicant is a good mathematician, we conclude that he is not. Harris, Corner, 
and Hahn predicted that the strength the strength of this inference depends on the 
expertise of the source (referee). They found supporting experimental evidence. 
Participants read a recommendation letter for a maths course, and rated how strongly 
they believed that the candidate should be admitted. Ratings decreased for the 
underwhelming ‘polite and punctual’ reference but only when the source was the 
applicant’s maths tutor, not when it was merely the applicant’s personal tutor. Here, 
source expertise determined whether participants inferred that the reference was a 
non-recommendation and decreased their ratings.10  
A picture emerges, then, of a pragmatics that is social, mentalistic and 
inferential, and that is fundamental to interpreting utterances, be they utterances in 
natural conversations or in psychological experiments. Pragmatics, on this account, 
is a key component in Crupi’s framework for assessing rationality in psychological 
                                                
 
10 Note that Harris, Corner, and Hahn also explicitly represent a pragmatic inference 
as an argument, an approach which assumes a close link between pragmatics and 
argumentation.  
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studies. Pragmatics imposes ‘evidential requirements’ on such studies (Lee, 2006, p. 
194): it is crucial to ‘[get] the communication right’ before proclaiming irrationality 
(Schwarz, 1996, p. 5). This is not to say that pragmatics will allow us to explain 
away all apparent irrationality, but rather that ‘we need to ensure that our 
experiments do not produce the phenomena for reasons that are unlikely to hold in 
daily life’ (Schwarz, 1996). In other words, pragmatics allows us to test the 
robustness of the evidence for irrational behaviour. 
1.2.2 Pragmatics and Theories of Rationality  
Now that we have a clearer picture of pragmatics, we can consider how it 
features in the theories of rationality discussed above. This process is not 
straightforward, because the theories adopt different and, in some cases, remarkably 
vague definitions of pragmatics.  
Perhaps the closest to the present definition is Oaksford and Chater’s 
approach (2007, 2009), which invokes pragmatics to explain a mismatch between 
their model and data on conditional inference. Although Oaksford and Chater seem 
to take a broadly Gricean view of pragmatics, their Bayesian Rationality also meshes 
well with new Bayesian approaches which promise rich treatments of pragmatic 
phenomena (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Franke & Jäger, 2016; Goodman & Lassiter, 
in press; Goodman & Stuhlmüller, 2013). The link between Bayesian rational and 
psycholinguistic models needs further exploration.  
Other theories invoke pragmatics to explain more fundamental mismatches 
between basic theoretical predictions and the data. For instance, both Mental Logic 
and Mental Models assume some kind of Gricean (or post-Gricean) pragmatics. Both 
also accommodate knowledge about social situations (Braine & O’Brien, 1991; 
Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), perhaps embodied in pragmatic-reasoning schemas 
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(Braine & O’Brien, 1991). But since their pragmatics includes broader general 
knowledge, it is a pragmatics so broad that it is hard to imagine a general, predictive 
account. For instance, when Mental Models Theory is implemented computationally, 
pragmatics, in the form of general knowledge, is simply written into the 
computational model for a specific context (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002).  For 
example, a computational model will specify that wet matches will not light, to 
cancel an inference from ‘A match is struck’ to ‘The match will light’. Although this 
strategy is successful in individual cases, it is ad hoc and unlikely to generalize.  
Still other theories invoke pragmatics to explain why apparent irrationality 
occurs. In dual-process theories, pragmatics is typically labelled a Type 1 process 
(Stanovich & West, 2000), a decision which is surprising given the ample evidence 
that pragmatic inferences are effortful and can be disabled by cognitive load 
(Noveck & Reboul, 2008) and resemble rational arguments (Macagno & Walton, 
2013). Nevertheless, in dual-process theory, pragmatics is a cause of biased 
reasoning. Lastly, the Fast and Frugal Heuristics program uses pragmatics to explain 
away irrationality: pragmatics is part of social, hence ecological, rationality, and is 
one way to reduce uncertainty (Gigerenzer, 2010, 2015)11.  
This thesis takes a different strategy from the theories above. It does not 
invoke pragmatics to explain away problematic data for a given theory or position on 
rationality; rather, it argues that pragmatics and rationality are fundamentally – 
                                                
 
11 Missing from this discussion is the approach of Stenning and van Lambalgen 
(2012). It is unclear how pragmatics fits with their account. Stenning and van Lambalgen 
posit specialist logics for mentalistic inference. Pragmatics could correspond to one such 
logic. But pragmatics is also relevant for what they call credulous reasoning - finding a 
single interpretation that makes the speaker’s utterances true – which sounds decidedly 
pragmatic. Lastly, a crucial notion is reasoning to an interpretation: selecting the appropriate 
logic for the task in hand. This reasoning, too, could be considered pragmatic. 
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indeed, inextricably – linked. The thesis follows Crupi (personal communication, 
September 5, 2016) in arguing that considering pragmatics is a precondition for 
establishing irrationality in an experiment, and it follows Schwarz (1996) and Lee 
(2006) in arguing that pragmatics tests the robustness of apparent irrationality. But it 
will argue, in later chapters, that there is a deeper connection between pragmatics 
and rationality that justifies treating the two together.   
The next section will discuss empirical studies that use pragmatics to test the 
robustness of apparent irrationality. The aim is to present, not an exhaustive survey, 
but a sample of diverse studies which show how pragmatics has tended to feature in 
the literature on (ir-)rationality.  
1.2.3 Pragmatics and Experiments on Rationality  
The psychologists Denis Hilton (1995) and Norbert Schwarz (1996) have 
done much to emphasize the importance of considering pragmatics when assessing 
rationality. Experiments, they observed, are communicative situations of a peculiar 
kind. Experimental tasks differ substantially from communication in daily life. For 
reasons of experimental control, instructions, questions and response options have 
standardized wordings; and, if asked, experimenters will generally not help to clarify 
their meanings, for fear of introducing confounds (Schwarz, 1996). In such contexts, 
participants may rely even more on general pragmatic expectations than they would 
in daily life (Schwarz, 1996). Given that experimenters will often covertly behave in 
non-cooperative ways – for instance, by providing deliberately misleading or 
irrelevant information (Hilton, 1995; Schwarz, 1996) – pragmatics has the potential 
to explain much of the variance in experimental tasks. Only once this variance is 
accounted for can we pronounce on rationality. This section will review major 
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findings from attempts to address this issue, and will relate them to Crupi’s 
framework: more specifically, to premise (mis-)match and conclusion (mis-)match.12  
Premise Mismatch.  
Presupposition. A speaker often takes for granted, or presupposes, certain 
information when making an utterance. Imagine, for instance, a speaker making the 
request, ‘Please put the bins out when you leave for work this morning.’ The speaker, 
here, presupposes that the hearer is going to work on the morning in question. 
Presupposition features in a cluster of related effects which, at first blush, suggest 
that people naively accept presupposed information. 
P1.‘Did you see the children getting on the school bus?  
Asked this question after seeing a video, participants are more likely than 
controls to falsely remember seeing a school bus even though there was none 
(see, e.g., Loftus, 1975).  
P2. ‘What do you do to liven things up at a party?’ 
Participants form the impression that the speaker is an extravert, on scant 
information (see, e.g. Swann, Giuliano, & Wegener, 1982). 
P3. ‘The CIA is not currently involved in illegal drug trafficking.’  
After reading this denial in a fictional newspaper report, participants who 
had indicated prior disbelief in this claim nevertheless increased their belief 
that the CIA is, in fact, involved in illegal drug trafficking (Gruenfeld & 
Weyer, 1992).  
                                                
 
12 At no point will I assume that the reviewed studies provide the definitive analyses 
of the tasks in question. These studies simply show that pragmatic factors must be 
considered.  
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Participants seem to be accepting presupposed information without recognizing a 
possible difference between the speaker’s belief and reality. The false-memory effect, 
as in P1, has been taken as a sign of irrationality (for discussion, see Hilton, 1995, 
and Schwarz, 1996). But a pragmatic analysis, supported by the effects in P2 and P3, 
suggests a counterargument. This counterargument relies on recognizing the 
presupposed information. In P1 and P2, the speaker’s presuppositions are relatively 
clear: that there was a school bus, and that parties should be lively. In P3 the 
presupposition is subtler: that there were enough grounds for suspicion to issue a 
denial.  
We turn to the pragmatic analysis. False-memory effects, as in P1, seem to 
require the leading question to come from a trustworthy (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980) 
or knowledgeable source (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987)(for discussion, see Hilton, 
1995; Schwarz, 1996). Thus, people may be rationally changing their beliefs because 
of the testimony of reliable sources. Admittedly, the false-memory effect remains 
surprising, at least to the extent that people are unaware of, or do not report, this 
inference, and to the extent that they experience memories of events whose 
occurrence they take on trust. However, the effects in P2 and P3 offer supportive 
evidence that people handle presupposed information critically. Impression 
formation, as in P2, relies on a cooperative speaker, and does not survive when the 
information is described as randomly drawn (Swann, Giuliano, & Wegner, 1982; for 
discussion, see Schwarz, 1996). Furthermore, ‘saying things that go without 
saying’13, as in P3, seems to rely on a pragmatic context. For instance, to borrow 
Gruenfeld & Wyer's (1992) example, imagine that we are told that ‘Peter’s IQ is at 
                                                
 
13 This is Schwarz’s (1996) term for the effect.  
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least 100’. If a hearer lacks any knowledge of Peter’s IQ, then this utterance could be 
taken at face value: Peter is of at least average, and perhaps above average, 
intelligence. However, if the hearer had previously believed Peter to be his high-
school valedictorian, then, to avoid apparent irrelevance, this utterance could be 
taken to mean that Peter is only of average, not above average, intelligence. Thus, in 
the CIA case above (and equivalent materials), when the source was a reference 
source (e.g. an encyclopaedia), the information could be taken at face value, and 
belief in the denied proposition did not significantly increase. But when the source 
was a newspaper, taken to be conveying novel, newsworthy information, then belief 
in the denied proposition increased significantly (Gruenfeld and Wyer, 1992).  
This nuanced view of presupposition contrasts with the findings of Gilbert 
and colleagues (D. T. Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990; D. T. Gilbert, Tafarodi, & 
Malone, 1993) which suggest that, at base, people naively believe what they are told. 
But, again, a pragmatic defence is possible. In probably the most widely discussed 
experiment, participants read definitions of words purportedly from the Hopi 
language (though actually non-words), such as ‘A monishna is a star’. The 
definitions were followed by the tag ‘true’ or ‘false’. Afterwards, participants had to 
perform a memory test. On some trials, processing was disrupted, for instance, with 
a tone. Disruption significantly increased the number of false trials remember as true, 
suggesting that, by default, people represent new information as true, and that 
scepticism takes extra work and is fragile. However, Hasson, Simmons, and Todorov 
(2005) argued that the experiment confounded truth value and informativeness14. 
                                                
 
14  A relevance theorist (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1995) would likely want to re-
express this analysis in terms of relevance: more specifically, here, in terms of cognitive 
effects. This would be a straightforward step, but is not necessary for present purposes.  
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Negative utterances such as ‘A monishna is not a star’ are, in this context, radically 
uninformative, as ‘a monishna’ could refer to anything else. Hasson, Simmons and 
Todorov found that, when sentences were informative when false (e.g. ‘This person 
owns a television’), or when true or false (‘This person is a liberal’), the effect 
disappeared. This finding suggests that people can adopt a somewhat critical stance 
to new information (see, also, Richter, Schroeder, & Wöhrmann, 2009).  
Relevance. As we saw above, the notion of relevance is central to several 
major theories of pragmatics15. Relevance has featured, too, in the pragmatic 
analyses of apparent irrationality. A good example is the literature on base-rate 
neglect. Kahneman and Tversky (1973) identified this effect in a simple prediction 
task. Participants read a scenario concerning a group of engineers and lawyers: for 
instance, in one version, 30 engineers and 70 lawyers. They were asked to predict 
whether a target person was an engineer or a lawyer. Target people were introduced 
with descriptions such as the following: 
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four children. He is 
generally conservative, careful, and ambitious. He shows no interest in 
political and social issues and spends most of his free time on his many 
hobbies, which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical puzzles.  
     (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 241) 
This description is meant to be representative of an engineer. Participants tend to 
rely on such descriptions when making their judgments and to neglect the provided 
                                                
 
15 As we have also seen, an alternative is to focus on the maxim of quantity. It may 
be possible to translate between the notions of quantity and relevance to some extent (for 
discussion, see Huang, 2007). This theoretical project will not be undertaken here.  
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base rates. Thus, in this case they would tend to ignore the stronger prior probability 
of Jack being a lawyer (.7) and predict that he is an engineer.  
This apparent base-rate neglect is striking, but the task is pragmatically 
complex. The task presents irrelevant information - the psychological descriptions – 
and emphasizes its quality by identifying its source as expert psychologists (Schwarz, 
1996). When the information is attributed to a computer’s random selection, 
participants can produce predictions much closer to the base rate (Schwarz, Strack, 
Hilton, & Naderer, 1991). The classic task also varies the descriptions within-
subjects but not the base rates, making the descriptions seem highly relevant 
(Schwarz, 1996). Varying the base rates across trials encourages participants to make 
greater use of them (Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & Naderer, 1991). Importantly, 
although such manipulations reduce base-rate neglect, participants still tend to 
underuse base rates (Schwarz, Strack, Hilton, & Naderer, 1991). The important point, 
here, is that pragmatic features of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1973) original task led 
to overestimating the size and robustness of the effect.  
A similar case can be made for the effect known as the fundamental 
attribution error. This effect arises when participants are asked to explain a person’s 
behaviour: they tend to over-weight the person’s characteristics (e.g. their intentions) 
and underweight the situation (for discussion, see Schwarz, 1996). In a typical task, 
participants read about students who have been told to write essays arguing for a 
position that has been chosen for them (Schwarz, 1996). Even though participants 
are aware of this strong situational factor, they nevertheless tend to attribute the 
position to the students. However, the experimental design echoes that of the base-
rate neglect study in that it deliberately presents irrelevant information. The typical 
instructions and materials may not be clear enough to convince participants to reject 
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potentially relevant information: in this case, the essay content (Schwarz, 1996). In a 
clearer version of the task, Wright and Wells (1988) instructed participants that the 
information about students was randomly selected and potentially incomplete. In this 
case, the size of the effect was approximately halved, though the effect was not 
eliminated.  
In the studies cited above, relevance is understood in an intuitive, informal 
way. Relevance is put to work in a more theoretical way in an analysis of the Wason 
selection task (for the original task, see, Wason, 1966). Sperber, Cara, and Girotto 
(1995) used Relevance Theory (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1995) to explain 
participants’ performance on this staple of the psychology of reasoning. The 
standard abstract version of the task requires participants to test a rule by turning 
over some cards. Consider, for example, the following sample item as presented by 
Van der Henst and Sperber (2004): 
 Rule: If there is a 6 on one of the cards, there is an E on the other.  
 Card 1: 6 Card 2: 7 Card 3: E Card 4: G  
Formal logic prescribes that, to falsify a rule of the form ‘If P, then Q’, we must find 
an instance of ‘P and not Q’ and that, therefore, we must select the cards ‘6’ and ‘G’ 
above. In general, only around 10% of participants select these cards (Sperber, Cara, 
& Girotto, 1995; Van der Henst & Sperber, 2004). Although other, non-logical 
analyses are possible (see, e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 1994), Sperber, Cara, and 
Girotto (1995) stick to formal logic. They argue that Relevance Theory can explain 
the standard response, and can successfully predict when people will give the 
supposedly normative response.  
On this Relevance account, participants interpret the task as an act of 
communication, and deploy a relevance-based inferential mechanism in the 
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following way. Relevance, here, is understood as a trade-off between cognitive 
effects (e.g. true conclusions, or strengthened/weakened assumptions) and 
processing effort (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 1995). The 
more cognitive effects, the more relevant the stimulus; the higher the processing 
effort, the less relevant the stimulus. Cognitive effects are derived following a path 
of least effort. Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995) argue that, from a general 
conditional rule, two inferences are particularly accessible. Firstly, modus ponens: 
participants infer that the ‘6’ card must have an E on the other side, and therefore 
select it. Secondly, the rule has instances: participants infer that there are cards that 
match the rule, and therefore select the ‘6’ card and the ‘E’ card. These are the two 
most common responses to the standard abstract task (Sperber, Cara, & Girotto, 
1995). It requires, in contrast, high processing effort to infer from the given rule ‘Not 
(6 and not E)’.    
The above analysis makes the following prediction: manipulating cognitive 
effects and processing effort should lead to more logical responses. More 
specifically, cognitive effects can be boosted by, for instance, making ‘P and not Q’ 
cases more salient; and processing effort can be minimized by, for instance, using 
lexicalized ‘P and not Q’ cases (as, for example, bachelors are male and not married). 
Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995) manipulated these parameters in a set of 
experiments and found support for their predictions. For instance, in one task, they 
used the rule ‘If a woman has a child, then she has had sex’. On their view, a ‘not Q’ 
case here would have considerable cognitive effects but would highly implausible. 
The authors created a scenario which made ‘not Q’ plausible: the leader of a cult was 
rumoured to be forcing female members to undergo artificial insemination to create a 
generation of ‘Virgin-Mothers’. Here, ‘not Q’ is plausible but not certain. Moreover, 
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participants were told to imagine that they were journalists writing about the cult. In 
this case, 78% of participants selected the ‘P and not Q’ cards (Virgin-Mothers). 
This method has been extended to the deontic version of the selection task with 
equivalent results (Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber, & van der Henst, 2001). 
Once again, pragmatics can explain important patterns of participant 
behaviour. Here, however, pragmatics plays a different role from that in the other 
reviewed studies. While the other studies argued for new estimates of the size and 
prevalence of existing effects, Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995) argued that the 
Wason Selection Task is not fit for purpose. For, on their view, participants do not 
engage in reflective reasoning at all, but rather in spontaneous communicative 
inferences. In other words, Sperber, Cara and Girotto take the literature on the 
Wason Selection Task to be irrelevant to the rationality debate. This point of view is 
by no means universally accepted (see, e.g., Manktelow, 2012; Stenning & van 
Lambalgen, 2008, for discussion).  
Framing and Implicature. One of the key phenomena in judgment and 
decision making is the framing effect (for a review, see Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 
1998). A framing effect occurs when different representations of a problem prompt 
different responses. Simple examples arise often in consumer-judgment research. For 
instance, people tend to judge the same product differently when it is described as 
75% lean or 25% fat (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). This phenomenon is widely 
taken to be problematic, on the grounds that the information is objectively or 
‘informationally’ equivalent (for discussion, see Corner & Hahn, 2010; Levin et al., 
1998). Pragmatics, however, offers a different perspective (Corner & Hahn, 2010; 
McKenzie & Nelson, 2003; Sher & McKenzie, 2006).  
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We will start with the simplest type of framing, attribute framing, where 
framing is applied to a single underlying attribute or variable (Levin, Schneider, & 
Gaeth, 1998). The following are examples of attribute frames: describing a product 
as N% fat-free/100-N% fat; describing an operation as having an N% survival/100-
N% mortality rate; describing a business team as having an N% success/100-N% 
failure rate. The standard finding is that people give higher favourability ratings to 
an item when it is described using a positive frame (e.g. N % fat-free) than when it is 
described using a negative frame (e.g. 100-N% ‘fat’)(Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 
1998). McKenzie and colleagues (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003; Sher & McKenzie, 
2006) disputed the conventional assumption that positive and negative frames 
convey equivalent information, and argued that information leaks through the 
supposedly equivalent descriptions16. On their view, we understand such situations 
relative to an implicit reference point: for instance, the expected, or normal, level of 
fat/fat-freeness. All else equal, speakers are more likely to select ‘fat’ (respectively, 
‘fat-free’) if there is an increase relative to the reference point, that is, there is more 
fat (respectively, ‘fat-freeness’) than usual. Listeners are sensitive to these 
regularities, and draw appropriate inferences (or implicatures).  
McKenzie and colleagues (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003; Sher & McKenzie, 
2006) explored this account in a series of experiments. In one task, for instance, they 
asked participants to imagine that they had a 4-ounce measuring cup in front of them. 
One group of participants was told to imagine that the cup was filled with water to 
the 4-ounce line; that they left the room; and that on their return they found that the 
                                                
 
16 Sher and McKenzie (2014) generalized this into an ‘options as information’ 
account, in which choice sets are taken to leak information, accounting for preference 
reversals.  
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water was at the 2-ounce line. Another group of participants was told to imagine the 
scenario but with the cup initially empty and then, after their return to the room, with 
water at the 2-ounce line. In each case, participants chose whether to describe the 
cup as half-full or half-empty. Participants were significantly more likely to describe 
the cup as half-full when it was previously empty, and as half-empty when it was 
previously full. These data support the reference-point hypothesis. In a separate task, 
participants were presented with a different scenario in which a participant described 
a cup as ‘half-full’ or ‘half-empty’, and were asked to decide whether the cup was 
previously full or previously empty. Participants were significantly more likely to 
choose ‘previously full’ when the cup was described as ‘half-empty’, and 
‘previously empty’ when the cup was described as ‘half-full’. These data also 
support the reference-point hypothesis (see, also, Ingram, Hand, & Moxey, 2014, 
and Keren, 2007; for a related semantic analysis, see Geurts, 2013). 
A pragmatic analysis has also been offered for another type of framing, risky-
choice framing: in particular, the so-called Asian Disease Paradigm. In this paradigm, 
participants see the following types of material: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to 
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific 
estimate[s] of the consequences of the programs are as follows: 
[Usually seen by one group] 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, 
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
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[Usually seen by another group] 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die.  
     (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453) 
Note that Programs A and C are low risk (risk-averse) options; Programs B and D 
are high risk (risk-seeking) options. Participants who see the pair of Programs A and 
B tend to prefer low risk Program A (72% in Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Those 
who see the pair of Programs C and D tend to prefer high risk Program D (78% in 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The materials manipulate framing through the 
descriptions ‘will be saved’ and ‘will die’. On the standard account (e.g. Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), the phrase ‘will be saved’ fixes the reference point at 0 lives 
saved (600 lives lost). Participants treat any survivors, then, as gains relative to the 
reference point, and are risk-averse. In contrast, the phrase ‘will die’ fixes the 
reference point at 0 lives lost (600 lives saved). Participants treat any victims, then, 
as losses relative to the reference point, and are risk-seeking. Generally, risky-choice 
framing replicates well with these, and equivalent, materials (for a review, see Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998; for more recent replications of the basic effect, see Costa, 
Foucart, Arnon, Aparici, & Apesteguia, 2014, and Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012) 
This species of framing has, however, provoked controversy: the options, and 
framing conditions, differ in information content (Kühberger, 1995; Kühberger & 
Tanner, 2010; Mandel, 2001, 2014). Programs A and C specify only what happens to 
200 or 400 people respectively; Programs B and D fully specify the outcomes. This 
pattern of information may be a prerequisite for the classic framing effect. The 
framing effect can be blocked by fully specifying all programs (e.g. Kühberger, 
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1995; Mandel, 2001). It can be reversed by specifying only the complements: for 
example, in Program A, ‘400 people will not be saved’ (Kühberger, 1995; see, also, 
Kühberger & Tanner, 2010). People do not seem to use arithmetic to infer what 
happens to the unmentioned people.  Such arithmetic would presuppose that 
participants interpret the number terms to mean ‘exactly N people’. In fact, 
qualifying number terms with ‘exactly’ can render framing non-significant; 
conversely, qualifying them with ‘at least’ can increase framing (Mandel, 2014). 
Participants also report interpreting the unmodified number terms as ‘at least’ 
(Mandel, 2014). For such participants, Program A has a potentially better outcome 
than B; Program D, a potentially better outcome than C.  
Although such findings are highly compelling, there is reason, still, to believe 
in risky-choice framing. For one thing, the Asian Disease Paradigm only corresponds 
to a subset of risky-choice data (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). For another, the 
Asian Disease Paradigm may be over-determined. In a recent study, Chick, Reyna, 
and Corbin (2016) tested the robustness of framing in the Asian Disease Paradigm 
while controlling for the ‘at least’ reading of the number term. They provided 
extensive instructions, detailed examples, and quizzes, and ran various analyses, 
including focusing on participants who reported an ‘exactly’ reading of the number 
terms. This method yielded robust framing effects. As the authors observe, ‘at least’ 
readings may be a sufficient condition for a framing effect but do not appear to be a 
necessary one. More data are needed to explore how robust such framing is to 
pragmatic manipulations (for an alternative approach, see Wallin, Paradis, & 
Katsikopoulos, 2016).  
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Another type of framing, goal framing, will arise in a later chapter. For now, 
we will turn to a phenomenon that bridges premise (mis-)match and conclusion (mis-
)match.  
The Conjunction Fallacy: Bridging Premise (Mis)match and Conclusion 
(Mis)match.  
The conjunction fallacy is one of the most widely debated effects in the 
judgment literature. Probably the simplest version of the effect is the following, from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983, p. 299) 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations.  
Linda is a bank teller. (T)  
Linda is a bank teller and a feminist. (T&F) 
Participants were asked to indicate which of (T) and (T&F) was the most 
probable. 85% chose (T & F), violating the conjunction rule of probability: here, 
P(T&F) ≤ P(T) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Tversky and Kahneman (1983) 
demonstrated the effect with different response formats and materials, and a large 
literature has manipulated various parameters (for a review, see Moro, 2009). 
The conjunction fallacy has prompted numerous pragmatic analyses. We 
begin with premise (mis-)match. Firstly, participants may understand the term 
‘probability’ differently from the mathematical sense intended by the experimenters. 
They may understand it as, for instance, plausibility, believability or imaginability 
(Fiedler, 1988; Gigerenzer, 1996; Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999). There is some merit 
to this suggestion: betting versions, which avoid talking of probability, tend to 
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produce lower fallacy rates, but nevertheless over 50% (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1993; 
Bonini, Tentori, & Osherson, 2004; Messer & Griggs, 1993; Sides, Osherson, Bonini, 
& Viale, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Wolford, Taylor, & Beck, 1990). 
Likewise, a frequency format reduces, but does not eliminate, the fallacy (Fielder, 
1988). Secondly, participants may take their task to be identifying the most 
informative response (Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 1999). But there does not appear to be 
empirical evidence to support this interpretation (Moro, 2009). 
We turn to conclusion (mis-)match: to different interpretations of the 
response set. Firstly, people may not interpret the linguistic conjunction as a 
logical/probabilistic conjunction, since the linguistic conjunction is ambiguous. The 
most relevant alternative readings are disjunction and causation (for discussion, see 
Moro, 2009). However, the conjunction fallacy occurs even when ‘and’ is not used 
in the materials (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1993). And it occurs, albeit at a reduced rate, 
when controlling for disjunctive readings (Bonini, Tentori, & Osherson, 2004; Sides, 
Osherson, Bonini, & Viale, 2002). Moreover, causal readings seem to be interpreted 
not as conditionals (contra Hertwig, Benz, and Krauss, 2008), but as conjunctions, to 
which the conjunction rule still applies; and these causal conjunctions, then, seem to 
produce a robust conjunction fallacy (Tentori and Crupi, 2012). Nevertheless, some 
manipulations do seem to substantially reduce the fallacy: Politzer and Noveck 
(1991) found that implicit conjunctions, such as ‘Lendl will win the finals’ (as 
opposed to ‘Lendl will play the finals and win’) significantly decreased the 
occurrence of the fallacy (though see Moro, 2009, for a critical discussion).  
Secondly, people may interpret the individual conjuncts differently: for 
instance, they might interpret ‘Linda is a bank teller’ to implicitly mean ‘and not a 
feminist’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Researchers have responded principally by 
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exploring different wordings and altering the response set (Moro, 2009). A range of 
re-wordings of ‘and’ have prompted different fallacy rates: ‘whether or not’ – 57% 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1983); ‘regardless of whether or not’ – 56% (Messer & 
Griggs, 1993); ‘may or may not’ – 69%17 (Agnoli & Krantz, 1989). A complex re-
wording by Dulany and Hilton (1991) reduced the rate to 38%, but contains other 
cues for normative behaviour (Moro, 2009). Changes to the response set have also 
varied the fallacy rate. Including both conjuncts, (T) and (F), reduced the rate in an 
estimation task (42%) but not a ranking task (78%) (Hertwig & Chase, 1998). 
Adding a disjunction of the events, (T v F), somewhat reduced the rate to 69% 
(Morier & Borgida, 1984). Perhaps most strikingly, however, including items 
equivalent to (T), (F), (T&F), (T & not F) produced a high rate, 78%, even in a 
betting task which should prompt more probabilistic reasoning (Bonini et al., 2004).  
Overall, there is evidence that pragmatic factors influence the robustness of 
the conjunction fallacy: both premise (mis-)match and conclusion (mis-match). 
Given the range of these factors, it is hard to get a general sense of the robustness. 
Nevertheless, the conjunction fallacy does seem to survive.  
Conclusion (Mis)match.  
Other examples of conclusion (mis-)match abound in survey research. Here, 
survey responses may not be literal. For instance, many survey participants will give 
answers to questions about fictional issues (for discussion, see Schwarz, 1996). A 
straightforward interpretation is that participants dislike appearing ignorant and, 
therefore, make up a response as a face-saving device (Schwarz, 1996). This 
possibility raises alarming questions about the quality of survey research. However, 
                                                
 
17 Macdonald and Gilhooly (1990) found 20%, switching the problem to the future.  
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a pragmatic interpretation is plausible. Strack, Schwarz, and Wänke (1991) 
hypothesized that participants use context – for instance, surrounding questions – to 
transform the question into one about a broader set of issues on which they can 
legitimately offer an opinion. They asked student participants about a fictional 
‘educational contribution’, and used a previous question to suggest that the 
contribution meant the state paying the student or the student paying the state. 
Participants’ views depended on this previous question. It remains to be seen how 
often this pragmatic account is correct.  
Survey and experimental research alike make use of response scales. Varying 
these scales can cause considerable inconsistencies in data, suggesting unreasonable 
responding (Schwarz, 1996). However, scale wording can often be vague or 
ambiguous, and scale numbers can cue specific interpretations. Take, for instance, a 
question about how successful a participant is in life, with a scale anchored at the 
lower end with ‘not at all successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’. These terms are ambiguous. 
If the numeric scale ranges from -5 to 5, it prompts participants to think of failure; if 
the scale ranges, instead, from 0 to 10, it prompts them to think of the absence of 
success (Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler, Noelle-Neumann, & Clark, 1991). Participants’ 
responses cluster significantly higher when the -5 to 5 scale is used. Similarly, 
Schwarz (1996) reports data that frequency scales, lower-bounded at ‘rarely’, receive 
different interpretations depending on the numeric scale: if the scale is anchored at 0, 
participants interpret ‘rarely’ as ‘never’; if at 1, as ‘sometimes’. Such frequency 
scales can also act as cues for estimating the frequency of habitual events, such as 
watching television, which may not be represented discretely in memory (Schwarz, 
1996). Lastly, these scale phenomena can interact with the interpretation of questions. 
For instance, a vague question like ‘How often are you really irritated?’ can be 
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interpreted differently depending on the scale. If the frequency scale is anchored at 
‘several times daily’ and ‘less than once a week’, participants report minor 
irritations; if the scale is anchored, instead, at ‘several times a month’ to ‘less than 
once every three months’, participants report more major irritations (Schwarz, 1996).  
Summary.  
This section has argued that pragmatics is essential to the rationality debate. 
The grounds for this are multiple. Firstly, pragmatics features, to a varying degree, in 
prominent psychological theories. Secondly, pragmatic analysis is a precondition for 
assessing rationality in experiments: we must check whether participants and 
experimenters understand the premises (instructions and materials) and conclusions 
(responses) in the same way. Considering pragmatics in this way is both theoretically 
essential and richly productive. A large and growing literature has emerged, testing 
the size and robustness of common effects, principally biases in decision making and 
judgment. This focus on biases should not suggest, however, that pragmatics is only 
relevant to diagnoses of irrationality. When people show apparently rational 
behaviour, such effects, too, should be pragmatically analysed, to ensure that they 
are not merely an artefact of a particular design. Finally, later chapters will argue for 
a stronger conceptual relationship between rationality and pragmatics.  
1.3 Sources  
We turn now to the third component in the triangular scheme, sources. This 
thesis will argue that sources are inextricably linked to both rationality and 
pragmatics. The link to pragmatics has already been explored above. This section 
will introduce the link between sources and rationality.  
Within psychology, sources have been given the most extensive treatment in 
the psychology of persuasion and, in particular, in dual-route models. Although this 
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social psychological research is relevant for debates on rationality, it takes a purely 
descriptive approach. The persuasion literature will be surveyed in more detail in 
Chapter 6. Here, it suffices to note that information about sources – typically, a 
person making a claim - generally features in the peripheral, heuristic route (Briñol 
& Petty, 2009; Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Petty & Briñol, 2008; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1984, 1986). That is, sources influence persuasion primarily when 
the audience is unmotivated, unengaged or unskilled. They can influence persuasion 
indirectly in the central, analytic route through effects on processing and 
metacognition. And, exceptionally, source information can be an explicit argument. 
Such sensitivity to sources seems intuitively reasonable, but the psychology of 
persuasion lacks an appropriate normative theory, the credibility of sources being 
determined, like the strength of arguments, in pre-tests (for further discussion, see 
Chapter 6).  
A strikingly different approach is taken in a recent psychological theory, the 
Argumentative Theory of Reasoning (Mercier & Sperber, 2011, 2017). This theory 
places sources at the heart of reasoning, decision making, and judgement, in the 
sense that these cognitive abilities are seen as fundamentally geared towards 
interaction with others. On this view, reasoning (construed broadly to include 
decision making and judgement) is argumentative: it is not intended for deriving 
conclusions but rather for ‘[devising] and [evaluating] arguments intended to 
persuade’ (Mercier & Sperber, 2011, p. 57). Mercier and Sperber acknowledge 
evidence that, on an individual level, much of our reasoning seems to be biased or 
motivated (see, e.g., Kunda, 1990), but argue that this behaviour can be 
argumentatively appropriate. For instance, it may seem undesirable for individual 
reasoners to generate evidence only in support of their belief, neglecting possible 
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falsification. But, Mercier and Sperber argue, such a confirmation bias primarily 
affects the production, not the evaluation of arguments, and allows an efficient 
division of labour, both sides producing as many arguments as possible and then, 
ideally, resolving their dispute together. Mercier and Sperber apply their theory to a 
wide range of classic fallacies. They argue, for instance, that people make choices 
that are easy to justify, regardless of their ultimate optimality, and argue that such 
reason-based choice can explain the attraction effect, disjunction effect, the sunk-
costs fallacy, framing effects, and preference inversion (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
They also take a somewhat optimistic view of the data on group decision making, 
concluding that such data show that discussion improves reasoning (though, as we 
will below, see qualifications are due).  
The claim that argumentation is social has precedent in Argumentation 
Theory. Research on argumentation asks what makes a good natural-language 
argument, whether people are good at natural-language argumentation, and whether 
people’s skills can be improved. Argumentation theory has taken a social turn, the 
focus being less on relationships between true and false propositions and more on the 
use of argument in reasoned dialogue (Toulmin, 1958; Walton, 2008). Since the 
social turn, argument strength is treated as relative to an audience (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Toulmin, 1958; Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1979). Argument 
strength can also vary across social contexts: for example, the same argument may 
be strong in a casual discussion but weak in a court of law. The content and contexts 
of argument can demand particular criteria for validity, criteria which are established 
by the participants in the argument (Toulmin, 1958; Toulmin et al., 1979). 
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More recent Argumentation Theory places even greater emphasis on social 
factors. This emphasis takes the form of rules intended to regulate the behaviour of 
participants. Take, for instance, the following rules from Pragma-Dialectics: 
Rule 1 (Freedom Rule): Discussants may not prevent each other from 
advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question.  
Rule 2 (Burden of Proof Rule): Discussants who advance a standpoint may 
not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so 
   (Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2009, pp. 21–22). 
These rules can be construed as social or ethical norms, their ethical character being 
clearer in the ‘fairness rules’ formulation of Christmann and colleagues (Christmann, 
Mischo, & Flender, 2000; Christmann, Mischo, & Groeben, 2000; Schreier, Groeben, 
& Christmann, 1995). Such rules have also been also put to work in explaining both 
qualitative (Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999) and quantitative data (Christmann, Mischo, 
& Groeben, 2000; Eemeren et al., 2009; Schreier et al., 1995).  
Sources figure especially strongly in a range of arguments which were 
classically deemed fallacious but which can, since the social turn, be considered 
good arguments. Historically, since sources were irrelevant to argument quality, 
arguments were deemed poor if they relied on appeal to features of a source 
(argumentum ad verecundiam) or attacking a source (argumentum ad hominem). 
However, properties of the source do seem to matter: intuitively relevant are its 
expertise, accuracy, and trustworthiness. Indeed, contemporary Argumentation 
Theory attempts to explain when source information is relevant and how it should be 
judged. Take, for instance, the following argumentation scheme and critical 
questions for an argument from expertise from Walton, Reed, and Macagno (2008):  
Argument Scheme 
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Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A. 
E asserts that proposition A (in domain S) is true (false). 
A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).  
Critical Questions  
How credible is E as an expert source? 
Is E an expert in the field that A is in? 
What did E assert that implies A?  
Is E personally reliable as a source? 
Is A consistent with what other experts assert?  
Is A based on evidence?  
It is questionable whether such critical questions really do provide anything like a 
normative basis (Hahn & Hornikx, 2016). But, as this approach shows, 
Argumentation Theory assumes that sources should be considered.  
Related to both persuasion and argumentation is the philosophy of testimony. 
Testimony, in the philosophical sense, is information received from other people; the 
study of testimony has increasing impact on the psychology of rationality (see 
chapters in Zenker, 2012). Theories of testimony can provide both normative 
accounts and hypotheses to test. For testimony, the normative question is whether it 
is justifiable to revise one’s beliefs in response to testimony and, if so, how (see, e.g., 
Coady, 1992). Testimony has proved amenable to normative Bayesian models, 
which will be explored in Chapter 6 (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Olsson, 2011; 
Olsson & Vallinder, 2013). These models prescribe consideration of sources 
whenever information is received from other people; hence, they insist on a close 
relationship between rationality and sources. A growing literature tests whether these 
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models are descriptively accurate (e.g. Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2009; Harris & Hahn, 
2009; Harris, Hahn, Madsen, & Hsu, 2016).  
Testimony overlaps with many tasks in judgment and decision making. This 
is perhaps most obviously the case in individual decision making by description, in 
which an individual makes a decision based on information provided to them by 
some source. Sources have made their way into the literature on individual 
judgement and decision making: recall the examples above in which experiments 
manipulated sources when exploring, for instance, the false-memory effect (Dodd & 
Bradshaw, 1980; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987) or ‘saying things that go without saying’ 
(Gruenfeld & Wyer, 1992). There is, of course, a more fundamental point: 
experimental participants know that an experiment is designed by an experimenter to 
some end; they may factor this into their interpretation of materials, and into their 
decisions about whether to trust the information they receive (Hilton, 1995; Schwarz, 
1996). There is scarce research on actual testimonial models in this context. A 
notable exception is Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003) treatment of the conjunction 
fallacy, an analysis which shows that a sophisticated probabilistic reasoner could 
produce the typical response pattern (rating the conjunction higher than the 
conjuncts) under certain assumptions. This model has been tested by Jarvstad and 
Hahn (2011), who found no evidence to support the model’s assumptions. This issue 
will resurface in Chapter 4. 
Testimony also overlaps with group judgement and decision making. 
Although there are testimonial models of receiving information from multiple 
sources (e.g. Bovens & Hartmann, 2003), these models do not seem to have had an 
impact on the group decision-making literature. There is considerable potential for 
useful dialogue between the two disciplines. A key question is how individual and 
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group performance are related: under what conditions does group performance 
outperform individual performance (for a review, see Gigone & Hastie, 1997; Kerr 
& Tindale, 2004)? The main focus has been on interaction: for instance, studies have 
had groups choose and nominate their best member (the dictator method); or freely 
debate to reach consensus (the consensus method); or consider the group mean, think 
of reasons why it might be too high or low, and then decide on an answer (the 
dialectic method); or just view all judgements, and make revisions in rounds, without 
discussion, until consensus is achieved (the Delphi method) (eg. Sniezek, 1989). The 
crucial measure is how the group performs relative to some baseline, often the 
performance of the most successful member (Kerr & Tindale, 2004).  
Groups vary from the baseline by making process gains (they outperform 
their best member) or process losses (they are outperformed by their best member). 
These deviations from the baseline give insight into rationality. Take, first, process 
losses. There are numerous examples in the literature. When there is discussion, one 
party can dominate, trains of thought can be prevented from arising or, if they do 
arise, can be derailed (Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Other common deficits are 
demotivation and social loafing (Kerr & Tindale, 2004). Groups can also exchange 
information sub-optimally. For instance, in the ‘hidden profile method’, some 
information is distributed to all participants (shared information); other information 
is distributed only to some (unshared information) (Stasser & Titus, 1985, 2003). 
Participants tend to overweight shared information, especially under time pressure; 
they prefer to present and receive shared information; and they judge someone who 
gives shared information as more competent and credible (for discussion, see Kerr & 
Tindale, 2004). There are, nevertheless, cases of process gains. When groups are 
cohesive, share strong productivity norms, and have a shared understanding of the 
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task, they show high motivation, and can perform strikingly well (Mellers et al., 
2014). Such factors were exploited in the recent Good Judgment Project, in which 
groups who discussed forecasts freely outperformed both individuals and groups 
who only saw other members’ judgments (see, e.g., Atanasov et al., 2015; Mellers et 
al., 2014; Mellers, Stone, Atanasov, et al., 2015; Mellers, Stone, Murray, et al., 2015; 
Tetlock, Mellers, Rohrbaugh, & Chen, 2014). 
Such experiments offer rich testimonial contexts and ample opportunities for 
models of complex testimony with multiple sources (see Bovens & Hartmann, 2003, 
and for discussion Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2016). These rewarding prospects argue 
for further research to explore how people interact and how they process the 
information they receive from sources. Such fine-grained manipulations are 
unfeasible in such large-scale studies as the Good Judgment Project. There is, 
however, suggestive evidence already. Participants seem to consider sources expert 
if they are loquacious, influence other group members using reason, and are 
confident or dominant (Kerr & Tindale, 2004; for the empirical studies, see 
Littlepage & Mueller, 1997; Littlepage, Schmidt, Whisler, & Frost, 1995). Much 
remains to be done to explore the rationality of both these reliability judgements and 
their subsequent use in weighting evidence.  
Although such group decision making is an extremely valuable topic of 
research, this thesis will focus on individual judgement, reasoning, and decision 
making by description. This focus does not imply that this is the more important 
level. Rather, these individual judgements mesh better with natural-language 
pragmatics, which has focused, thus far, on dyadic or small-scale interactions. This 
focus also allows us to explore basic mechanisms which can later be extended to 
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group contexts. As we will see in Chapters 2-4 and 6, there is much to be done at this 
lower level.  
1.4 Prospectus  
This thesis will address the relationships among the three components. 
Chapters 2 to 4 explore, in particular, the relationship between pragmatics and 
sources, though rationality will never be far from the debate. These chapters 
investigate conditionals in simple testimonial contexts. The data bear directly on 
how participants interpret conditional premises in a wide variety of experiments. The 
data, as a whole, are not well accommodated by the leading theories of the 
conditional.  Chapter 5 also investigates conditionals, but this time in the context of 
goal framing. This chapter focuses on the link between pragmatics and rationality. 
The data offer new insight into goal framing by providing evidence that participants 
are sensitive to the utilities of the frames. Chapter 6 focuses on the link between 
sources and rationality, investigating how people respond to information from 
partially reliable sources. The data suggest that people use the expectedness of 
claims to calibrate their perception of a source’s reliability, and that they can treat 
sources as anti-reliable: as negatively correlated with the truth. Chapter 7 develops 
the experimental method from Chapter 6 to return to the relationship between 
pragmatics and sources. This chapter focuses on hedging, a phenomenon which 
plays a key role in a recent theory of pragmatics. The data do not support this theory 
Throughout, the thesis will argue for the inseparability of rationality, 
pragmatics, and sources. Although each chapter will foreground two of these 
components, the third will remain in the background. Chapter 8 will draw together 
the experimental data and will further develop the themes in this introductory 
chapter. It will, in particular, return to the topic of argumentation and use it as a case 
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study for reconceptualising the links between rationality, pragmatics, and sources. 
The chapter will also discuss emerging research programs which have the potential 
to fundamentally reshape the approach to rationality.   
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2 Conditionals and Testimony 
Chapter 1 introduced a triangular scheme for interpreting the relationship 
between rationality, pragmatics, and sources. The link between pragmatics and 
sources is the topic of this and the following two chapters18. Each chapter treats the 
conditional, understood here as the construction ‘If P, (then) Q’, which has a 
privileged place in philosophy, psychology and linguistics. More specifically, the 
chapters treat conditionals in the context of testimony, in the philosophical sense. 
Testimony occurs when a speaker says, asserts, or tells someone something; in 
epistemology, testimony is studied descriptively – studying when people accept what 
they are told - and normatively - when they should accept what they are told (Adler, 
2015). Testimony is fundamentally linked with pragmatics: both involve the 
intentional transfer of belief from a speaker to a hearer. Considering the two 
phenomena together forces us to think of the connection between pragmatics and 
sources: particularly, between pragmatics and attributes of the speaker(s) such as 
their reliability. Although the connection between pragmatics and sources is the 
principal focus of these chapters, the issue of rationality will surface repeatedly, 
emphasizing the closeness of all three components. 
Why study conditionals in this way? Conditionals feature prominently in the 
psychological of rationality, and their testimonial aspects, though crucial, are 
underexplored. Conditionals abound in communication, since they are a natural 
vehicle for expressing information under uncertainty (Hilton, Kemmelmeier, & 
Bonnefon, 2005) and for expressing arguments from consequences, which are 
central to persuasion (Bonnefon, 2016; Schellens & De Jong, 2004). Such 
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conditionals are testimonial: they have a source, even if that source is only implicit. 
Conditionals also arise in the psychology of decision making in two key framing 
effects (again, with implicit sources): risky-choice framing, in the Asian disease 
paradigm (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981); and goal framing, where a behaviour is 
advocated either using the positive consequences of compliance or the negative 
consequences of non-compliance (for reviews, see, e.g., Gallagher & Updegraff, 
2012; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Rothman & Salovey, 1997). Witness the 
following pair of sentences: 
(1) If you decide to get HIV tested you may feel the peace of mind that 
comes with knowing about your health.  
(2) If you decide not to get HIV tested you may not feel the peace of mind 
that comes with knowing about your health.  
    (Apanovitch, McCarthy, & Salovey, 2003) 
Conditionals are also heavily implicated in the psychology of reasoning, where 
conditional inference is a central topic. Wherever such experiments manipulate 
sources explicitly (e.g. Stevenson & Over, 2001), or can be considered 
communicative contexts (see Chapter 1), conditional materials can be understood as 
testimony. Even though conditionals seem natural and are readily understood, as we 
will see below, they are also somewhat mysterious: there is little consensus on their 
meaning; and there is still less consensus on what we learn from the saying, asserting, 
or telling of a conditional – henceforth, from ‘testimonial conditionals’. 
 In this chapter, I will briefly survey the relevant psychological literature on 
the meaning of the conditional: both its semantics and its pragmatics. This literature 
                                                                                                                                     
 
18 These chapters report collaborative work with Professors Ulrike Hahn, Stephan 
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gives a basis for the study of testimonial conditionals. I will then introduce testimony 
and discuss its role in generating empirical predictions. Lastly, I will introduce some 
experiments that are a first step towards an empirical study of the testimonial 
conditional. As this is the first in a series of related chapters, I will postpone some 
important issues to later chapters for the sake of brevity: for instance, I will discuss 
philosophical theories of the conditional across the chapters; and I will discuss the 
formal issues around learning a conditional in Chapter 4.  
2.1.1 Conditionals in the psychology of reasoning  
Although testimonial conditionals do not seem to have been studied 
independently in psychology, there are nevertheless suggestive data, especially in the 
psychology of reasoning. These data bear on the meaning of the conditional: its 
semantics and, to a lesser extent, its pragmatics. In its early days, the psychology of 
reasoning tended to focus on abstract tasks (Over, 2016), such as the abstract Wason 
selection task (Wason, 1966). It is tempting to view such tasks as pure reasoning: a 
sentence such as ‘If A, then B’ seems to communicate little. Even with 
comparatively abstract tasks, though, interpretation intervenes. In modelling the 
abstract Wason selection task, for instance, Oaksford and Chater (1994) make an 
assumption about participants’ interpretations: that the conditional in the following 
rule is interpreted as a conditional probability: ‘If there is an A on one side of a card, 
then there is a 2 on the other’.  In more natural tasks, pragmatics becomes more 
obviously relevant (Girotto, Kemmelmeier, Sperber, & van der Henst, 2001; Sperber, 
Cara, & Girotto, 1995). Naturalness is one of the key aims of the ‘New Paradigm’ in 
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RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 77 
the psychology of reasoning (Over, 2016). Naturalistic tasks can more easily be 
understood as communicative or testimonial contexts.  
One common task in the psychology of reasoning is the truth-table task, 
which is often taken to offer direct evidence about the meaning of the conditional. 
The task recalls work in truth-conditional semantics which takes the core meaning of 
a sentence (at least when used to express a proposition) to be given by its truth 
conditions: that is, the conditions in the world that make the sentence true or false 
(Cann, 1993). Truth-conditional semantics uses propositional logic to model the 
meaning of the natural-language connectives ‘not’, ‘if’, ‘and’, and ‘or’. 
Propositional-logical connectives are defined with truth tables. Most relevant, for 
present purposes, is the truth table for the material conditional, shown in Table 2.1: 
Table 2.1. Truth table of material conditional 
P Q P → Q 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
The material conditional is true in all cases except when P is true and Q is false: it is 
equivalent to (~P v Q). It is truth-functional - the truth of the whole is a function of 
the meaning of its parts – it has had prominent defenders as a theory of the natural-
language conditional (see, e.g., Bennett, 2003, for discussion; for defenders, see 
Grice, 1989; Jackson, 1979), and it forms the basis of the mental-models account of 
the conditional (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). 
The truth-table task tests the truth table above against rivals, thereby offering 
insight into the meaning of the conditional. Common formats are (1) to present 
participants with the four combinations of P and Q states, and ask them to decide 
whether they make the conditional true or false (or, sometimes, neither); (2) to have 
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participants construct their own truth tables; or (3) to ask which cases prove a 
conditional rule (Schroyens, 2010). The major rival to the material-conditional truth 
table is the so-called ‘defective’ truth table (for discussion, see Over, 2016), which is 
shown in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Defective truth table 
p q p → q 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 Irrelevant 
0 0 Irrelevant  
 
The typical finding is that ‘P and Q’ makes the conditional true and that ‘P 
and not Q’ makes the conditional false; this is consistent with both truth tables 
(Politzer, Over, & Baratgin, 2010). But the following finding is commonly reported: 
participants tend to say that the ‘not P’ cases make the conditional neither true nor 
false, when they have that option available to them, a response which suggests that 
the conditional best corresponds to the defective truth table (Over, 2016; Politzer et 
al., 2010). Such reports may overstate the evidence. In a meta-analytic review, 
Schroyens (2010) showed that ‘irrelevant’ was not, in fact, the majority response for 
false-antecedent conditions. ‘Irrelevant’ was the modal response only for 
conditionals with false antecedents and false consequents where the falseness was 
conveyed implicitly: for instance, the rule ‘If A then 2’ was labelled ‘irrelevant’ 
when there were cards for ‘B’ and ‘7’. Similarly, in a recent experimental study, 
Skovgaard-Olsen, Kellen, Krahl, and Klauer (2017) found a poor fit between their 
data and any major truth table, suggesting, perhaps, complex individual differences.  
 Although there is controversy around the evidence for the defective truth 
table, the supposed evidence is interpreted in two principal ways. The first is to 
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argue that the conditional is best modelled with a three-valued logic (Edgington, 
1995; Evans & Over, 2004; Over, 2016; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2010). The second is to 
argue that conditionals are best modelled with conditional probabilities. In the truth 
table, the columns then represent, not the truth of the statements, but the probabilities 
in the special case where there is certainty. This interpretation must contend with the 
fact that participants are prepared to use the labels ‘true’ and ‘false’: the labels must 
presumably be taken to express subjective agreement or disagreement with a 
judgment rather than committing to a strict truth value (Over, 2016). But the 
probabilistic interpretation can be supported by testing other, more complex truth 
tables which allow for more variation in uncertainty (Over, 2016). 
Another common task is the conditional-inference task. Participants typically 
read a conditional premise of the form ‘If p then q’ and a minor premise, and then 
must draw or endorse inferences. The minor premises in question could be ‘p’ for 
modus ponens (If p, q; p; therefore q), ‘not q’ for modus tollens (If p, q; not q; 
therefore not p); ‘q’ for Affirmation of the Consequent (If p, q; q; therefore p); or 
‘not p’ for Denial of the Antecedent (If p, q; not p; therefore not q). The resultant 
data suggest that participants perform, or endorse, modus ponens most frequently, 
followed by modus tollens, Affirmation of the Consequent, and then Denial of the 
Antecedent (for discussion, see, e.g., Manktelow, 2012). These data bear on learning 
testimonial conditionals. Most obviously, they suggest the inferences that people will 
likely draw from a conditional as part of an argument; hence, they suggest the 
learning downstream of the conditional. But they also offer indirect evidence about 
the information content of the conditional itself. For, if participants understand the 
conditional to mean the material conditional of classical logic, and if they reason 
using classical logical principles, then they reason poorly. Of the inferences above, 
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modus ponens and modus tollens are classically valid: they should be endorsed by all 
participants. The remaining inferences are classically fallacious: they should be 
rejected by all participants. However, a different account better approximates 
participants’ reasoning. This account models the conditional as the conditional 
probability, and treats participants’ conclusions as probabilistic inferences (e.g. 
Oaksford, Chater, & Larkin, 2000). Although this is only indirect evidence of the 
information content of the conditional itself, it is nevertheless suggestive.  
 More direct evidence can be found in studies using judgment tasks, in which 
participants assess the probability of the conditional. Such studies have asked, for 
instance, whether the probability of the conditional corresponds to the probability of 
the material conditional, P(~P v Q); to the probability of the conjunction, P(P & Q); 
or to the conditional probability, P(Q|P). Their results provide considerable support 
for the conditional probability (Evans, Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2007; Evans, 
Handley, & Over, 2003; Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; Oberauer & 
Wilhelm, 2003; Over, Hadjichristidis, Evans, Handley, & Sloman, 2007; Politzer, 
Over, & Baratgin, 2010), though also some support for the probability of the 
conjunction (e.g. Evans et al., 2003; Fugard et al., 2011). These data suggest that the 
conditional probability is closely tied to the meaning of the conditional. 
 A special role for probabilities can be neatly accommodated within the 
suppositional theory of the conditional (e.g. Adams, 1965, 1970, 1975, Edgington, 
1995, 2014; Evans & Over, 2004). On this theory, when we hear a conditional If A, B, 
‘[we] suppose (assume, hypothesize) that A, and make a hypothetical judgment about 
B, under the supposition that A, in light of your other beliefs’ (Edgington, 2014). In 
other words, we judge the conditional probability P(B|A). This theory takes the 
conditional to have, not a truth value, but a conditional probability (for a recent 
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discussion, see, e.g., Over, 2016). This semantics is supplemented with a pragmatic 
account. Since ‘it can be held that a conditional is only asserted when [the 
conditional probability] is high enough in context’, asserting a conditional 
pragmatically implies that the conditional probability is high (D. Over, personal 
communication19, February 2, 2017) 
Despite such evidence, there is still controversy about the relationship 
between the probability and meaning of the conditional. Some researchers argue that 
basic conditionals are deterministic (e.g. Goodwin, 2014; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 
2002). Other researchers argue that, although probabilities are important, there are 
other requirements, such as a relevance relation between antecedent and consequent 
(Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, & Klauer, 2016b) or an inferential link (Douven, 
2015; Krzyżanowska, 2015). Still others point to systematic divergences between the 
conditional probability and the acceptability of different types of conditionals 
(Douven & Verbrugge, 2010). Thus, although the literature shows a close 
association between conditionals and the conditional probability, it vigorously 
debates whether probabilities are part of the semantics20 of the conditional and, if 
they are, whether they exhaust the semantics of the conditional. Since the empirical 
literature has given little attention to testimonial conditionals, it is also debatable 
whether changes to the conditional probability exhaust the belief change resulting 
from the assertion of a conditional.  
                                                
 
19 The quotation is from David Over’s talk at the ‘Learning Conditionals’ Workshop 
at Ludwig Maximillian’s University, Munich, February 2nd-3rd, 2017. His lecture notes, 
including the quotation, are available at http://www.cas.uni-
muenchen.de/veranstaltungen/archiv_veranstaltung/tagungen/ws_krzyzanowska_hartmann/i
ndex.html 
20 If probabilities are part of the semantics, then this will be a rather different 
semantics than conventional truth-conditional semantics. I thank Drs Niels Skovgaard Olsen 
and Karolina Krzyżanowska for discussion of this point.  
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2.1.2 Conditionals in Psycholinguistics 
Although debate continues, the psychology of reasoning clearly suggests that 
when we learn a conditional from testimony, we change our estimates of the 
conditional probability. Further evidence is offered by psycholinguistic research. For 
instance, the probability of the conditional predicts reading times (Haigh & Stewart, 
2011), and this seems to be due to the conditional probability, not the probability of 
the conjunction or of the material conditional (Haigh, Stewart, & Connell, 2012). 
Such psycholinguistic studies tend to use more natural materials and less intrusive 
dependent measures than the psychology of reasoning, which reduces the risk that 
the data considered thus far are attributable to demand characteristics. However, 
psycholinguistic studies also suggest that other probabilistic quantities are important. 
For instance, reading times are also predicted by the probability of the antecedent 
(Haigh, Stewart, & Connell, 2012), a finding which raises the possibility that people 
may learn more from the assertion of a conditional than just the conditional 
probability. When conditionals are about valued actions and outcomes, then 
participants also show early sensitivity to conditional utilities (Haigh, Ferguson, & 
Stewart, 2014) and to types of speech act, such as warnings versus tips (Stewart, 
Haigh, & Ferguson, 2013). This is all potential information to be learnt from the 
assertion of a conditional.  
2.1.3 Conditionals and Pragmatics 
 It is tempting, but ultimately unsatisfactory, to limit one’s attention to the 
conditional probability, since it seems to offer the basis of a theory of meaning and 
reasoning. Other factors – we might argue - are ‘just pragmatics’, and should be 
treated elsewhere. This argument is reminiscent of a common – and often 
condemned – strategy in linguistics known as the ‘pragmatic waste-bin’ (Mey, 2001). 
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We start with a formal theory which, though elegant, cannot explain certain crucial 
phenomena. We then declare these phenomena to be pragmatics, often solely on the 
grounds that they do not fit within the theory, and take no further responsibility for 
explaining the phenomena. Applying this strategy more generally results in a 
pragmatics populated by discarded, unconnected phenomena. Specifically for the 
conditional, the approach is unsatisfactory for three reasons. Firstly, as we will see 
below, there is no well-developed pragmatic theory of the conditional to explain 
what is leftover. Secondly, if we are interested in the process of learning a 
conditional, then what is learnt in a given context will not, presumably, be limited to 
purely semantic information. Thirdly, pragmatics is intimately bound up with 
reasoning.  
While the first two reasons are self-explanatory, the third requires elaboration. 
The essence is that pragmatics is crucial for discerning the premises and the 
operations on those premises. Consider, for example, the following sentence: 
(3) Syntactic Structures is Chomsky’s book. 
Here, semantics alone does not yield an evaluable proposition: with the semantics 
alone, we can only tell that there is some relation between Chomsky and the book. A 
mandatory pragmatic process must specify what that relationship is: the process is 
mandatory because it is driven by the linguistic structure; there is a slot, here 
provided by the genitive ‘s, which needs to be filled pragmatically (Recanati, 2004). 
Is Chomsky the book’s author, borrower, or owner? Consider, now, sentence (4): 
(4) If Syntactic Structures is Chomsky’s book, then he’ll be angry that you 
lost it.  
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Pragmatics, again, is crucial. The conditional probabilities – and, hence, any 
subsequent reasoning - will presumably differ depending on whether Chomsky is the 
author, borrower, or owner, not to mention the necessary reference assignments21. 
Sometimes, semantics delivers an evaluable proposition, but that proposition may 
not be the intended one. Consider sentence (5): 
(5) Peter has had breakfast.  
Here, there is no linguistic slot to be filled, but the proposition may optionally be 
specified further, for instance, by adding ‘today’ (Recanati, 2004). Consider, now, 
sentence (6): 
(6) If Peter has had breakfast, he won’t be hungry this morning.  
Again, the conditional probabilities – and, hence, any subsequent reasoning - 
will presumably differ depending on whether the breakfast in question was eaten 
today, yesterday, or twenty years ago. These pragmatic concerns will apply, too, to 
the conditionals themselves – indeed, to any operator. If researchers want a theory of 
reasoning which can predict people’s behaviour across contexts, then they will need 
a component which explains how the operators are interpreted and why. It is 
important, then, to ask how people change their beliefs when they learn a conditional 
from assertion. Is the change localized on the conditional probability, or do beliefs 
change more broadly? If belief change is broader, then there may be a profound 
effect on reasoning: for instance, by modifying belief in the other premises in an 
argument.  
                                                
 
21  I am not, here, committing to conditionals expressing propositions. I will assume 
pragmatics is required to produce an evaluable premise, however it is formally understood.  
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Perhaps surprisingly, there are limited data, thus far, on the pragmatics of the 
conditional. Much of these data come from studies on conditionals with valued 
antecedents and consequents, known as utility conditionals. Such studies suggest that 
people draw on the utilities of antecedent and consequent and on simple mentalistic 
assumptions to interpret conditionals, to infer other people’s intentions, and to 
predict other people’s behaviour (Bonnefon, 2009, 2012; Bonnefon, Girotto, & 
Legrenzi, 2011; Bonnefon, Haigh, & Stewart, 2013; Bonnefon & Hilton, 2004; 
Bonnefon & Sloman, 2013; Haigh & Bonnefon, 2015). Utility conditionals will be 
the topic of a later chapter. It suffices, for now, to observe that utility conditionals 
are an important subset of conditionals, and that more remains to be done on the 
pragmatics of the conditional per se.  
A more general topic is invited inferences. Geis and Zwicky (1971) 
suggested that conditionals tend to undergo ‘conditional perfection’, a pragmatic 
enrichment, and become bi-conditionals practically automatically (Noveck & 
Bonnefond, 2011). This practical automaticity has since been questioned. For 
instance, Evans and Over (2004) have observed that the inference ‘If p then q; q; 
therefore p’ tends to occur more with abstract conditionals, and that the inference ‘If 
p then q; not p; therefore not q’ tends to occur more with everyday conditionals. 
There is arguably, then, no strong connection between the two inferences (for 
discussion, see Bonnefon & Politzer, 2010). Moreover, as Noveck and Bonnefon 
(2011) observe, the idea of default pragmatic inferences has lost favour as, contrary 
to prominent theories (e.g. Levinson, 2000), even seemingly routine inferences have 
been shown to require effortful contextual processing. Conditional perfection 
arguably arises out of the expectation that, when we hear a conditional, we will then 
hear information about the antecedent being satisfied (Noveck & Bonnefond, 2011). 
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When we do not hear such information, we display a surprise response, and attempt 
to accommodate this information by pragmatic enrichment (Bonnefond et al., 2012; 
Noveck & Bonnefond, 2011). On this account, once this accommodation has 
occurred, the classically fallacious inferences can still be inhibited by people with 
high cognitive abilities, but this process is effortful and time-consuming (Bonnefond 
et al., 2012; Noveck & Bonnefond, 2011).  
While it is worth bearing this pragmatic account in mind, it applies in the 
context of reasoning: the pragmatic inferences arise out of a conflict between the 
expectation of information about the antecedent and the actual appearance of a minor 
premise which does not satisfy this expectation. There is a more fundamental 
question to be asked: namely, what is learnt from the assertion of a conditional. The 
following three chapters will address this question.  
2.1.4 Testimony 
Where, then, should we look for hypotheses about what is learnt from the 
assertion of a conditional and why? There is a rich literature on the philosophy of 
testimony which treats the issue of learning from an assertion. Within this literature, 
formal Bayesian models have been developed to prescribe how people should revise 
their beliefs in response to the testimony of other people (e.g. Bovens & Hartmann, 
2003). Chapter 4 will treat these models in detail. It suffices, at this point, to note the 
following. The models in question treat belief as subjective probability, and consider 
the normative impact of factors such as the number of sources, the coherence of their 
testimony, the relationship between the sources (i.e. whether they are dependent or 
independent), and the reliability of the sources (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Olsson, 
2005).  
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Drawing on these models not only allows us to generate hypotheses about 
how beliefs change and why. It also allows us to ask questions about the rationality 
of people’s behaviour. Indeed, this literature on testimony has already generated rich 
hypotheses for empirical research. For example, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) 
offered a reanalysis of the conjunction fallacy. People are taken to commit the 
conjunction fallacy when they rate a conjunction as more probable than its conjuncts. 
In their analysis of typical experimental task, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) 
considered people’s prior beliefs about the conjuncts and how they judge the 
reliability of the information source. They showed that, as long as the individual 
propositions are interpreted as coming from different sources – or, perhaps, are being 
entertained separately at different time points – then for a range of priors, the 
standard response is, in fact, legitimate. Although the models’ predictions do not find 
support in experimental data (Jarvstad & Hahn, 2011) they show the value of 
considering the literature on testimony. Moreover, since the literature has recently 
turned to the specific issue of learning a conditional from testimony  (e.g. Hartmann 
& Rafiee Rad, 2017), the empirical data below will dovetail with cutting-edge 
formal work. As we will see, the data also provide useful constraints on modeling.  
2.1.5 Towards an experimental method  
This chapter reports the first in a series of studies which explored the learning 
of conditionals in simple testimonial contexts. The experiments were inspired by the 
literature on testimony, and were loosely based on Stevenson and Over (2001), who, 
uniquely in the literature, explored the impact of source reliability and 
conversational contexts on reasoning. For present purposes, the most relevant of 
their experiments is the following. They presented participants with arguments from 
sources of different reliabilities. One item, for instance, was the following:  
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 Major Premise: If Bill has typhoid he will make a good recovery.  
Minor Premise: Bill has typhoid.  
The relevant source, here, was either a medical professor (high expertise) or a 
medical student (low expertise); this manipulation was applied to either the major or 
minor premise. Participants indicated their certainty in the conclusions of modus 
ponens and modus tollens arguments. Source expertise predicted participants’ 
certainty in the conclusions, an effect which has recently been partially replicated by 
Singmann, Klauer, and Beller (2016): the effect was replicated for modus ponens 
and extended to Denial of the Antecedent, but did not replicate for modus tollens.  
The present studies were adapted from Stevenson and Over’s (2001) design. 
Participants did not derive inferences, but rather performed a judgment task. There 
were two versions of this task, performed by different participants; both manipulated 
variables from the literature on social epistemology. The first task manipulated 
assertion: a conditional could be asserted by multiple sources or a single source, or 
there was a null condition. For instance:  
Multiple Condition  Adam, Barbara, Nick and Sue are at a large car 
dealership. They tell you, ‘If a car is a Mercedes, then 
it’s black.’  
Single Condition Adam is at a large car dealership. He tells you, ‘If a car 
is a Mercedes, then it’s black’ 
Null Condition Imagine you are at a large dealership.  
In each case, participants were asked about the probability that a car on the lot was a 
Mercedes; that a car on the lot was black; and that the car on the lot was black given 
that it was a Mercedes. The design was between-subjects, but each participant 
provided estimates of all three probabilities for each item. The conditionals 
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themselves were simple indicative conditionals with neutral content22. They were 
designed to avoid obvious real-world causal relations, to avoid noise from 
participants’ different causal beliefs and knowledge. 
A different group of participants performed a second task, which manipulated 
source expertise: a conditional could be asserted by an expert or inexpert source. All 
but one of the conditionals from the first task were used, with different contexts. For 
instance:  
Expert Condition Imagine you are at an infectious-diseases ward. A 
professor of medicine tells you, ‘If Bill has malaria, 
then he’ll make a good recovery’. 
Inexpert Condition  Imagine you are at an infectious-diseases ward. A 
medical student tells you, ‘If Bill has malaria, then 
he’ll make a good recovery.’ 
The same probability questions were asked as above.  
The purpose of this study was exploratory: we did not have specific 
predictions about how the probability of the antecedent and consequent would 
change. A subsidiary aim was to interpret the data in the light of philosophical 
theories of the conditional. For expository reasons, these theories will largely be 
discussed in later chapters. The predictions, then, are non-directional.   
Of the two tasks, the assertion task is more obviously pragmatic. In particular, 
the single-assertion condition tests the pure case of learning a conditional from an 
assertion. The source-expertise task is more obviously testimonial, in that it 
manipulates a variable which is theoretically important for the literature on 
                                                
 
22 Such conditionals might be termed ‘contingent universals’ (Douven, 2015, p. 16), 
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testimony but which has played little role in the pragmatics literature (though see 
McCready, 2014; Sperber et al., 2010). However, I will not attempt to firmly 
distinguish pragmatics and testimony here; the extent to which this is possible is a 
question I will return to at various points throughout the thesis.  
2.2 Experiment 2.1: effect of assertion 
2.2.1 Methods 
Participants. 179 participants (68 female; mean age 32.81) completed this 
experiment; 5 participants had already been excluded since they were non-native 
English speakers.  Participants were recruited via the intermediary MTurk Data 
(www.mturkdata.com). High qualifications were set for the task to improve the 
quality of the data and maximize the number of native English speakers: participants 
had to be resident in the US, and have an overall approval rating of 99% for 1,000 
previously completed tasks. Participants received a small fee, chosen to exceed the 
US minimum wage per minute.  
 
Materials. Participants took web surveys on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The 
items were as follows. Note that the items are presented in the multiple-assertion 
condition, with the single-assertion condition in brackets. In the null condition, the 
text read, instead, ‘Imagine you are at a large dealership (or infectious diseases word 
etc.), and the conditional was not presented.  
(1) Adam, Barbara, Nick and Sue (Adam) are at a large car dealership. 
They say, 'If a car on this lot is a Mercedes, then it's black.' 
                                                                                                                                     
 
as they summarize real-world regularities without expressing temporal or causal information. 
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(2) Olivia, Aaron, Zoe and Felix (Olivia) are at an infectious diseases 
ward. They say,' If a patient on this ward has malaria, then he'll 
make a good recovery.'  
(3)  Jack, Isabel, Elliot and Amy (Jack) are at a university halls of 
residence. They say, 'If Lisa, a student, has an essay to write, then 
she is studying late in the library.' 
(4) Sophie, Owen, Julia and Nathan (Sophie) are at a veterinary hospital. 
They say, 'If Fido the dog is in the hospital kennels, then he's had 
his operation.' 
(5) Harry, Emma, Katie and Rory (Harry) are at a butterfly house. They 
say, 'If a butterfly is purple, then it's a fast flyer.'  
(6) Lily, Tom, Sarah and Leo (Lily) are at a New York coffee shop. They 
say, 'If Dan, a customer, is drinking coffee, then his drink is 
decaffeinated.  
(7) Josh, Holly, Jamie, Maria (Josh) are at a restaurant. They say, ‘If the 
dish is chicken stew, then it’s gluten free.’  
These items were followed by questions about the probability of the antecedent, the 
probability of the consequent, and the conditional probability. In the null condition, 
the same events were used, but there was no conditional asserted. The probability 
questions were simply ‘What’s the probability that 
[antecedent/consequent/consequent given antecedent23]?’ 
 
                                                
 
23 That is, the actual events were used, not the words ‘antecedent’, ‘consequent’ and 
so on. 
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Procedure. The design manipulated Assertion (Null, Single Assertion, 
Multiple Assertion); the dependent measures were the probability of the antecedent, 
P(Antecedent); the probability of the consequent, P(Consequent); and the conditional 
probability, P(Consequent|Antecedent). The task was between-subjects: participants 
were assigned, in a round-robin fashion, to a condition. After giving informed 
consent, participants gave demographic information and were then shown the 
following instructions: 
‘Thank you for taking part in this study. You will read about some people 
who are making claims. You will be told who is making the claim and what 
they are saying. For example, you might read  'If the ferry is painted blue, 
then it's called The Empress.' Below each claim you'll be asked a question. 
You will be asked to judge a probability on a scale from 0 (not at all 
possible) to 10 (certain). But each question is subtly different, so please read 
the wording carefully. There are no correct answers. Please just give the 
probability that comes to mind.’ 
The conditional above was included for illustration; it was not an experimental item. 
Participants then provided ratings for each probability question for each item on a 
Likert-style scale from 0 (not at all possible) to 10 (certain). There was a different 
page for each combination of the conditional and probability question: that is, 
participants saw each item three times, with a different probability question. The 
order of the pages was randomized. Finally, participants received debriefing 
information.  
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2.2.2 Results & Discussion 
For all data in this chapter, the analyses comprised crossed random-effects 
models. The analyses treated the probability questions as separate dependent 
variables. These analyses followed the guidelines of Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily 
(2013). Significance was determined by a likelihood ratio test (maximum-likelihood 
method) on two models: the full model, which included the fixed effect in question; 
and the null model. Unless otherwise specified, both models included the full 
random-effects structure justified by the design. This structure included the random 
slopes of the independent variable across items, random intercepts of items, and 
random intercepts of participants. The covariance of random slopes and items was 
also estimated. It is perhaps more common to test for the significance of random 
effects by, for instance, starting with a full model and simplifying it by removing 
non-significant effects (Finch, Bolin, & Kelley, 2016; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). 
However, as Barr, Levy, Scheepers and Tily (2013) note, experimental designs 
rarely have enough power to be confident in rejecting the random effects, and 
maintaining the full random-effects structure, as far as convergence allows, yields 
models that have been shown to generalize better in Monte Carlo simulations and 
which have a low risk of Type 1 errors.  
Alongside the likelihood-ratio tests are estimates of the (unstandardized) 
coefficients for the fixed effects and the 95% confidence intervals (calculated using 
the Wald method) for these estimates. These coefficients for fixed effects serve as 
estimates of effect size24. Since the aim, throughout, is to control for random effects, 
coefficients for the random effects are not relevant for present purposes and will not 
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be reported. Analyses were run using the R programming language (R Core Team, 
2016) and the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015); where 
relevant, pairwise comparisons were run using the lsmeans package (Leith, 2016). 
Probability of the Antecedent. Figure 2.1 shows the descriptive data for the 
effect of Assertion on the probability of the antecedent25.  
  
Figure 2.1. Mean rating of P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
Note that, although the data suggest an increase from null (M = 3.79) to single (M = 
4.29) and multiple (M = 4.67) conditions, the difference between means is small. 
Indeed, including Assertion did not significantly improve fit26 over the null model, 
χ2(2) = 4.55, p =.10.  Table 2.3 summarizes the estimates of the fixed effects.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
24 Unit-free measures, such as r, are not straightforwardly calculable with crossed 
random-effects models and can produce uninterpretable results (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2013). 
25 For all reported crossed random-effects models, I present figures which show the 
descriptive data by trial; the figures do not take account of nesting. However, if we compare 
these descriptives with the unstandardized coefficients and least-squares means, we can see 
that the figures provide a not unreasonable summary. For present purposes, the chosen 
figures are more illustrative than the more complex plots discussed, for instance, by Finch, 
Bolin, and Kelley (2016). 
26 Note that here, and throughout, assumptions were met, unless otherwise specified.   
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 95 
Table 2.3. Fixed effects of Assertion on P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 3.79 2.84, 4.74 
Single  b = .50 -.24, 1.24 
Multiple  b = .88 0.13, 1.62 
 
Probability of the Consequent. Figure 2.2 shows the descriptive data for the 
effect of Assertion on the probability of the consequent.  
  
Figure 2.2. Mean rating of P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
These data do not suggest an obvious trend. The mean rating decreases from the null 
(M = 5.39) to the single conditions (M = 4.77) and then increases to the multiple 
condition (M = 5.23). As above, mean ratings are close together. Also as above, 
including Assertion did not significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(2) =  
5.13, p = .08. Table 2.4 summarizes the estimates of the fixed effects.  
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Table 2.4. Fixed effects of Assertion on P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 5.39 4.32, 6.46 
Single b = -.62 -1.44, .20 
Multiple  b = -.16 -1.06, .73 
 
The confidence intervals for parameter estimates for single and multiple assertion 
both comfortably include zero, thus offering no clear evidence for an effect.  
Conditional Probability. Figure 2.3 shows the descriptive data for the effect 
of Assertion on the conditional probability, P(Consequent|Antecedent).  
  
Figure 2.3. Mean rating of Conditional Probability by condition; error bars of standard error 
These data suggest a trend for Assertion to increase ratings of the conditional 
probability. There is an increase from the null (M = 4.60) to single condition (M = 
7.29), although there is then a small decrease to the multiple condition (M = 7.10). 
This time, including Assertion significantly improved fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 
11.55, p <.001. Table 2.5 
Table 2.5 summarizes the estimates of the fixed effects.  
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Table 2.5. Fixed effect of Assertion on Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 4.61 3.54, 5.67 
Single b = 2.69 1.32, 4.06 
Multiple  b = 2.50 1.43, 3.56 
Pairwise comparisons were conducted on least-square means with a Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons27. The increase from null to single conditions 
was significant, M = 2.69, 95% CI [.68, 4,69],  (t(11.04) = 3.63, p =.01, though note 
the wide confidence intervals, hence the uncertainty, around the estimated mean. The 
increase from null to multiple conditions was also significant, M = 2.50, 95%, CI 
[1.02, 3.97], t(15.87) = 4.38, p =.001. The difference between single and multiple 
conditions was non-significant, M = -.19, 95% CI [-1.12, .73], t(50.52) = -.50, p =.87. 
This suggests that the effect of Assertion plateaus.  
 These data suggest that Assertion targets the conditional probability, leaving 
the probability of the antecedent and consequent unaffected. The data also suggest 
that Assertion has a diminishing return on the conditional probability: assertion by 
multiple sources does not increase the conditional probability. Since these are novel 
data, however, they require replication. This replication is reported next.  
 
2.3 Experiment 2.2: replicating the effect of Assertion 
2.3.1 Method 
Participants. 188 (88 female; 1 non-binary; average age 39.02 years) 
completed this experiment; 1 participant had already been excluded since they were 
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a non-native speaker of English. Participants were, again, recruited on Amazon 
Mechnical Turk using the same criteria and remuneration as for Experiment 2.1.  
 
Materials. The items were largely the same as those used for Experiment 2.1. 
Some small adjustments were made to one item. The conditional ‘If Dan is drinking 
a coffee, then his drink is decaffeinated’ creates an ambiguity.  In the conditions in 
which a conditional is asserted, ‘his drink’ may be interpreted as the aforementioned 
coffee: thus, when asked about the probability of the consequent (that Dan’s drink is 
a coffee), participants may judge the probability of a decaffeinated (quite low). 
However, in the null condition, ‘his drink’ can be interpreted either as a coffee, when 
judging the conditional probability, or as any drink when judging the probability of 
the consequent. The probability of a drink being decaffeinated is rather different 
from the probability of a coffee being decaffeinated. Although the analysis controls 
for the effects of items, the replication removed this ambiguity by a re-wording: ‘If 
Dan is drinking a coffee, then it’s decaffeinated’. The P(Consequent) question 
referred to the probability of a coffee being decaffeinated, and the conditional 
probability question was phrased as follows, ‘Given that Dan’s drink is a caffeinated, 
what’s the probability that it is a coffee?’ The items were otherwise the same.  
 
Procedure. The same procedure was used as for Experiment 2.1 except for 
the following change. The repeated occurrence of the same items may have caused 
confusion. To improve the presentation, all probability questions were presented 
                                                                                                                                     
 
27 For clarity’s sake, I report the differences between means although they largely 
duplicate the information from the coefficients.  More important are the confidence intervals, 
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together for the same item. The order of the questions was reversed for half the 
participants. As above, participants provided ratings for each probability question for 
each item on a Likert-style scale from 0 (not at all possible) to 10 (certain) 
 
2.3.2 Results & Discussion  
Probability of the Antecedent. Figure 2.4 shows the descriptive data for the 
effect of Assertion on the probability of the antecedent.  
  
Figure 2.4. Mean P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
These data do not suggest an obvious trend. There is a small increase in rating from 
the null condition (M = 4.60) to the single condition (M = 4.77), and a small decrease 
to the multiple condition (M = 4.36). Including Assertion did not significantly 
improve fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 3.03, p =.22. Table 2.6 reports the estimates 
of the fixed effects.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
which differ from those of the coefficients because of computational differences such as a 
multiplicity correction.  
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Table 2.6. Fixed effect of Assertion on P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 4.60 3.12, 6.09 
Single b = .16 -.10,  1.33 
Multiple  b = -.24 -1.26, .77 
 
In terms of overall significance, the replication is consistent with the original data set. 
The parameter estimates for the single assertion condition are also consistent. The 
estimate for the original study was larger but still small, b = .50. There is also 
considerable overlap (1.34) between the replication confidence interval (see above) 
and that of the original study, 95% CI [-.24, 1.24], and both confidence intervals 
include 0. The estimate for the multiple assertion condition was also larger in the 
original study, b = .88, but, again, both estimates are small. There is also overlap in 
the confidence intervals for the replication (see above) and original study, 95% CI 
[.13, 1.62], and both intervals include 0. The overlap (.64) is somewhat smaller than 
that for the single assertion condition, but is nevertheless large enough to consider 
the data consistent, at over half the length of the average margin of error of .88. 28 
(Cumming, 2012, p. 158).  
  
Probability of the Consequent. Figure 2.5 shows the descriptive data for the 
effect of Assertion on the probability of the consequent.  
                                                
 
28 As Cumming (2012) notes, if the confidence intervals overlap by up to 
approximately half the length of the average margin of error, then the data are significantly 
different at the p <.05 level.  
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Figure 2.5. Mean P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
Once again, there is little suggestion of an effect, the means for the null (M = 4.90), 
single (M = 5.38), and multiple (M = 5.08) conditions being close together. Including 
Assertion did not significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 2.41, p = .30. 
Table 2.7 reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 2.7. Fixed effect of Assertion on P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 4.90 3.98, 5.82 
Single b = .47 -.74, 1.69 
Multiple  b = .18 -1.21, 1.57 
In terms of overall significance, the original and replication studies are broadly 
consistent. The parameter estimates for the single condition are also consistent. 
While the original study produced a parameter estimate with a negative sign, b = -.62, 
the confidence intervals for the original study -  95% CI [-1.44, 2] - overlap with 
those for the replication (see above) by some .76, which is above a benchmark of 
approximately half the average margin of error 1.02. The replication confidence 
interval is somewhat broader, suggesting greater uncertainty in the estimate. The 
parameter estimates for the multiple assertion condition are also consistent. Again, 
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the original study produced an estimate with a different sign, b = -.16. But the 
confidence intervals for the original study – 95% CI [-1.06, .73] – are fully within 
those for the replication. As above, the greater width of the interval does, however, 
suggest considerably more uncertainty in the estimate for the replication study than 
for original study.  
  
Conditional Probability. Figure 2.6 shows the descriptive data for the effect 
of Assertion on the conditional probability.  
  
Figure 2.6. Mean Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error 
The data suggest a linear trend of Assertion. Mean ratings increase from the null 
condition (M = 4.60) to the single condition (M = 7.14) and the multiple condition 
(M = 7.41), although the difference is small between the last two conditions. 
Including Assertion significantly improves fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 17.41, p 
<.001, replicating the overall significance of the original study. Table 2.8 
summarizes the estimates of fixed effects.  
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Table 2.8. Fixed effects of Assertion on Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 4.60 3.75, 5.45 
Single b = 2.54 1.75, 3.34 
Multiple  b = 2.82 1.90, 3.74 
 
The original and replication studies produced consistent estimates of the 
fixed effect of single assertion. The original study showed a similar parameter 
estimate, b = 2.69, and the confidence interval for the replication study falls wholly 
within that for the original study, 95% CI [1.32, 4.06]. This suggests greater 
certainty about the estimate for the replication study. The estimates for multiple 
assertion are also consistent. The original study showed a similar parameter estimate, 
b = 2.50, and there is considerable overlap (1.66) between the confidence intervals 
for the replication study and those for the original study, 95% CI [1.43, 3.56].  
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-square means, using the 
Tukey correction for multiple comparisons.  The increase from the null to single 
conditions was significant, M = 2.54, 95% CI [1.53, 3.55], t(46.55) = 6.09,  p <.001. 
This replicates the comparison from the original study, which showed a similar mean, 
M = 2.69 and overlapping confidence intervals, 95% CI [.68, 4.69]. The confidence 
interval for the replication study falls wholly within that for the original study, 
suggesting greater certainty in the estimate for the replication study. The increase 
from null to multiple conditions was also significant, M = 2.82, 95% CI [1.60, 4.03], 
t(24.98) = 5.78, p <.001. This, too, replicates the comparison from the original study, 
which showed a similar mean, M = 2.50, and overlapping confidence intervals, 95% 
HDI [1.02, 3.97], the overlap being 2.37. The increase from single to multiple 
conditions was not significant, M = .27, 95% CI [-.57, 1.12], t(103.18) = .77, p =.72. 
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This replicates the comparison from the original study. Here, though, the sign of the 
mean was different, M = -.19. However, the original confidence intervals, 95% CI [-
1.12, .73], show considerable overlap (1.3). Both sets of confidence intervals include 
0. Both sets of data suggest that the effect of Assertion plateaus.  
The original and replication studies offer consistent data. Although there 
were some differences in the means for P(Antecedent) and P(Consequent), there was 
substantial overlap in the confidence intervals. The data for the conditional 
probability showed similar means and, again, substantially overlapping confidence 
intervals. Together, the studies suggest that the effect of Assertion is focused on the 
conditional probability. The analyses for the two studies produce consistent results. 
There is no reliable evidence for an effect on P(Antecedent) and P(Consequent). 
Before discussing the implications of these data, we turn to the source expertise task.  
 
2.4 Experiment 2.3: effect of source expertise  
2.4.1 Method 
Participants. 122 (50 female; average age 37.15 years) completed this 
experiment; 4 participants had already been excluded since they were non-native 
speakers of English. Participants were recruited on Amazon Mechnical Turk using 
the same criteria and remuneration system as for Experiments 2.1 and 2.2.  
 
Materials. The items were as follows. Note that the items are presented in the 
expert source condition, with the inexpert source condition in brackets. The 
conditionals were the same as for Experiment 2.1, excluding item (3): during pre-
testing of the items, this item did not work well under a source expertise 
manipulation. The items, then, were as follows:  
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(1) Imagine you are at a large car dealership. The manager (A customer) 
tells you, 'If a car on this lot is a Mercedes, then it's black.' 
(2) Imagine you are visiting an infectious diseases ward. A professor of 
medicine (a medical student) tells you, 'If a patient on this ward 
has malaria, then they'll make a good recovery.' 
(3) Imagine you are at a veterinary hospital. A veterinary nurse (delivery 
man) tells you, 'If Fido the dog is in the hospital kennels, then he's 
had his operation.' 
(4) Imagine you are at a butterfly house. A butterfly keeper (five-year-old 
visitor to the butterfly house) tells you, 'If the butterfly is purple, 
then it's a fast flyer.' 
(5) Imagine you are at a New York coffee shop. The girlfriend of Dan, a 
customer, (an old friend of Dan, another customer, who hadn’t 
seen Dan for 10 years) tells you, 'If Dan is drinking a coffee, then 
his drink is decaffeinated.' 
(6) Imagine you are at a restaurant. The head chef of the restaurant (the 
restaurant’s regular handyman) tells you, 'If a dish is chicken stew, 
then it's gluten free'. 
As above, the items were followed by questions to elicit people’s judgments about 
the probability of the antecedent, the probability of the consequent, and the 
conditional probability. The probability questions were, again, simply, ‘What’s the 
probability that [antecedent/consequent/consequent given antecedent]?’  
 
Procedure. The design manipulated Expertise (Inexpert Source, Expert 
Source); the dependent measures were the probability of the antecedent, 
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P(Antecedent); the probability of the consequent, P(Consequent); and the conditional 
probability, P(Consequent|Antecedent). The task was between-subjects: participants 
were assigned, in a round-robin fashion, to a condition. After giving informed 
consent and demographic information, participants were shown the same instructions 
as for Experiment 2.1. Participants then provided ratings for each probability 
question for each item on a Likert-style scale from 0 (not at all possible) to 10 
(certain). There was a different page for each combination of the conditional and 
probability question: that is, participants saw each item three times, with a different 
probability question. The order of the pages was randomized. Finally, participants 
received debriefing information.  
 
2.4.2 Results & Discussion 
Probability of the Antecedent. Figure 2.7 shows the descriptive statistics for 
the effect of Expertise on the probability of the antecedent.  
  
Figure 2.7. Mean P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
These data do not support an effect of Expertise: note that means for inexpert 
sources (M = 4.48) and expert sources (M = 4.51) are very close. Indeed, including 
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Expertise did not significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(1) = .01, p =.93. 
Table 2.9 summarizes the estimates of the fixed effects. 
Table 2.9. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Inexpert) b = 4.48 3.85, 5.12 
Expert b = .02 -.52, .57 
 
Probability of the Consequent.  Figure 2.8 shows the descriptive statistics for 
the effect of Expertise on the probability of the consequent.  
  
Figure 2.8. Mean P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
The means for inexpert (M = 5.03) and expert (M =5.49) conditions are close 
together. Including Expertise did not significantly improve fit over the null model, 
χ2(1) = 3.28, p =.07. Table 2.10 reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 2.10. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Inexpert) b = 5.03 4.31, 5.76 
Expert b = .46 -.03, .94 
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Note that the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval shows only very slight 
overlap with 0, arguing for caution. Nevertheless, the difference between means, 
at .46, is small.  
 
Conditional Probability. Figure 2.9 shows the descriptive data for the effect 
of Expertise on the conditional probability.  
  
Figure 2.9. Mean Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error 
Mean rating of Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error 
The data suggest an effect of expertise: there is an increase from inexpert sources (M 
= 7.23) to expert sources (M = 8.59). Including Expertise significantly improved fit 
over the null model, χ2(1) = 8.18, p <.01. Table 2.11 reports the estimates of the 
fixed effects.  
Table 2.11. Fixed effects of Expertise on Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Inexpert) b = 7.21 6.58, 7.84 
Expert b = 1.38 .60, 2.15 
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 The data for this experiment suggest that Expertise, like Assertion, has a 
focused effect on the conditional probability; there was no evidence of a reliable 
effect on the probability of the antecedent or the probability of the consequent. The 
novelty of these data argues for replication. Moreover, since Experiment 2.3 did not 
include a null condition, the data are not directly comparable with the data for 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. This defect was remedied in Experiment 2.4.  
2.5 Experiment 2.4: replicating the effect of source expertise  
2.5.1 Method  
Participants. 179 participants (75 female; average age 36.32 years) 
completed this experiment; 1 participant had already been excluded since they were 
a non-native speaker of English. Participants were recruited on Amazon Mechnical 
Turk using the same criteria and remuneration system as for Experiments 2.1, 2.2 
and 2.3.  
  
Materials. The same items were used as for Experiment 2.3 with one small 
change. As in Experiment 2.2, the conditional (5) was changed to ‘If Dan is drinking 
a coffee, then it’s decaffeinated’. The P(Consequent) question referred to the 
probability of a coffee being decaffeinated, and the conditional probability question 
was phrased as follows, ‘Given that Dan’s drink is a caffeinated, what’s the 
probability that it is a coffee?’ A null condition was also introduced which matched 
that of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2: participants in this condition saw the context, such 
as ‘Imagine you are at a large car dealership’, and then the probability questions 
without seeing the conditional.  
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Procedure. As with the previous experiments, the survey was hosted on 
Mechanical Turk. The experiment manipulated Expertise (Null, Inexpert Source, 
Expert Source). Participants were assigned to condition round-robin style. The same 
procedural changes were introduced as for Experiment 2.2: there was now one page 
for each item. Below the item, the probability questions appeared together; the order 
was reversed in half the surveys. Participants rated the probabilities on a Likert-style 
scale from 0 (not at all possible) to 10 (certain).  
2.5.2 Results & Discussion 
Probability of the Antecedent. Figure 2.10 shows the descriptive data for the 
effect of Expertise on the probability of the antecedent.  
  
Figure 2.10. Mean P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
The data suggest little evidence for a clear effect, although there is a very small 
increase from the null condition (M = 4.05) to the inexpert condition (M = 4.43) and 
the expert condition (M = 4.56). Indeed, including Expertise did not significantly 
improve model fit, χ2(2) = .77, p =.68. Table 2.12 reports the estimates of the fixed 
effects.  
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Table 2.12. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 4.05 2.58, 5.51 
Inexpert b = .38 -.78, 1.54 
Expert  b = .52 -.67, 1.71 
 
In terms of overall significance, the data replicate the original study. In the original 
study, the Expertise variable had only two levels, whereas here there are three. 
However, parameter estimates can still be compared by reconstructing the relevant 
values, since the b values correspond to the mean in the baseline condition, for the 
intercept, and the mean difference from it for the remaining conditions. The intercept 
in the original is the estimate for the inexpert condition, MInexpert = 4.48, 95% CI 
[3.84, 5.12]. This corresponds to the replication inexpert condition (reconstructed 
from the table above), MInexpert = 4.43, 95% CI [3.27, 5.59]. The parameter estimates 
are tightly clustered, and the confidence interval for the original inexpert condition is 
wholly included in the confidence interval for the replication inexpert condition. The 
estimates are, thus, consistent. The estimates for the expert condition are closely 
clustered, and the confidence interval for the replication once again wholly include 
that for the original study: for the original study, MExpert = 4.50, 95% CI [3.96, 5.05]; 
for the replication, MExpert = 4.57, 95% CI [3.38, 5.76].  
Probability of the Consequent. Figure 2.11 shows the descriptive data for the 
effect of Expertise on the probability of the consequent.  
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Figure 2.11. Mean P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
The data suggest a small increase from the null condition (M = 4.60) to the inexpert 
condition (M = 5.30) and the expert condition (M = 5.65). However, including 
Expertise did not significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(2)  = 1.34, p =.51. 
Table 2.13 reports the estimates of the fixed effects.   
Table 2.13. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 4.60 3.54, 5.66 
Inexpert b = .70 -.88, 2.29 
Expert  b = 1.05 -.84, 2.93 
The replication study produced a non-significant result, as did the original study. The 
estimate for the fixed effect of the inexpert condition in the original study was 
MInexpert = 5.03, 95% CI [4.31, 5.76]. The estimate for the inexpert condition above is 
MInexpert = 5.30, 95% CI [3.72, 6.89]. The estimates are close together, and the 
confidence interval for the replication wholly includes that for the original study, 
suggesting consistency. The estimates for the expert condition are very close for the 
original and replication studies, and, once again, the confidence interval for the 
replication study wholly includes that for the original study: for the original study, 
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MExpert= 5.49, 95% CI [5.00, 5.97]; and for the replication, MExpert= 5.65, 95% CI 
[3.76, 7.53]. Note that the latter interval is rather wide, suggesting uncertainty about 
the estimate.  
  
Conditional Probability. Figure 2.12 shows the descriptive data for the effect 
of Expertise on the conditional probability.  
  
Figure 2.12. Mean Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error 
The data suggest a linear trend from the null condition (M = 3.94) to the inexpert 
condition (M = 7.11) and the expert condition (M = 8.77). Including Expertise 
significantly improved fit over the null model, χ2(2)  = 20.39, p <.001. Table 2.14 
reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 2.14. Fixed effects of Expertise on Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 3.94 3.21, 4.67 
Inexpert b = 3.17 2.19, 4.15 
Expert  b = 4.83 3.97, 5.69 
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-squares means, using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The increase from the null to inexpert 
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conditions was significant, M = 3.17, 95% CI [1.74, 4.60], t(10.55) = 6.02,  p <.001. 
The increase from the null to expert conditions was significant, M = 4.83, 95% CI 
[3.63, 6.04], t(14.33) = 10.47, p <.001. The increase from the inexpert to expert 
conditions was also significant, M = 1.66, 95% CI [.52, 2.81], t(16.59) = 3.72, p 
=.005. 
The parameter estimates for the inexpert condition are consistent between the 
original and replication studies: for the original study, MInexpert = 7.21, 95% CI [6.58, 
7.84]; and for the replication, MInexpert  = 7.11, 95% CI [6.13, 8.09]. Once again, the 
estimates are tightly clustered, and the confidence interval for the replication 
includes that for the original study. The parameter estimates for the expert condition 
are also consistent between the original and replication studies: for the original study, 
MExpert = 8.59, 95% CI [7.81, 9.36]; and for the replication study, MExpert = 8.77, 95% 
CI [7.91, 9.63]. The estimates are close together, and there is considerable overlap in 
the confidence intervals (1.45).  
 The original and replication studies offer consistent data: the means are close 
together for all conditions and dependent variables, and the confidence intervals 
overlap substantially. The data suggest that Expertise has a focused effect on the 
conditional probability. There is no evidence of a reliable effect on the probability of 
the antecedent and the probability of the consequent.  
2.6 General Discussion 
The four experiments reported above offer insight into how our beliefs 
change when we learn a testimonial conditional. Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 showed 
that assertion increases the conditional probability, though with a diminishing return: 
ratings were not higher in the multiple-assertion condition than in the single-
assertion condition. Assertion did not reliably influence the probability of the 
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antecedent or the probability of the consequent. Experiments 2.3 and 2.4 showed that 
source expertise likewise increases the conditional probability, but here there was no 
diminishing return: ratings were reliably higher for expert than inexpert sources. 
Again, though, the effect was limited to the conditional probability: expertise did not 
reliably influence the probability of the antecedent and the probability of the 
consequent. These data can be taken to generalize the findings of Stevenson and 
Over (2001) to testimonial contexts and to a different manipulation, the Assertion 
manipulation.  
The data are also consistent with a large body of work in the psychology of 
reasoning which argues that the meaning of the conditional is closely associated with 
the conditional probability. As we saw in the Introduction, one way to interpret this 
association is the suppositional theory of meaning. On this account, when we hear a 
conditional If A, B, ‘[we] suppose (assume, hypothesize) that A, and make a 
hypothetical judgment about B, under the supposition that A, in light of your other 
beliefs’ (Edgington, 2014).  This judgment amounts to the conditional probability 
(for extended discussion, see, e.g., Evans & Over, 2004). Here is how a 
suppositional theorist could account for the present data. Participants supposed that 
the antecedent was true, and judged the conditional probability. In making their 
judgments, participants in the assertion task simply drew on the fact of assertion; 
participants in the source-expertise task drew also on the information about the 
source. But why should participants increase29 the conditional probability? Here, the 
suppositional theorist can invoke the pragmatic assumption: that asserting a 
                                                
 
29 Or, more strictly, why should participants in the assertion conditions give higher 
ratings than the control condition? I am assuming, here, that the between-subjects design 
approximates learning a conditional.  
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 116 
conditional implies high conditional probability. In this experiment, then, 
participants moved from a non-committal probability to a higher one. Participants 
did not, however, reliably modify their belief in the antecedent. Coherently, then, 
they also did not reliably modify their belief in the consequent. This picture is also 
consistent with an account in linguistics which takes conditionals to be defined by 
remoteness: that is, in uttering an indicative conditional, a speaker is not committing 
to the truth (or falsity) of the antecedent (Elder & Jaszczolt, 2016). 
The data sit less well with two other prominent accounts. The first takes the 
indicative conditional to be the material conditional. Although this account has had 
prominent supporters (Grice, 1975; Jackson, 1979), it is not widely supported in 
contemporary philosophy (Bennett, 2003; Hartmann & Rafiee Rad, 2017). The 
material conditional does, however, seem to underpin the approach to the conditional 
of Mental Models Theory30 (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). The material 
conditional has limited appeal in part because its account of learning a conditional 
has counterintuitive consequences (for discussion, see Hartmann & Rafiee Rad, 
2017; Popper & Miller, 1983). Assuming the material conditional, recall, means 
assuming that the probability of the conditional ‘If P, Q’ is equivalent to the 
disjunction P(~P v Q). Accordingly, learning a conditional can be construed as 
conditioning on the disjunction. This conditioning is compatible with an increase in 
the conditional probability, P(Q|P).  To illustrate, take the simple case in which 
conditioning means assigning  P = 1 to the disjunction. The disjunction (~P v Q) 
                                                
 
30The Mental Models account is not clearly expressed. Although Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne (2002) try to distinguish their account from the material conditional, referring to 
possibilities rather than truth, it still seems to reduce to the material conditional, plus highly 
flexible semantic and pragmatic modulation (for discussion, see Krzyżanowska, Collins, & 
Hahn, 2017). 
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corresponds to four conjunctions. Cases (1) to (3) make the disjunction true; case (4) 
makes it false: 
(1) ~P & Q 
(2) ~P & ~Q 
(3)  P & Q 
(4) P & ~Q 
Conditioning on (~P v Q) means eliminating case (4): there are no P cases which are 
not also Q cases. The conditional probability P(Q|P), therefore, increases to 1. But, 
less happily, as long as two constraints hold  – 0 < P < 1 and 0 < Q < 1 – when we 
learn a conditional we should decrease the probability P and increase the probability 
of Q (for the proofs, see Popper & Miller, 1983). These latter predictions are not 
only counterintuitive; they are not supported by the data above.  
The second prominent account takes learning a conditional to be governed by 
an attempt to minimize the difference between the prior and posterior distributions, 
defined formally as the Kullback-Leibler divergence (Hartmann & Rafiee Rad, 
2017). This account has the same consequences for the probability of the antecedent 
as the material conditional as long as we assume a model for the conditional such as 
Figure 2.13, where ‘H’ represents the antecedent and ‘E’ the consequent:  
 
 
H E 
 
Figure 2.13. Simple Bayesian belief network for a conditional 
Again, the data above do not support this downward revision in the probability of the 
antecedent. This problem can be avoided by building a more extensive causal model 
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of the relevant situation. Doing so, as Hartmann and Rafiee Rad (2017) show, leads 
to other, more intuitively appealing revisions of belief. This strategy does not seem 
plausible for the present materials, however, as they are deliberately light on causal 
information. An alternative but related strategy, which models information about the 
sources, will be described in Chapter 4. 
 Although the present data cohere well with the dominant theory of the 
conditional within psychology and philosophy, there is reason to doubt how well the 
data will generalize. Consider the following intuitions.  
Intuition 1: It is a sunny day, without a cloud in the sky, but you have not 
seen the weather forecast. Someone says to you, ‘If it rains this afternoon, 
they’ll have to postpone the tennis match’.  
In this context, it seems likely that the hearer would increase their judgment of the 
probability of rain.  
Intuition 2: You have been promised a job, and you believe that you are 
certain to get it. A trusted and knowledgeable colleague says to you, ‘If you 
get the job, we can collaborate more’.  
In this context, it seems likely that the hearer would decrease their judgment of the 
probability of getting the job. This intuition may be clearer with the intonation ‘IF 
you get the job, we can collaborate more’.  The relevant factor seems to be the 
hearer’s prior beliefs. Similar intuitions underlie the examples in Douven’s (2012) 
influential paper and the following passage from Evans and Over (2004, pp. 144-5): 
‘”If p then q” is not assertable – or at least has low relevance – in most 
contexts if P(p) is too or if P(q|p) is too low. As conditionals only apply to p-
states, such states must normally be reasonably probable (at least in the near 
future for a conditional statement to have relevance.’ 
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Presumably, then, the hearer of a conditional will assume that the antecedent is 
reasonably probable. Chapter 4 will explore these intuitions further.  
 Finally, in this chapter, there is an important limitation in the present design: 
namely, that participants responded with point estimates. While such responses are 
simple and intuitive, they may conceal subtle belief change. For instance, 
participants’ beliefs might be better captured by a distribution, the central tendency 
corresponding to the point estimate. The point estimates may not pick up changes to 
the underlying distributions. This possibility will be explored in the next chapter.  
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3 Conditionals, Testimony, and Interval Estimates 
The previous chapter introduced novel data on how people’s beliefs change 
when they learn a conditional. The data suggested that belief change focuses on the 
conditional probability, leaving the probability of the antecedent and of the 
consequent unaffected. The data sit well with the suppositional theory of the 
conditional, but they are intuitively surprising. Given their surprisingness and their 
relevance to theories of the conditional, it is worth probing deeper to ascertain 
whether belief change really is so focused.  
This chapter explores the simplest adaptation to the experimental design: 
namely, to allow participants to respond by indicating a range of values. This 
adaptation allows a straightforward test of the possibility that there is belief change 
hiding behind the point estimates. Participants indicated a range by positioning two 
endpoints of a slider. This dependent measure should detect changes to an 
underlying probability distribution which would not have been detected by point 
estimates. The experiments below replicate those in the preceding chapter with this 
new dependent measure. 
3.1 Experiment 3.1: Assertion and Interval Estimates  
3.1.1 Method 
Participants. 187 (92 female, 1 non-binary; average age 37.09 years) 
participants completed this experiment; 5 participants had already been excluded 
since they were non-native English speakers. As above, participants were recruited 
via the intermediary MTurk Data (www.mturkdata.com). High qualifications were 
set for the task to improve the quality of the data and maximize the number of native 
English speakers: participants had to be resident in the US, and have an overall 
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approval rating of 99% for 1,000 previously completed tasks. Participants received a 
small fee, chosen to exceed the US minimum wage per minute.  
Materials. These were the same as in Experiment 2.2.  
Procedure. As in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, the design manipulated Assertion 
(Null, Single, Multiple), and the dependent measures were the probability of the 
antecedent, the probability of the consequent, and the conditional probability. The 
design was between-subjects. Participants first gave informed consent, and were then 
assigned, in a round-robin fashion, to a condition. They were then shown the same 
general instructions as for Experiments 2.1 to 2.4. Since the dependent measure – 
ratings with a slider – was less transparent, participants were shown an additional set 
of instructions as follows: 
We would like you to estimate the probability of various events. To do this, 
you will need to use a slider on the scale provided. Here is how you can use 
the slider. Imagine that you’ve been given the task of estimating the 
probability of heads when tossing a coin. You have tested the coin to your 
satisfaction, and you believe that the coin is fair. In this case, you might be 
pretty confident in estimating that the probability of heads is 50%. You can 
position the sliders in the following way for such an estimate. 
Figure 3.1 shows the slider that participants saw at this point. 
 
Figure 3.1. Illustrative slider for exact estimate of P=.5 
The instructions then continued as follows:  
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 Now imagine that you have to estimate the probability of heads when tossing 
another coin. This time, the coin looks strange, and you believe it might be a 
coin from a magic shop. In this case, 50% might still be your best estimate. 
But you might be less confident in your estimate. You can position the sliders 
in the following way for such an estimate.  
Figure 3.2 shows the slider that participants saw at this point.  
 
Figure 3.2. Illustrative slider for uncertain estimate 
The instructions finished as follows:  
In the following pages, you’ll be asked to make a series of probability 
estimates. Your estimate can be anywhere on a scale from 0% to 100%. You 
may also want to choose an interval to show your confidence your estimates 
in the way described above. 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 used different approaches for presenting the probability 
questions: Experiment 2.1 presented each probability question on a separate screen, 
so that participants saw each item three times but with different probability 
questions; Experiment 2.2 presented all the probability questions together. Other 
things being equal, the latter method is preferable. However, the latter method 
resulted in considerable visual complexity in the present experiment. Since the 
results did not differ reliably for Experiments 2.1. and 2.2, the present experiment 
presented the probability questions separately to minimize the visual complexity. 
After the probability question, participants were asked to ‘Please use the sliders to 
give your personal estimate between 0% (not at all possible) and 100% (certain).’ 
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The order of items was randomized. Finally, participants received debriefing 
information.  
3.1.2 Results and Discussion 
The analysis, here, takes the same general approach as with the point 
estimates: crossed random-effects models followed up by pairwise comparisons 
where appropriate. The analysis treated the dependent measure in two different ways. 
Firstly, the end points of the sliders were averaged to produce a point value 
(henceforth, ‘point values’) and entered into the models; this method allows 
replication of the data in Experiments 2.1 and 2.2. Secondly, the ranges of the sliders 
(henceforth, ‘slider ranges’) were entered into the models. Since these are two ways 
of looking at the same data, it is appropriate to correct for multiple analyses. Thus, 
the significance level is p =.025 below.  
Probability of the Antecedent.  
Point Values. Figure 3.3 shows the descriptive data for the effect of Assertion 
on the point values for the probability of the antecedent.  
  
Figure 3.3. Mean point value of P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
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The descriptive data suggest small differences between conditions: there is a slight 
decrease from the null condition (M = 52.61) to the single condition (M = 48.58) and 
then a slight decrease to the multiple condition (M = 49.94). Including Assertion did 
not significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(2)  = 1.49, p = .47. Table 3.1 
reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 3.1. Fixed effects of Assertion on point values of P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 52.68 45.19, 60.16 
Single b = -4.10 -10.56, 2.36 
Multiple  b = -2.74 -9.12, 3.64 
These data offer no clear evidence for an effect of Assertion, and are consistent with 
the data in the studies with point estimates.  
Slider Ranges. Figure 3.4 shows the descriptive data for the effect of 
Assertion on the slider ranges. 
  
Figure 3.4. Mean slider range by condition; error bars are standard error 
These data suggest that participants are uncertain about their probability estimates. 
The data also slight trend for an increase in the slider ranges as the level of Assertion 
increases: from the null condition (M = 45.95) to the single condition (M = 50.68) 
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and the multiple condition (M = 53.09). However, including Assertion did not 
significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 3.08, p =.21. Because of 
convergence problems, no estimate was included for the covariance of random 
intercepts and slopes. Table 3.2 reports the estimates for the fixed effects.  
Table 3.2. Fixed effects of Assertion on slider ranges of P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 45.85 40.06, 51.65 
Single b = 4.83 -3.37, 13.03 
Multiple  b = 7.24 -1.02, 15.51 
These data are consistent with those of Experiments 2.1 and 2.2 and with the 
analysis of the point values above.  
 
 
 Probability of the Consequent.  
Point Values. Figure 3.5 shows the descriptive data for the effect of Expertise 
on the point values for the probability of the consequent. 
  
Figure 3.5. Mean point values of P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
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These data suggest, once again, that there is little evidence for an effect, as the 
means of the null condition (M = 54.96), the single condition (M = 55.32) and 
multiple condition (M = 57.55) are close together (though increasing). Including 
Assertion did not significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(2) = .10, p =.95. 
Table 3.3 report the fixed effects.  
Table 3.3. Fixed effects of Assertion on point values of P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 55.07 47.80, 62.34 
Single b = .25 -10.56, 11.06 
Multiple  b = 1.05 -10.57, 12.68 
 
 Slider Ranges. Figure 3.6 shows the descriptive data for the effect of 
Assertion on the slider ranges for the probability of the consequent.  
  
Figure 3.6. Mean range of P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
The data suggest little evidence for an effect: ranges increase slightly from the null 
condition (M = 44.56) to the single condition (M = 46.20) and fall again to the 
multiple condition (M = 45.48). Including Assertion did not significantly improve fit 
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over the null model, χ2(2) = .45, p =.80. Table 3.4 reports the estimates of the fixed 
effects.  
Table 3.4. Fixed effects of Assertion on slider ranges for P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 44.42 38.51, 50.32 
Single b = 1.78 -7.43, 10.99 
Multiple  b = 3.43 -6.55, 13.41 
 
Taken together the data for P(Consequent) are consistent with the data for 
Experiments 2.1 and 2.2: there is no reliable change in the probability of the 
consequent, whether it is measured as a point estimate or as an interval.  
 Conditional Probability.  
 Point Values. Figure 3.7 shows the descriptive data for the effect of Assertion 
on the point values for the conditional probability. 
  
Figure 3.7. Mean point values of Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are 
standard error 
The data suggest a linear trend for Assertion to increase the slider averages for the 
conditional probability. There is an increase from the null condition (M = 51.62) to 
the single condition (M = 72.62) and a smaller increase to the multiple condition (M 
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= 75.19). Indeed, including Assertion significantly improved fit over the null model, 
χ2(2) = 17.76, p < .001. Table 3.5 reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 3.5. Fixed effects of Assertion on Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 51.34 45.09, 57.59 
Single b = 21.28 13.53, 29.04 
Multiple  b = 23.74 15.21, 32.27 
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-squares means using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The increase from null to single assertion was 
significant, M = 21.28, 95% CI [11.67, 30.90], t(72.70) = 5.30, p <.001. So too was 
the increase from null to multiple assertion, M = 23.74, 95% CI [12.91, 34.57], 
t(37.93) = 5.35, p <.001. The increase from single to multiple assertion, in contrast, 
was not significant, M = 2.45, 95% CI [-6.32, 11.22], t(148.91) = .66, p = .79. These 
data are consistent with the data from the point-estimate studies. There is, again, 
evidence for a plateauing in the effect of Assertion.  
 Slider Ranges. Figure 3.8 shows the descriptive data for the effect of 
Assertion on the slider ranges for the conditional probability.  
  
Figure 3.8. Mean range of Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error 
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There is evidence for a linear trend of Assertion: ranges decrease from the null 
condition (M = 46.18) to the single condition (M = 37.60) and the multiple condition 
(M = 32.41). Because of convergence problems, the mixed-effects, here, excluded 
the estimates of the covariance for random slopes and intercepts. Including Assertion 
improved fit over the null model. We have adopted the more stringent significance 
level of p =.025. The model improved fit, χ2(2) = 7.26, p = .027. Given this closeness, 
further analyses are justified. 
Table 3.6. Fixed effects of Assertion on ranges for Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 46.42 39.44, 53.41 
Single b = -8.83 -18.95, 1.30 
Multiple  b = -13.85 -24.02, -3.68 
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-squares means, using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The decrease from the null to single conditions 
was not significant, M = -8.83, 95% CI [-21.13, 3.48], t(170.09) = -1.70, p =.21. The 
decrease from the null to multiple conditions was significant, M = -13.85, 95% CI [-
26.21, -1.49], t(171.43) = -2.65, p =.02. The decrease from the single to multiple 
conditions was not significant, M = -5.02, 95% CI [-5.02, 5.38], t(166.71) = -.93, p 
=.62. It is well to note that, since participants made their response on a bounded 
scale, there will inevitably be some shortening of the ranges at the ends of the scale. 
These data should, therefore, be interpreted cautiously. However, these data can be 
taken to suggest that Assertion decreases the slider range: that people’s beliefs 
become more precise as the level of Assertion increases.  
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3.2 Experiment 3.2: Expertise and Interval Estimates 
3.2.1 Method  
Participants. 173 (52 female, 3 non-binary; average age 38.43 years) 
participants completed the task; 5 participants had already been excluded since they 
were non-native speakers of English. As above, participants were recruited via the 
intermediary MTurk Data (www.mturkdata.com). High qualifications were set for 
the task to improve the quality of the data and maximize the number of native 
English speakers: participants had to be resident in the US, and have an overall 
approval rating of 99% for 1,000 previously completed tasks. Participants received a 
small fee, chosen to exceed the US minimum wage per minute.  
Materials. These were the same as for Experiment 2.4.  
Procedure. This experiment manipulated Expertise (Null, Inexpert, Expert). 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 3.1.  
3.2.2 Results & Discussion  
As with the Assertion data, this section adopts a more stringent significance 
level of p =.025 to account for multiple analyses of the same data.  
Probability of the Antecedent.  
Point Values. Figure 3.9 shows the descriptive data for the effect of Expertise 
on the slider averages for the probability of the antecedent.   
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Figure 3.9. Mean point values of P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
The data do not suggest a clear trend: there is a small decrease from the null 
condition (M = 54.58) to the inexpert condition (M = 50.86) and then an increase to 
the expert condition (M = 51.71). Including Expertise did not significantly improve 
fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 1.88, p = .39. Table 3.7 reports the estimates of the 
fixed effects.  
Table 3.7. Fixed effects of Expertise on point values of P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 54.63 48.86, 60.40 
Inexpert b = -3.84 -9.57, 1.89 
Expert  b = -2.93 -8.57, 2.70 
 
Slider Ranges. Figure 3.10 shows the descriptive data for the effect of 
Expertise on the slider ranges for the probability of the antecedent.  
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Figure 3.10. Mean slider ranges for P(Antecedent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
As above, there is little evidence for a trend: the means for the null condition (M = 
54.27), inexpert condition (M = 50.47) and expert condition (M = 54.94) are 
clustered, with the inexpert condition slightly lower. Because of convergence 
problems, the models, here, exclude the random intercepts (though not the random 
slopes) for topic. Including Expertise did not significantly improve fit over the null 
model, χ2(2) = 1.25, p =.53. 
Table 3.8. Fixed effects of Expertise on slider ranges for P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 54.23 46.93, 61.54 
Inexpert b = -3.86 -12.45, 4.73 
Expert  b = .74 -8.27, 9.76 
 
 Probability of the Consequent.   
 Point values. Figure 3.11 shows the descriptive data for the effect of 
Expertise on the point values for the probability of the antecedent.  
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Figure 3.11. Mean point values of P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard error 
The means are, again, grouped close together for the null condition (M = 56.33), 
inexpert condition (M = 55.31) and expert condition (M = 58.91). Including 
Expertise did not significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 1.27, p = .53. 
Table 3.9. Fixed effects of Expertise on point values for P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 56.38 51.03. 61.72 
Inexpert b = -1.11 -8.38. 6.15 
Expert  b = .2.53 -8.84, 13.90 
 
 Slider Ranges. Figure 3.12 shows the descriptive data for the effect of 
Expertise on the probability of the consequent.  
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Figure 3.12. Mean slider ranges for P(Consequent) by condition; error bars are standard 
error 
Once again, the means are tightly clustered for the null condition (M = 50.47), the 
inexpert condition (M = 50.32) and the expert condition (M = 50.34). The models 
exclude the random intercept of items because of convergence problems. Including 
Expertise did not significantly improve fit over the null model, χ2(2) = .0008, p =1. 
Table 3.10. Fixed effects of Expertise on slider ranges for P(Consequent); error bars are 
standard error 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 50.40 46.93, 61.54 
Inexpert b = -.12 -12.45, 4.73 
Expert  b = -.04 -8.27, 9.76 
 
 Conditional Probability.  
 Point Values. Figure 3.13 shows the descriptive data for the effect of 
Expertise on the point values for the Conditional Probability.  
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Figure 3.13. Mean point values for Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are 
standard error 
The data suggest a linear trend for the slider averages to increase with Expertise 
from the null condition (M = 52.02) to the inexpert condition (M = 68.68) and the 
expert condition (M = 82.26). Including Expertise significantly improved fit over the 
null model, χ2(2) = 23.84, p <.001. Table 3.11 reports the estimates of the fixed 
effects.  
Table 3.11. Fixed effects of Expertise on point values for Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 52.05 47.18, 56.91 
Inexpert b = 16.61 9.87, 23.35 
Expert  b = 30.22 23.41, 37.04 
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-square means, using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The increase from null to inexpert conditions 
was significant, M = 16.61, 95% CI [8.29, 24.94], t(75.78) = 4.77, p <.001. So too 
was the increase from null to expert conditions, M = 30.22, 95% CI [21.82, 38.62], 
t(81.95) = 8.59, p <.001. The increase from inexpert to expert conditions was also 
significant, M = 13.61, 95% CI [5.00, 22.21], t(67.75) = 3.79, p <.001. These data 
replicate the findings of the point-estimate studies.  
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 Slider Ranges. Figure 3.14 shows the descriptive data for the effect of 
Expertise on the slider ranges for the conditional probability.   
  
Figure 3.14. Mean slider ranges for Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are 
standard error 
The data suggest a linear trend for the slider ranges to decrease with Expertise, from 
the null condition (M = 51.93) to the inexpert condition (M = 40.38) and the expert 
condition (M = 28.97). The models, here, excluded the estimate of the covariance of 
random slopes and intercepts. Including Expertise significantly improved fit over the 
null condition, χ2(2) = 16.84, p <.001. Table 3.12 reports the estimates of the fixed 
effects.  
Table 3.12. Fixed effects of Expertise on slider ranges for Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 51.93 44.31, 59.55 
Inexpert b = -11.55 -22.47, -.63 
Expert  b = -22.98 -33.66, -12.30 
 
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-squares means, using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The decrease from null to inexpert conditions 
was non-significant, M = -11.55, 95% CI [-24.91, 1.80], t(117.56) = -2.05, p =.10. 
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The decrease from null to expert conditions was significant, M = -22.98, 95% CI [-
35.99, -9.97], t(152.25) = -4.18, p <.001. The decrease from inexpert to expert 
conditions was non-significant, M = -11.42, 95% CI [-11.42, 5.63], t(122.69) = -2.03, 
p = .11. As with the Assertion data, there is a trend for participants’ beliefs to 
become more precise; but, again as with the Assertion, this increasing precision may 
partly be due to inevitable narrowing of the range towards the end of the bounded 
scale. 
 
3.3 General Discussion  
This chapter has investigated belief change from learning a conditional as 
measured by interval estimates.  The data support the findings of Chapter 2. On 
learning a conditional, participants did not reliably adjust their judgments of the 
probability of the antecedent or the probability of the consequent, whether the 
estimates were analysed as point estimates or intervals. For these probabilities, their 
estimates were wide, indicating high uncertainty. However, participants did, again, 
reliably increase their judgments of the conditional probability; they also appeared to 
make their judgments more precise.  
These data arose from considering the conditional in simple assertions, that is, 
in simple pragmatic contexts. The data offer suggestive evidence about how people 
change their beliefs when they learn a conditional from a speaker; hence, about the 
information content – the meaning (pragmatics included) – of the conditional. All the 
experiments, thus far, have derived predictions from rational models in the 
philosophy of testimony, illustrating the value of considering pragmatics, sources, 
and rationality together.  
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Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 offer further evidence against the material 
conditional and its psychological variants. There was, again, no good evidence that 
people decreased their belief in the probability of the antecedent or that they 
increased their belief in the probability of the consequent. The data also count as 
further evidence against the simple Bayesian belief network with minimization of the 
Kullback-Leibler Divergence. This account also predicts that people revise their 
belief in the antecedent downwards. Experiments 3.1 and 3.2 suggest, then, that the 
data in Chapter 2 were not just an artefact of the response scale.  
In contrast, these data are consistent with two competitors of the material 
conditional. As discussed in Chapter 2, the first of these theories, the suppositional 
theory, sits well with focal change to the conditional probability. Recall that, on this 
account, people suppose the antecedent to be true, and then judge the conditional 
probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The theory does not imply 
change to the probability of the antecedent or the probability of the consequent. 
Although the theory does not seem to imply that interval estimates should decrease, 
it is not inconsistent with this finding. Similarly, the data are consistent with the idea 
of remoteness: that is, the idea that the speaker of a conditional makes no 
commitment to the truth or falsity of the antecedent of an indicative conditional.  
In sum, the data so far support the leading theory of the conditional in 
psychology, namely the suppositional theory, and they extend the data of Stevenson 
and Over (2001). But there remain issues to be resolved. Firstly, each Assertion 
experiment has suggested a diminishing return, or plateauing: there is a reliable 
increase from the null to single-assertion conditions, but no reliable difference 
between single and multiple-assertion conditions. This finding is intuitively 
surprising and, potentially, problematic from the point of view of rationality. In 
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many (though not all) circumstances, a good case can be made that a hearer should 
put more weight in testimony from multiple sources than from a single source 
(Bovens & Hartmann, 2003). Secondly, the tension remains between the finding of 
no reliable change to the probability of the antecedent or the probability of the 
consequent and the intuition that the probability of the antecedent, at least, will shift 
in some contexts, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
The next chapter will explore the issues raised in the preceding paragraph. In 
so doing, it will reveal findings which illustrate the advantages of considering 
sources, rationality, and pragmatics together. The chapter will also discuss a model 
for capturing the effects revealed by these three chapters on testimony and the 
conditional.  
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4 Independent Testimony, Priors, and a Model of Testimonial Conditionals 
This chapter rounds off the section of the thesis on conditionals and 
testimony. It will address two outstanding issues from previous chapters - the role of 
multiple sources, and the role of the prior – and report experiments on them. The 
chapter will close by drawing together the data from these three chapters in a general 
discussion. Taken as a whole, the data demonstrate the limits of current modelling 
techniques. This point will be illustrated by discussing attempts to model the data 
with Bayesian belief networks (Collins, Krzyżanowska, Wheeler, Hartmann, & Hahn, 
2017).   
4.1.1 Multiple Testimony 
Chapters 2 and 3 reported a consistent difference between the assertion and 
expertise experiments, which this chapter will explore. In each assertion experiment, 
the Assertion variable increased ratings of the conditional probability, but this effect 
plateaued. In no assertion experiment was there a reliable difference between the 
single and multiple conditions. In each expertise experiment, however, the Expertise 
variable increased ratings of the conditional probability at each level: inexpert 
sources reliably increased the conditional probability over the null condition; expert 
sources reliably increased the conditional probability over inexpert sources. In only 
one analysis was there no reliable difference between the inexpert and expert 
conditions: namely, when the sliders data, from Chapter 3, were treated as ranges 
(though when point values were calculated, there was a reliable difference).  
This difference requires explanation. Intuitively, it is puzzling that 
participants were prepared to take one source at their word but that several sources 
made no reliable difference. Again intuitively, corroboration is desirable: think of 
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multiple witnesses to a crime, or multiple sources for a news story (Sullivan, 2016). 
There are also formal results suggesting that multiplicity of sources can, in the right 
circumstances, be decisive (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003). Consequently, it is 
important to test whether the ineffectiveness of multiple testimonies is a robust 
finding or merely an artefact of the experimental materials.  
It is worth examining these intuitions and formal results more closely. Take, 
first, the intuition that having more sources is better. This intuition will not always 
hold. In a court case, for instance, multiple witnesses are desirable, but the 
multiplicity is only probative if the witnesses have not conferred and agreed on story 
(Kadane & Schum, 1996).  In other words, the witnesses need to be independent to 
some degree.  The formal results, too, are subtle. It may sometimes be wise to place 
more trust in groups than individuals, since group accuracy often surpasses 
individual accuracy (Surowiecki, 2005). Indeed, as long as individual group 
members have an accuracy above P = .5 and make independent judgments, group 
accuracy converges on the truth (Condorcet, 1785; for discussion, see, e.g., Hahn, 
Harris, & Corner, 2016). Multiplicity can also be an asset in testimony. Here, at least 
three factors are relevant: the coherence of the claims; the number, or proportion, of 
sources making a claim; and the reliability of the sources (Bovens & Hartmann, 
2003; for empirical evidence on coherence, see Harris & Hahn, 2009). Coherent 
evidence is often, though not always, more likely to be true (Bovens & Hartmann, 
2003; Glass, 2007; Olsson, 2005), especially when the sources are independent 
(Olsson & Schubert, 2007; Schubert, 2012). The absolute number of sources is 
important when the sources are independent (List, 2004); the proportion of sources is 
important when the sources are dependent (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003). Lastly, 
reliability and perceived bias towards a positive report influence whether it is 
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for testimony to be dependent or independent (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; for 
discussion, see Hahn, Harris, & Corner, 2016).  
How do these normative issues bear on the Assertion variable in the present 
studies? Take, for example, the following item from the experimental materials:  
Adam, Barbara, Nick and Sue are at a large car dealership. They say, ‘If a car 
on this lot is a Mercedes, then it’s black.’  
Here, the sources are clearly making a maximally coherent claim, but the 
relationship between the sources is ambiguous. The sources could be fully dependent, 
fully independent, or somewhere in between. If the sources are fully dependent, then 
there is little, if anything, to be gained in revising one’s belief higher than for a 
single source. Compare the existing item with the following novel item: 
Adam, Barbara, Nick and Sue are each at a large car dealership. They don’t 
know each other, and haven’t spoken to each other. They each tell you 
independently, ‘If a car on this lot is a Mercedes, then it’s black.’  
This example can only reasonably be read as independent testimony. In these simple 
cases, in which the only information is the claim and the number of people making 
the claim, it seems both likely that participants will, and desirable that they should, 
place more weight in multiple independent testimony than in single testimony (Hahn 
et al., 2016).  
Experiment 4.1, below, uses such items to test the robustness of the 
plateauing effect: the ineffectiveness of the multiple assertion condition.  
4.1.2 Priors 
Chapters 2 and 3 have found that assertion and expertise predicted ratings of 
the conditional probability, but found no such evidence for an effect on the 
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probability of the antecedent or the probability of the consequent. These data seem 
intuitively surprising. Chapter 2 discussed the following two intuitions: 
Intuition 1: It is a sunny day, without a cloud in the sky, but you have not see 
the weather forecast. Someone says to you, ‘If it rains this afternoon, they’ll 
have to postpone the tennis match’.  
The hearer increases his/her judgment of the probability of rain.  
Intuition 2: You have been promised a job, and you believe that you are 
certain to get it. A trusted and knowledgeable colleague says to you, ‘If you 
get the job, we can collaborate more’.  
The hearer decreases his/her judgment of the probability of getting the job.  
These intuitions can be buttressed by natural-language pragmatics. Take, first, 
Intuition 1. The conditional, here, would be an odd thing to say unless there were a 
considerable chance that the antecedent obtains: that there will be rain. This is a 
stronger phenomenon than the standard presupposition of the indicative conditional, 
that the antecedent is possible (see, e.g., Leahy, 2011). At work is an assumption that 
speakers should be relevant (e.g. Clark, 2013; Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). 
Take, now, Intuition 2. Imagine a speaker who has to choose between two 
statements: a stronger statement, and a weaker statement. If the speaker is similarly 
confident in the stronger and weaker statements, then the speaker should choose the 
stronger statement (e.g. Grice, 1975; Jackson, 1979). A speaker who makes a weaker 
statement, but otherwise appears cooperative, may be taken to mean that the stronger 
statement does not hold (Grice, 1975; Horn, 1989). In this case, the speaker could 
have said ‘Since you will get the job, we can collaborate more’. The speaker’s 
choice of ‘if’ might, in the right context, be taken to mean that the speaker does not 
belief the hearer is certain to get the job.  
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Experiments 4.2 to 4.5 adapt the existing materials to explore the effects of 
prior probability on the probability of the antecedent and the probability of the 
consequent. Although the intuitions have only treated the probability of the 
antecedent, the probability of the consequent is included for completeness.  
 
4.2 Experiment 4.1: Independent testimony  
4.2.1 Method.  
Participants. 240 participants (115 female, 1 other; average age 33.91 years) 
completed the task; 2 participants had previously been excluded since their first 
language was not English. Participants were recruited via the intermediary MTurk 
Data (www.mturkdata.com). High qualifications were set for the task to improve the 
quality of the data and maximize the number of native English speakers: participants 
had to be resident in the US, and have an overall approval rating of 99% for 1,000 
previously completed tasks. Participants received a small fee, chosen to exceed the 
US minimum wage per minute.  
Materials. The experimental items were the same as for Experiments 2.2 and 
3.1. To realize the independent testimony condition, the existing multiple-assertion 
condition was adapted in the following way (changes in italics).  
Adam, Barbara, Nick and Sue are each at a large car dealership. They don’t 
know each other, and haven’t spoken to each other. They each tell you 
independently, ‘If a car on this lot is a Mercedes, then it’s black.’ 
Since the additional text was exactly the same for each item, and the items were 
otherwise identical to those in Experiments 2.2 and 3.1, I will not report the full set 
of items here.  
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Procedure. The design manipulated Assertion (Null, Single, Multiple, 
Multiple Independent). Note that ‘Multiple’, here, refers to the original multiple 
condition, which is ambiguous. The task focused on the conditional probability 
P(Consequent|Antecedent), measured on a Likert-style scale from 0 (not at all 
possible) to 10 (certain). The task was between-subjects. After giving informed 
consent, participants were assigned, in a round-robin fashion, to a condition. 
Participants first read instructions, which were the same as the instructions for 
Experiment 2.2. Participants then read and rated 7 items, the order of presentation 
being randomized. The dependent measure was worded as in Experiment 2.2.  
4.2.2 Results 
Figure 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the effect of Assertion, 
including the new multiple independent assertion condition, on the conditional 
probability.  
 
Figure 4.1. Mean Conditional Probability by condition; error bars are standard error 
The data suggest a linear trend of Assertion, from the null condition (M = 4.85) to 
the single condition (M = 6.35), the multiple condition (M = 7.22), and the multiple 
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independent condition (M = 7.52). A mixed-effects model (with full random-effects 
structure) supported this picture. Including Assertion significantly improved fit over 
the null model, χ2(3) = 14.55, p =.002. Table 4.1 reports the fixed effects.  
Table 4.1. Fixed effects of Assertion on Conditional Probability 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 4.85 3.92, 5.79 
Single 
Multiple  
b = 1.50 
b = 2.37 
.43, 2.56 
1.32, 3.42 
Multiple Independent b = 2.67 1.53, 3.82 
 
Pairwise comparisons were performed using the Tukey correction for multiple 
comparisons. The increase from null to single conditions was not significant, though 
it approached significance, M = 1.50, 95% CI [-.09, 3.08], t(18.95) = 2.66, p =.07. 
The increase from null to multiple conditions was significant, M = 2.37, 95% CI [.80, 
3.94], t(18.16) = 18.16, p =.002. So was the increase from null to multiple 
independent conditions, M = 2.67, 95% CI [.93, 4.42], t(4.39) = .002. The increase 
from single to multiple conditions was not significant, though it approached 
significance, M = .87, 95% CI [-.06, 1.81], t(118.64) = 2.43, p =.08. The increase 
from single to multiple independent conditions was significant, M = 1.17, 95% CI 
[.10, 2.24], t(80.38) = 2.88, p =.03. Lastly, the increase from multiple to multiple 
independent conditions was not significant, M = .30, 95% CI [-.75, 1.35], t(83.02) 
= .75, p = .88.  
4.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 4.1 offers new data on the effect of multiple sources. For the first 
time, a condition with multiple sources is rated reliably higher than one with a single 
source. The new condition combines multiplicity with independence; this 
combination seems enough to tip the result over into significance. These data seem 
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to remove, therefore, a surprising finding: the plateauing effect in the Assertion 
variable. Moreover, participants seem to be sensitive to a normative factor, 
independence, in making their estimates of the conditional probability.  
The above interpretation requires some caveats. Firstly, there is a difference 
between the present data and that for the previous assertion experiments: participants, 
here, rated the single-assertion condition somewhat lower than in previous 
experiments. Table 4.2 reports the fixed effects of single assertion for each of the 
three point-estimate studies. 
Table 4.2. Fixed effects and confidence intervals of single assertion for the point-estimate 
studies 
Study Fixed Effect of Single 
Assertion 
95% CI 
Experiment 2.1 b = 2.69 1.32, 4.06 
Experiment 2.2 b = 2.54 1.75, 3.34 
Experiment 4.1  b = 1.5 .43, 2.56 
 
If we take Cumming’s (2012) rule of thumb for the consistency of confidence 
intervals, then we calculate the average margin of error, here 1.07, and the overlap 
between confidence intervals, and judge whether the overlap is greater than half the 
length of the margin of error. Here, the smallest overlap is .81, which suggests, then, 
that the confidence intervals are consistent. However, the estimate for the multiple 
independent assertion condition also falls within, or overlaps considerably with, the 
confidence intervals for the fixed effect of single assertion for both Experiments 2.1 
and 2.2. These considerations suggest an alternative explanation: the single and 
multiple conditions are marginally significantly different, and the single and 
multiple-independent conditions are significantly different, because the single 
condition is rated rather lower than in previous studies. These low ratings lack an 
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obvious explanation, since the materials (apart from the extra condition) and 
procedure were identical to Experiment 2.2.  
 A second caveat is this. As we saw earlier in this chapter, multiplicity is a 
separate factor from (in)dependence. The present design does not include an 
unambiguous multiple dependent condition. It cannot, therefore, directly address the 
question of whether participants are sensitive to the relationship between the sources. 
Moreover, the difference between single and multiple independent conditions, 
though significant, is not large. There is little space, then, for a significant difference 
from a hypothetical multiple dependent condition, unless that condition were treated 
as equivalent to single testimony.  
 We must draw cautious conclusions here. These data suggest that the 
Assertion variable does not necessarily lead to a plateauing effect: that this effect 
depends on how participants interpret the multiple-assertion condition. But more 
data should be collected, both to extend the present data and to explore, further, 
whether participants are sensitive to the crucial factors of multiplicity and 
(in)dependence of sources. Future studies could combine modelling of testimonial 
conditionals (on which, more later) and empirical work with additional variables, to 
ask whether models predict that multiplicity and independence interact in the 
complex ways suggested by Bayesian modelling of testimony (Bovens & Hartmann, 
2003), and whether people’s behaviour maps on to these predictions. This 
exploration would require the integration of both Assertion and Expertise variables, 
factors which are severely underexplored in the empirical literature (Hahn, Harris, & 
Corner, 2016).  
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4.3 Experiment 4.2: Priors, Assertion, and the probability of the antecedent 
Experiment 4.2 investigated the intuition that, when we hear the assertion of 
a conditional, we may learn something about the antecedent depending on our prior 
beliefs.  
4.3.1 Methods 
Participants. 354 participants (161 female, 1 non-binary; average age 35.38 
years) completed the task; 9 participants had previously been excluded since their 
first language was not English. Participants were recruited via the intermediary 
MTurk Data (www.mturkdata.com). High qualifications were set for the task to 
improve the quality of the data and maximize the number of native English speakers: 
participants had to be resident in the US, and have an overall approval rating of 99% 
for 1,000 previously completed tasks. Participants received a small fee, chosen to 
exceed the US minimum wage per minute.  
Materials. The materials were adapted from the previous studies. The 
materials manipulated two variables: Assertion (Null, Single, Multiple); Prior (Low, 
High). The prior probability of the antecedent was manipulated by contexts. The full 
items are as follows. Note that the brackets contain the manipulation for multiple 
sources and for high prior. 
(1) Adam (..,,Barbara, Nick, and Sue) is (are) at a large car dealership 
which specializes in mid-range cars. He (They) tells (tell) you, 'If a 
car is a Rolls Royce (Chevrolet), then it's black.' What's the 
probability that a car in the dealership is a Rolls Royce (Chevrolet)?  
(2) Jo (…, Aaron, Zoe and Felix) is/are at a medical clinic. She (They) 
tells (tell)  you, 'If a patient has bubonic plague (a common cold), 
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then they'll make a good recovery.' What's the probability that a 
patient has bubonic plague (a common cold)?  
(3) Mike (…,Isabel, Elliot and Amy) is (are) at a steakhouse. He (They) 
tells (tell) you, 'If a customer is eating tofu (steak), then it's gluten 
free.' What's the probability that a customer is eating tofu (steak)? 
Please make your response on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not at 
all possible and 10 is certain. 
(4) Anna (…Owen, Julia and Nathan) is (are) at a zoo. She (They) tells 
(tell) you, 'If the zoo has black rhinoceroses (seals), then they're by 
the main building.' What's the probability that the zoo has black 
rhinoceroses (seals)?  
(5) Colin (…Tom, Sarah and Leo) is (are) visiting a Liberal Arts College. 
He (They) tells (tell) you, 'If Lisa, a student, is majoring in 
astrophysics (an arts subject), then she's working late in the library.' 
What's the probability that Lisa is majoring in astrophysics (an arts 
subject)?  
(6) Lizzy (…Holly, Jamie and Maria) is (are) at a veterinary clinic. She 
(They) tells (tell) you, 'If Susie is an African grey parrot (dog), then 
she's had her operation.' What's the probability that Susie is an 
African grey parrot (dog)?  
(7) Lorraine (…Eric, Robby and Emma) is (are) at a coffee shop. She 
(They) tells (tell) you, 'If Dan, another customer, is drinking a 
decaffeinated (caffeinated) coffee, then he has work to do.' What's the 
probability that Dan is drinking a decaffeinated (caffeinated) coffee?  
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As in previous studies, in the null condition, the first sentence was replaced by 
‘Imagine you are at…’, followed directly by the probability question.  
Procedure. This task focused on the probability of the antecedent; hence 
there was a single dependent measure, P(Antecedent), measured on a scale from 0 to 
10. After giving informed consent, participants were assigned, in a round-robin 
fashion, to a condition. Participants read the same instructions as for Experments 2.1 
to 2.4. Participants rated all 7 items, which appeared in a random order.  
4.3.2 Results & Discussion.  
The key prediction was for an interaction between Prior and Assertion. 
Figure 4.2 shows the descriptive data for the effects of Assertion and Prior on the 
probability of the antecedent.  
  
Figure 4.2. Effect of Assertion and Prior on P(Antecedent); error bars are standard error 
The descriptive data suggest an interaction. With low priors, there appears to be a 
linearly increasing trend, from the null condition (M = 1.95) to the single condition 
(M = 3.77) and the multiple condition (M = 3.83). With high priors, in contrast, there 
appears to be a decrease from the null condition (M = 6.31) to the single condition 
(M = 5.37) and then a slight increase to the multiple condition (M = 5.48). This 
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picture is confirmed by mixed-effects modelling; these models include the random 
intercepts only for topics and items, because of convergence problems. Including the 
interaction term significantly improved fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 81.12, p 
<.001. Table 4.3 reports the estimates of the fixed effects. 
Table 4.3. Fixed effects of Prior, Assertion, and Interaction 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept  b = 1.95 1.27, 2.63 
Prior (High) b = 4.36        3.90, 4.81 
Assertion (Single) 
Assertion (Multiple) 
Prior(H)*Assertion(S) 
Prior(H) * Assertion(M) 
b = 1.82 
b = 1.88 
b = -2.76 
b = -2.70 
1.36, 2.28 
1.42, 2.33 
-3.40, -2.11 
-3.35, -2.05 
To explore the interaction further, the data were split for low and high priors, and 
separate analyses were run to explore the effect of Assertion. The models, from here 
on, included the full random-effects structure.  For the low prior data, including 
Assertion significantly improved fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 18.04, p 
<.001.Table 4.4 reports the fixed effects of Assertion for the low prior data. 
Table 4.4. Fixed effects of Assertion at low prior 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 1.95 1.13 2.77 
Single b = 1.82 1.24, 2.40 
Multiple  b = 1.88 1.29, 2.46 
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-squares means, using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The increase from null to single conditions was 
significant, M = 1.82, 95% CI [1.06, 2.57]. t(25.39) = 5.99, p <.001. So too was the 
increase from null to multiple conditions, M = 1.88, 95% CI [1.13, 2.62], t(40.71) = 
6.13, p <.001 The increase from single to multiple conditions was not, however, 
significant, M = .06, 95% CI [-.6, .72], t(55.24) = .21, p =.98.  
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For the high prior data, including Assertion also significantly improved fit 
over the null model, χ2(2) =  8.47, p =.01. Table 4.5 reports the estimates of the fixed 
effects of Assertion for the high prior data. 
Table 4.5. Fixed effects of Assertion at high prior 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 6.31 5.35, 7.26 
Single b = -.94 -1.72, -.16 
Multiple  b = -.82 -1.32, -.33 
 
As above, pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-squares means, using 
the Tukey correction for multiple comparisons. The decrease from null to single 
conditions was not significant, M = -.94, 95% CI [-2.03, .16], t(14.80) = -2.23, p 
=.10. The decrease from null to multiple conditions, in contrast, was significant, M = 
-.82, 95% CI [-1.46, -.19], t(32.39) = -3.20, p =.008. The difference between single 
and multiple conditions was not significant, M = .11, 95% CI [-.65, .88], t(25.11) 
= .37, p =.93.  
Although it could be argued that a fuller picture would be given by 
investigating the effect of Prior at each level of Assertion, such analyses are not 
relevant for our predictions, which concerned only the effect of Assertion. We 
therefore omit the analyses here. The same applies to all the experiments below.  
The data vindicate the intuitions reported earlier in this chapter: the effect of 
Assertion depends on the prior probability of the antecedent. With low priors, there 
is a reliable increase in the ratings of the probability of the antecedent when a 
conditional is asserted. With high priors, there is a reliable decrease.  
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4.4 Experiment 4.3: Priors, Expertise, and the probability of the antecedent  
4.4.1 Method 
Participants. 357 participants (162 female, 1 non-binary; average age 34.56 
years) completed the task; 9 participants had previously been excluded since their 
first language was not English. Participants were recruited in the same manner as 
above, and remunerated in the same way.  
Materials. The materials manipulated Prior (Low, High) and Expertise (Null, 
Inexpert, Expert). The same contexts and items were used as for Experiment 4.2. The 
Expertise manipulation was implemented in the following way, replacing the text for 
the Assertion manipulation.  
(1) A customer/manager tells you… 
(2) A medical student/professor of medicine tells you… 
(3) The regular handyman/the head chef tells you… 
(4) A deliveryman/a veterinary nurse tells you… 
(5) A five-year-old visitor/zoo keeper tells you… 
(6) The canteen manager/personal tutor of Lissa, a student, tells you… 
(7) An old friend of Dan, another customer, who had not seen Dan for 10 
years/the girlfriend of Dan, another customer, tells you… 
The null condition was implemented in the same was as in Experiment 4.3.  
Procedure. The procedure was the same as for Experiment 4.3.  
4.4.2 Results & Discussion 
The key prediction was an interaction between Prior and Expertise. Figure 
4.3 shows the descriptive data for the effect of Prior and Expertise on the probability 
of the antecedent.  
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Figure 4.3. Effect of Prior and Expertise on P(Antecedent); error bars are standard error 
The descriptive data suggest an interaction. As with the Assertion data, when the 
prior is low, there appears to be a linear trend of Expertise, from the null condition 
(M = 2.08) to the inexpert condition (M = 3.78) and the expert condition (M = 4.25). 
When the prior is high, there is a decrease from the null condition (M = 6) to the 
inexpert condition (M = 5.6) and a slight increase to the expert condition (M = 5.86). 
Mixed-effects modelling supported this picture. The models, here, included the full 
random-effects structure. Including the interaction term significantly improved fit 
over the null model, χ2(2) = 10.11, p =.006.  
Table 4.6 reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 4.6. Fixed effects of Prior, Expertise, and Interaction on P(Antecedent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept  b = 2.08 1.16, 2.99 
Prior (High) b = 3.92 2.92, 4.93 
Expertise (Inexpert) 
Expertise (Expert) 
Prior(H)*Expertise(I) 
Prior(H) * Expertise(E) 
b = 1.70 
b = 2.17 
b = -2.10 
b = -2.31 
1.00, 2.40 
1.40, 2.94 
-3.13, -1.08 
-3.39, -1.23 
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To explore the interaction further, the data were split for low and high priors, and 
separate analyses were run to explore the effect of Expertise. For the low prior data, 
including Expertise significantly improved fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 13.13, p 
=.001. Table 4.7 reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 4.7. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Antecedent) at low prior 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 2.08 1.16, 3.00 
Inexpert b = 1.70 .99, 2.42 
Expert b = 2.17 1.39, 2.95 
Pairwise comparisons were conducted on the least-squares means, using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The increase from null to inexpert conditions 
was significant, M = 1.70, 95% CI [.74, 2.67], t(19.29) = 4.48, p <.001. The increase 
from null to expert conditions was also significant, M = 2.17, 95% CI [1.12, 3.23], 
t(19.72) = 5.22, p <.001. The increase from inexpert to expert conditions was not 
significant, M = .47, 95% CI [-.18, 1.11], t(44.72) = 1.76, p = .19.  
For the high prior data, including Expertise did not significantly improve fit 
over the null model, χ2(2) = 1.90, p =.39. Table 4.8 reports the estimates of the fixed 
effects.  
Table 4.8. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Antecedent) at high prior 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 6.00 5.00, 7.00 
Inexpert b = -.40 -1.15, .35 
Expert b = -.14 -.92, .64 
  
 These data generally support the intuition that the effect of Expertise depends 
on the prior probability of the antecedent. The data are similar to the Assertion data: 
as above, with low priors there is a reliable increase in the probability of the 
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antecedent; with high priors, there is a decrease but, unlike above, the effect is not 
significant.   
4.5 Experiment 4.4: Priors, Assertion, and the probability of the consequent  
4.5.1 Methods 
Participants. 367 participants (163 female, 4 other; average age 33.98 years) 
completed the task; 5 participants had previously been excluded since their first 
language was not English. Participants were recruited and remunerated in the same 
way as in Experiments 4.1 to 4.3 
Materials. The items, here, were adapted from Experiment 4.3. The 
antecedent and consequents of the conditional were simple swapped. One item had 
to be adapted. The previous experiment contained the following item: 
Jo (…, Aaron, Zoe and Felix) is/are at a medical clinic. She (They) tells (tell)  
you, 'If a patient has bubonic plague (a common cold), then they'll make a 
good (poor) recovery.' What's the probability that a patient has bubonic plague 
(a common cold)?  
This item does not work when the antecedent and consequent are swapped. It was 
therefore replaced with the following item. In brackets is the text for the multiple 
assertion condition and for the low prior condition.  
Jo (…Aaron, Zoe and Felix) is (are) at a medical clinic with an excellent 
recovery rate. She (They) tells (tell) you, ‘If a patient on the ward, has 
malaria, then he will make a good recovery.’ What’s the probability that a 
patient will make a good (poor) recovery?  
 Procedure. The design manipulated Assertion (Null, Single Assertion, 
Multiple Assertion) and Prior Probability (Low, High). This task focused on the 
probability of the consequent; hence there was a single dependent measure, 
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P(Consequent), measured on a scale from 0 to 10. The task was between-subjects. 
After giving informed consent, participants received the same instructions as in 
Experiment 4.2, and were assigned, in a round-robin fashion, to a condition. 
Participants saw all seven items, with the ordering being randomized.  
4.5.2 Results & Discussion  
The key prediction was an interaction between Prior and Assertion. Figure 
4.4 shows the descriptive data for the effects of Prior and Assertion on the 
probability of the consequent.  
  
Figure 4.4. Effects of Prior and Assertion on P(Consequent); error bars are standard error 
These data suggest an interaction. With low priors, there is a trend for Assertion to 
increase ratings of P(Consequent): an increase from the null condition (M  = 2.15) to 
the single condition (M = 4.51), which tails off somewhat with the multiple 
condition (M = 4.34). With high priors, there is the opposite trend: a decrease from 
the null condition (M = 6.45) to the single condition (M = 5.29), which tails off with 
the multiple condition (M = 5.48).  
A mixed-effects model (with full random-effects structure) showed that 
including the interaction term produced a significant improvement in fit over the null 
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model (i.e. the model without the interaction term), χ2(2) = 120.16, p <.001. Table 
4.9 shows the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 4.9. Fixed effects of Prior, Assertion, and Interaction on P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept  b = 2.15 1.37, 2.93 
Prior (High) b = 4.30 3.53, 5.07 
Assertion (Single) 
Assertion (Multiple) 
Prior(H)*Assertion(S) 
Prior(H) * Assertion(M) 
b = 2.36 
b = 2.19 
b = -3.53 
b = -3.16 
1.71, 3.00 
1.44, 2.93 
-4.17, -2.88 
-3.79. -2.52 
To explore the interaction further, the data were split for low and high priors, and 
separate analyses were run to explore the effect of Assertion. For the low prior data, 
including Assertion significantly improved fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 18.19, p 
<.001. Table 4.10 reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 4.10. Fixed effects of Assertion on P(Consequent) at low prior 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 2.15 1.26, 3.05 
Single b = 2.36 1.73, 2.99 
Multiple b = 2.38 1.61, 3.15 
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-squares means, using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The increase from null to single conditions was 
significant, M = 2.36, 95% CI [1.53, 3.19], t(27.87) = 7.05, p <.001. The increase 
from null to multiple conditions was also significant, M = 2.38, 95% CI [1.32, 3.45], 
t(15.85) = 5.78, p <.001. The increase from single to multiple conditions was not 
significant, M = .02, 95% CI [-.60, .64], t(41.48) = .10, p = .99.  
For the high prior data, including Assertion produced a marginally significant 
improvement in fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 5.48, p =.06. Table 4.11 reports the 
estimates of the fixed effects.  
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Table 4.11. Fixed effects of Assertion on P(Consequent) at high prior 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 6.45 5.35, 7.55 
Single b = -1.17 -2.01, -.32 
Multiple b = -1.12 -2.06, -.17  
Since the improvement was so close to significance, pairwise comparisons were 
performed on the least-squares means, using the Tukey correction for multiple 
comparisons. The decrease from null to single conditions was significant, M = -1.17, 
95% CI [-2.32, -.01], t(18.14) = -2.58, p =.05. The decrease from null to multiple 
conditions was not significant, M = -1.12, 95% CI [-2.45, .21], t(14.21) = -2.19, p 
=.11. The decrease from single to multiple conditions was also not significant, M 
= .05, 95% CI [-.58, .68], t(41.20) = .19, p = .98.  
This experiment shows that the effect of Assertion on the probability of the 
consequent depends on the prior probability. The effect is equivalent to the effect 
found for the probability of the antecedent, though the decreasing trend with high 
priors is less statistically reliable.  
4.6 Experiment 4.5: Priors, Expertise, and the probability of the consequent  
4.6.1 Methods  
Participants. 356 participants (173 female; average age 35.06 years) 
completed the task; 9 participants had previously been excluded since their first 
language was not English. This experiment used the same system as above for 
recruiting and remunerating participants.  
Materials. These were the conditions for Experiment 4.4, using the Expertise 
manipulation from Experiment 4.3.  
Procedure. The design manipulated Assertion (Null, Inexpert Source, Expert 
Source) and Prior Probability (Low, High). This task focused on the probability of 
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the consequent; hence there was a single dependent measure, P(Consequent), 
measured on a scale from 0 to 10. The task was between-subjects. After giving 
informed consent, participants read the same instructions as for Experiments 4.2, 4.3, 
and 4.4, and were assigned, in a round-robin fashion, to a condition. Participants saw 
all seven items in a randomized order.  
4.6.2 Results & Discussion  
The key prediction was an interaction between Prior and Assertion. Figure 
4.5 shows the descriptive data for the effects of Prior and Assertion on the 
probability of the consequent.  
  
Figure 4.5. Effects of Prior and Expertise on P(Consequent); error bars are standard error 
The data against suggest an interaction. With low priors, there is a trend for 
Expertise to increase ratings of P(Consequent), from the null condition (M = 2.44) to 
the inexpert condition (M = 3.96) and the expert condition (M = 4.93). With high 
priors, in contrast, the data seem rather flat for the null (M = 6.17), inexpert (M = 
5.87) and expert (M = 6.09) conditions. A mixed-effects model, run using the full 
random-effects structure, showed that including the interaction term significantly 
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improved fit, χ2(2) = 48.66,  p <.001. Table 4.12 reports the estimates of the fixed 
effects.  
Table 4.12. Fixed effects of Prior, Expertise, and Interaction on P(Consequent) 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept  b = 2.44 1.63, 3.25 
Prior (High) b = 3.74 3.03, 4.44 
Expertise (Inexpert) 
Expertise (Expert) 
Prior(H)*Expertise(I) 
Prior(H) * Expertise(E) 
b = 1.52 
b = 2.49 
b = -1.82 
b = -2.56 
.86, 2.18 
1.71, 3.26 
-2.53, -1.11 
-3.28, -1.85 
 
To explore the interaction further, the data were split for low and high priors, and 
separate analyses were run to explore the effect of Expertise. For the low prior data, 
including Expertise significantly improved fit over the null model, χ2(2) = 20.79, p 
<.001. Table 4.13 reports the estimates of the fixed effects.  
Table 4.13. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Consequent) at low prior 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 2.44 1.58, 3.29 
Inexpert b = 1.52 .85, 2.18 
Expert b = 2.45 1.86, 3.12 
Pairwise comparisons were performed on the least-squares means, using the Tukey 
correction for multiple comparisons. The increase from null to inexpert conditions 
was significant, M = 1.52, 95% CI [.66, 2,38], t(33.39) = 4.33, p <.001. The increase 
from null to expert conditions was also significant, M = 2.49, 95% CI [1.68, 3.30], 
t(35.64) = 7.51, p <.001. Lastly, the increase from inexpert to expert conditions was 
significant, M = .97, 95% CI [.31, 1.63], t(41.67) = 3.57, p =.003.  
With high priors, including Expertise did not significantly improve model fit, 
χ2(2) = 1.12, p =.57. Table 4.14 reports the estimates of the fixed effects. 
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Table 4.14. Fixed effects of Expertise on P(Consequent) at high prior 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept (Null) b = 6.17 4.87, 7.47 
Inexpert b = -.30 -1.29, .68 
Expert b = -.07 -1.20, 1.06  
The data for this experiment are consistent with those for the probability of the 
antecedent: as above, with low priors, there is a reliable increase in the probability of 
the antecedent; with high priors, there is decrease but this is not reliable.  
 
4.7 General Discussion 
The data above round off this thesis’ experimental work on testimonial 
conditionals; later chapters will consider related phenomena. We turn, now, to a 
summary of these three chapters’ data and to their philosophical and psychological 
implications.  
It will prove useful, here, to recapitulate the main findings. Chapters 2 and 3 
offered consistent evidence that both assertion and source expertise reliably 
increased the conditional probability, P(Consequent|Antecedent). With these 
experimental materials, assertion and expertise left the probability of the antecedent 
and the probability of the consequent relatively untouched. Chapter 3 also 
demonstrated that both assertion and expertise decreased interval estimates of the 
conditional probability: that is, participants gave narrower, more precise estimates. 
Although the assertion experiments generally showed a plateauing effect, whereby 
there was no reliable increase from single to multiple assertion, Experiment 4.1 
suggested that this plateauing may depend on the ambiguity of the experimental 
items in that multiple-assertion condition. Lastly Experiments 4.2 to 4.5 suggested 
that assertion and expertise can shift both the probability of the antecedent and the 
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probability of the consequent in appropriate contexts.  Assertion and expertise 
reliably increased the probability of the antecedent and the probability of the 
consequent when their respective prior probabilities were low. Assertion reliably 
decreased the probability of the antecedent, and marginally so the probability of the 
consequent, when their respective prior probabilities were high. Expertise did not 
have a reliable effect when the prior probabilities were high. A more reliable effect 
may result from tasks whose materials succeed in generating higher priors: ratings in 
the null condition reached only around 6 on a scale from 0 to 10.  
Chapters 2 and 3 suggested that their data are consistent with the leading 
psychology theory of the conditional, the suppositional theory. This suggestion can 
now be tested more rigorously against the full set of data. The suppositional theorist 
can straightforwardly account for the data in Chapter 2. On their theory, participants 
supposed that the antecedent was true, and judged the conditional probability. 
Participants took the assertion of the conditional to mean that the conditional 
probability was high. They may also have drawn on the number of people making 
the assertion (see Experiment 4.1). When participants had information about the 
source’s expertise available to them, they drew on this to judge the conditional 
probability. 
Other data are less easy to explain with the suppositional theory. Take, first, 
the data in Chapter 3. The data on slider averages pose no problem for the 
suppositional theorist, because they are amenable to the same explanation as the 
point-values data in Chapter 2. Matters are less straightforward for the slider ranges: 
these data do not contradict anything in the suppositional theory, but nor are they 
predicted by anything in the theory. It remains to be seen whether the suppositional 
theory should simply be extended to accommodate interval estimates and whether, if 
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so, this extension has any profound effect, positive or otherwise, on the theory’s 
predictions.  
The data from experiments 4.2 to 4.5 also do not find an obvious explanation 
in the suppositional theory. These data suggest that, when someone hears a 
conditional, they may revise more than just the conditional probability: that the 
probability of the antecedent and the probability of the consequent can also shift31. 
The crucial factor is the relevant prior probability. Again, these data do not 
contradict anything in the suppositional theory. To illustrate this point, consider the 
ratio definition of conditional probability as applied to the conditional ‘If a car is a 
Mercedes, then it’s black’. Assume that the conditional refers to a large car 
showroom with cars of different makes and different colours, and that the reference 
class is the cars in this showroom:  
P(Black |Mercedes) = P(Mercedes& Black)P(Mercedes)  
The conditional probability, in other words, is the proportion of Mercedes cars in the 
showroom that are black. Given the data in Chapters 2 to 4, we are interested only in 
cases in which the conditional probability rises. The conditional probability rises if 
the proportion of Mercedes cars which are black rises. But this change in the 
proportion is compatible with various actions by the management. Take some of the 
simplest changes. The number of Mercedes and the number of black cars can stay 
the same: the management can re-spray some Mercedes black and the same number 
                                                
 
31 Experiments 4.2 to 4.5 were designed to test whether P(Antecedent) and 
P(Consequent) could be made to shift. They were not designed to study exhaustively the 
effects of priors. So, it remains to be seen whether the priors for one probability affect the 
other probabilities. Plausibly they do. For instance, a conditional with low P0(Consequent) 
could be taken as a kind of reductio ad absurdum. Consequently, P(Antecedent) might 
decrease.  
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of black non-Mercedes another colour. The number of Mercedes can increase - the 
management can keep all existing Mercedes and buy in some new black ones – or 
decrease – the management can keep all its black Mercedes and sell some non-black 
ones. The number of black cars can vary freely as long as the black Mercedes are 
untouched. But, of course, if all the cars are black, then the conditional probability 
will be one. As this scenario illustrates, the problem is not that the suppositional 
theory is incompatible with change in P(Antecedent) and P(Consequent). It is, rather, 
that there is nothing in the theory to explain the systematicity of the changes.  
4.7.1 Modelling testimonial conditionals 
There may, yet, be a fairly straightforward probabilistic account for both the 
increase in P(Consequent|Antecedent) and the systematic changes in P(Antecedent) 
and P(Consequent). This account employs formal Bayesian models of testimony 
which were alluded to in Chapter 2. A simple model will serve as the entry point for 
this discussion. Figure 4.6 shows a simple model of testimony from Bovens and 
Hartmann (2003).  
	  
Figure 4.6. Bayesian belief network from Bovens and Hartmann (2003) 
This is a simple Bayesian belief network: the nodes represent random 
variables; the arcs represent probabilistic relationships between variables (for 
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discussion, see, e.g., Korb & Nicholson, 2011). The variable Hyp, here, is a 
proposition about the world, and has the states true and false. The variable Rel, here, 
is the reliability of the speaker: it, too, has the states true (reliable) and false 
(unreliable). Lastly, the variable Rep is the report that ‘Hyp is true’: it has the states 
true (the report is made) and false (the report is not made).  
To illustrate this simple model, consider the different positions of a source 
and hearer, assuming that the proposition under discussion is true. Take, first, the 
position of the source. Does the source report that ‘Hyp = True’? This will depend on 
two factors: the source’s beliefs about the state of the world, and the source’s 
reliability. In this situation, these factors have an independent influence on the node 
Rep. The source’s beliefs about the world are captured by a distribution over the 
binary states of Hyp. Similarly, the source’s reliability is represented by a 
distribution over the binary states of Rel. On this simple model, a reliable source will 
simply report ‘Hyp=True’. An unreliable source, in contrast, will randomize: s/he 
will, in effect, toss a coin to decide whether to report that ‘Hyp is true’. This 
relationship is defined in the conditional probability table for the node Rep, which is 
shown in Table 4.15. 
Table 4.15. Conditional probability table for Bovens Hartmann network 
 Reliable  Unreliable  
Hyp True False True False 
Rep = True 1 0 .5 .5 
Rep = False 0 1 .5 .5 
 
This network accommodates simple cases, where P(Hyp=True) and P(Rel=True) are 
both only 0 or 1, and subtler cases, where P(Hyp=True) and P(Rel=True) range 
anywhere between 0 and 1.  
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Now take the position of the hearer. Two states of the network are relevant 
here: before and after a source’s testimony. In the initial state, the hearer has prior 
beliefs about the world represented by a distribution over the binary states of Hyp, 
and an initial perception of the source’s reliability represented by a distribution over 
the binary states of Rel. These variables are marginally independent. However, when 
the source reports that ‘Hyp=True’, the hearer intervenes in the network and sets the 
state of Rep to true. Thereafter, the variables Hyp and Rel are conditionally 
dependent. The hearer revises his/her distributions for both variables. Information 
from the Hyp variable flows through to the Rel variable. If the hearer’s initial belief 
was P(Hyp=True) >.5, then the probability of P(Rel=True) will increase; but if the 
hearer’s initial belief was P(Hyp=True) <.5, then the probability of P(Rel=True) will 
decrease. Conversely, information from the Rel variable flows through to the Hyp 
variable. If the hearer’s initial reliability judgment was P(Rel=True) = 0, then the 
source will have no effect on the belief in P(Hyp=True). If the hearer’s initial 
reliability judgment was P(Rel=True)>0, then P(Hyp=True) will increase.  
This simple model can prove a valuable source of hypotheses for empirical 
research (see Chapter 6). However, it has little, if any, application to testimonial 
conditionals, for three principal reasons. While it might be tempting to simply assign 
the Hyp node to the conditional, this assignment would ignore the philosophical 
controversy over whether conditionals are propositions (for discussion, see Douven, 
2012). Relatedly, the assignment would obscure the fact that conditionals refer to a 
(potentially probabilistic) relationship between two variables: the antecedent and 
consequent. Finally, the assignment would run counter to the data discussed in this 
chapter: since the model would not represent antecedent and consequent separately, 
it could not represent changes to their probabilities either.   
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A more sophisticated approach has been proposed by Stephan Hartmann 
(reported in Collins, Krzyżanowska, Hartmann, Wheeler, & Hahn, 2017). The 
approach uses a baseline model, shown Figure 4.7. 
RepX B 
A X Rel 
 
Figure 4.7. Baseline Bayesian belief network for experimental data 
The variable A is the antecedent of a conditional, and has the values ‘The antecedent 
occurs’ and ‘The antecedent does not occur’. The variable B is the consequent, and 
has the values ‘The consequent occurs’ and ‘The consequent does not occur’. The 
variable X is the conditional, and has the values ‘The indicative conditional “If A, B” 
holds’ and ‘The indicative conditional “If A, B” does not hold’. Including such a 
variable is a strategy which originates in solutions to the Old Evidence Problem in 
epistemology (these will be discussed further below). Importantly, the variable is 
neutral with respect to theories of the conditional: the model, therefore, makes no 
major theoretical assumptions. The variable Rel is the reliability of the source, and 
has the values ‘The source is reliable’ and ‘The source is not reliable’. Lastly, the 
variable RepX is the report of the conditional, and has the values ‘The source reports 
X’ and ‘The source does not report X’. The arcs, in the model, once again represent 
probabilistic relationships between the variables.  
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The network also requires the probability distribution to be specified. Nodes 
A, X, and Rel are root nodes; as such, they can be assigned prior probabilities. There 
are, in addition, two conditional probability tables. Firstly, for node B32: 
Table 4.16. Conditional probability table for node B 
Conditional (X) Holds  Not  
Antecedent (A) Occurs Not Occurs Not 
Consequent (B) 
Occurs 
 
1 
 
β 
 
α 
 
γ 
Not 0 1- β 1- α 1- γ 
 
Here, no particular values are assumed for most parameters; however, it is assumed 
that X respects modus ponens. This assumption can be relaxed to allow for 
uncertainty, but I will not discuss this relaxation in this thesis. The second 
conditional probability table is for node Rep X.  
Table 4.17. Conditional probability table for node Rep X 
Conditional (X) Holds  Not  
Reliability (Rel) Reliable Not Reliable Not 
Report X 1 µ 0 µ 
Not Report X 0 1- µ 1 1- µ 
 
Here it is assumed that a reliable source will always report that the conditional holds 
when it does and never when it does not. In contrast, an unreliable source 
randomizes with probability µ. Note the similarity with Table 4.15 when µ is .5.  
                                                
 
32 In other words, P(B| A, X) = 1, P(B|A,~X) = α, P(B|~A, X) = β, and P(B|~A,~X) 
= γ. And likewise, P(RepX| X, Rel) = 1, P(RepX, X,~Rel) = µ, P(RepX, ~X, Rel) = 0, and 
P(RepX|~X,~Rel) = µ.  
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How does this model bear on the experimental data described above? This 
model was developed as a baseline model to account for the data in Experiments 2.1 
to 2.4. Consider, first, node A, the antecedent. A is marginally independent of RepX: 
A’s influence is blocked by B. Thus, A’s probability distribution will affect only the 
probability distribution over the states of B, unless certain interventions are made in 
the network. Imagine, now, that a source asserts a conditional: we intervene so that 
P(Rep X = ‘Reports X’) = 1. This intervention makes nodes X and Rel conditionally 
dependent. Consequently, the distributions change for nodes B, X, and Rel. However, 
the distribution for A remains untouched. When a conditional is asserted, the 
probability of the antecedent remains the same but the conditional probability 
increases.  
A second crucial aspect of the data was that the probability of the consequent 
did not shift. At first blush, this point is problematic for the network above because, 
as we have seen, the probability of the consequent – that is, the distribution over the 
states of node B – routinely shifts on the assertion of the conditional (intervention at 
node RepX). However, the probability of the consequent will not shift as long as two 
conditions hold: (1) that β ≈ γ (i.e. P(B|¬A,X) ≈ P(B|¬A,¬X)); and (2) that α ≈ 1 (i.e. 
P(B|A,¬X) ≈ 1). To elaborate, condition (1) requires that the following probabilities 
are approximately the same: the probability of the consequent given that the 
antecedent does not hold and the indicative conditional does; and the probability of 
the consequent given that the antecedent does not hold and the indicative conditional 
does not hold. Condition (2) requires that the following probability is approximately 
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1: the probability of the consequent given that the antecedent holds and the 
indicative conditional does not33.  
How reasonable is it to assume that the conditions hold for the data in 
Chapter 2? These assumptions have not been empirically tested, but their plausibility 
can nevertheless be assessed. Consider, first, β: the probability of the consequent 
given that the antecedent does not hold and the indicative conditional does. Plausibly, 
participants were non-committal on this probability: this probability occupies one of 
the ‘irrelevant’ or ‘void’ cells in the defective truth table, which, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, people arguably endorse. Moreover, participants would have no real 
information to judge how likely the consequent was in the relevant situation, since 
the scenarios were fictional. Consider, now, γ: the probability of the consequent 
given that the antecedent does not hold and the indicative conditional does not hold. 
Again, for the present studies, participants would likely be non-committal on this 
probability: they had no information to judge the probability of the consequent in 
this situation either. It is possible, then, that participants treated the probabilities as 
                                                
 
33 These conditions were explored in simulations in Hugin using priors for 
the A, X, and Rel that roughly corresponded to those in the data (including related 
data sets which are not reported in this thesis). The values of β and γ were initially 
set to .5. Even small departures from the conditions resulted in change to the 
probability of the consequent. When condition (1) held, but assumption (2) did not, 
then the probability of the consequent increased (though small changes to α led to 
small, tolerable increases in the probability of the consequent). When condition (2) 
held, but assumption (1) did not the probability of the consequent increased when β 
was greater than γ, and decreased when γ was greater than β.  
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approximately the same. It is not clear, however, whether these assumptions would 
have held if participants could have deployed their real-world knowledge.  
We turn, finally, to, α: the probability of the consequent given that the 
antecedent holds and the indicative conditional does not. This probability judgement 
requires us to separate judgement of the conditional probability and judgement of 
whether the indicative conditional holds. But it has been stressed, in previous 
chapters, how close these judgements seem to be. Nevertheless, separation is needed 
to avoid damaging self-reference in the model: the node cannot simply refer to the 
arc between nodes A and B (for discussion, see Collins et al., 2017). To make sense, 
node X must refer to other (additional, new) information not presently summarized 
by the arc between A and B. How plausible is inclusion of this node? We can answer 
this question by considering the Old Evidence Problem, which was raised by 
Glymour (1980). The problem is as follows. When proposing a new theory, we will 
likely consider it a virtue for the theory to explain existing evidence. But this virtue 
raises a problem for a Bayesian epistemology. Bayesian epistemology takes as a 
measure of support P(H|E) > P(H). But if the evidence is already known then P(H|E) 
= P(H) (for discussion, see Howson, 1991) and, in Bayesian terms, the evidence 
cannot be said to support the theory. Garber (1983) proposed adding a variable in a 
similar way to Stephan Hartmann’s model (see also Hartmann and Fitelson, 2015). 
The extra variable represents the discovery of new information: the deductive 
inference (or prediction) from the theory to the data. Similarly, in the present case, 
the extra variable could represent the discovery of new information: that the 
conditional holds. Since the model is neutral on the meaning of the conditional, 
though, it is also neutral on the nature of this new information.    
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The model in Figure 4.7 can capture crucial aspects of the data in Chapters 2 
and 3, albeit with assumptions that remain empirically untested and, in one case, 
decidedly questionable. This model cannot, however, account for the data in 
Experiments 4.2 to 4.5, which show that prior probabilities can induce change in the 
probability of the antecedent and the probability of the consequent. The next model 
can accommodate some of this change, while jettisoning the assumptions above. 
This model is shown in  
Figure 4.8.  
RepX B 
A X Rel 
 
Figure 4.8. Comparison Bayesian belief network for experimental data 
Structurally, the model differs from the baseline model only in the addition of an arc 
from A to Rep X. The probability distributions remain the same for all but Rep X, 
whose new conditional probability table is shown below. 
Table 4.18. Conditional probability table for Rep X 
Conditional 
(X) 
Holds    Not    
Reliability 
(Rel) 
Reliable  Unreliable  Reliable  Unreliable  
Antecedent 
(A) 
Holds Not Holds Not Holds No Holds Not 
Report X 1 0 µ µ 0 0 µ µ 
Not Report 
X 
0 1 1- µ 1- µ 1 1 1- µ 1- µ 
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It is assumed, here, that if the antecedent is false and the conditional holds, then a 
fully reliable source will not report that the conditional holds.  In many cases, this 
assumption seems plausible. It would ordinarily be strange for the manager of a car 
showroom to say ‘If a car in this showroom is a Mercedes, then it’s black’ if there 
were obviously no Mercedes in the showroom. A slight change to the scenario will 
license the conditional: the showroom does not currently have any Mercedes cars, 
but it sometimes does. In this case, the manager could utter the conditional without 
oddity. But then the antecedent would not be false; the conditional would mean 
‘Whenever there is a Mercedes in this showroom, then it’s black’. In other words, 
there are different reference classes: the current stock of cars, and all (or at least 
many non-specific) possible stocks of cars. We will return to this issue of the truth 
and falsity of antecedents below; for now, it suffices to say that, if a conditional with 
a false antecedent is asserted, it is considered a counterfactual, and counterfactual 
conditionals are typically treated separately. The assumption above, then, is plausible.  
By including the extra arc, the revised model can accommodate the data in 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3, which showed change to the probability of the antecedent. 
The nodes A and RepX are now directly connected, so the prior probability of the 
antecedent will influence the probability of reporting the conditional, and the 
assertion of the conditional will alter the probability of the antecedent. The model’s 
behaviour can be summarized with the following equation: 
0r = µ(µ + (1− a))  
Here, µ is the randomization parameter for the unreliable source, and a is the prior 
probability of the antecedent. The probability of the antecedent increases when the 
prior for Rel, r, is higher than r0; remains the same when r and r0 are the same; and 
decreases when r is lower than r0. Change to the probability of the antecedent is 
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directly linked to the perceived reliability of the source. In contrast, both the 
probability of the consequent and the conditional probability always increase on 
assertion. Therefore, this model can, in principle, only account for the data in 
Experiments 4.2 and 4.3; it cannot account for the effect of the prior probability of 
the consequent. Furthermore, this latter effect cannot simply be captured by adding 
an arc between B and RepX, because B would not be a root node, and could not, 
therefore, take a prior probability34. To capture this effect, we would need a more 
radical revision to the network, such as including a new root node with arcs to both B 
and RepX. It would be crucial, however, to independently justify the inclusion of this 
node to avoid the danger of over-fitting the model to the data.  
The model predictions above are not testable with the current data. They 
require the estimation of parameters that were not manipulated or measured in the 
relevant experiments: namely, the randomization parameter and people’s initial 
perception of the sources. Future work will explore how well the model fits 
empirical data. But both models above count as proof of principle: it is possible to 
capture systematic effects on at least the conditional probability and the probability 
of the antecedent using purely probabilistic models which flesh out the dependencies 
among variables. It is also striking that probabilistic models cannot straightforwardly 
capture all of the data from an apparently simple experiment. These difficulties 
                                                
 
34 Indeed, adding an arc from B to RepX or, in addition, from A to RepX simply 
results in an increase in probabilities (P(A), P(B) and P(C), which is not the pattern seen in 
the data. 
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signal the complexity of learning conditionals, a complexity which seems to have 
been largely overlooked in the psychological literature35.  
It is possible, however, to judge the plausibility of the link between perceived 
reliability and the changes to the probability of the antecedent. Relevant evidence is 
to be found in the extensive corpus work of Declerck and Reed (2001). Declerck and 
Reed collected a small corpus of conditionals, developed hypotheses, and tested 
these hypotheses against data in large publicly available corpora. Their analysis was 
qualitative: in effect, they built a conceptual framework by systematically probing 
their intuitions. Their treatment of the antecedent is compatible with the intuitions 
and experimental data reported in this thesis. They outlined systematic variation in 
the truth of the antecedent, proposing the following categories (all examples are also 
Declerck and Reed’s):  
(1) Factual Antecedent. The antecedent is known to be true. For example, ‘If 
I had a problem, I always went to my grandmother’. Often, the 
consequent refers to a past habitual action. 
(2) Non-factual Antecedent.  
a. Neutral. The antecedent is pure supposition. For example, ‘if a 
woman has a history of cancer in the family, she should have 
herself checked out once a year’. 
b. Non-neutral. The antecedent takes one of the following attitudes 
to the truth. 
                                                
 
35 This gap in the literature was repeatedly emphasized during the recent ‘Learning 
Conditionals’ workshop at Ludwig Maximillian’s University, Munich, February 2nd-3rd, 
2017. For discussion, see the lecture notes available at http://www.cas.uni-
muenchen.de/veranstaltungen/archiv_veranstaltung/tagungen/ws_krzyzanowska_hartmann/i
ndex.html.  
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i. Closed. The antecedent is assumed to be true for the 
purposes of the interaction, but no commitment is 
necessarily made to the actual truth. For example, ‘If you 
didn’t do it, it must have been Fred’.  
ii. Open. The antecedent may or may not prove true, and the 
conditional often refers to the future. For example, ‘If the 
train is late, we’ll miss our plane’  
iii. Tentative. The antecedent presents a possibility, but one 
that is considered unlikely. For example, ‘If he did/were to 
do that, he’d be in big trouble’36.  
iv. Counterfactual. The antecedent is false. For example, ‘If I 
were you, I wouldn’t go there’.  
Declerck and Reed (2001) use these categories to describe different types of 
conditionals, not to predict belief change from them. But if these categories are real 
to speaker-hearers, and not just corpus linguists, then they should give rise to 
systematic differences in belief change. This point holds most obviously for the 
following categories: factual-antecedent conditionals should lead to high belief in the 
antecedent (hence, a potential increase); and counterfactuals should lead to low 
belief (or, indeed, total disbelief) in the antecedent (hence, a potential decrease). 
Like counterfactuals, tentative-antecedent conditionals have a morpho-syntactic cue 
(the verb form), in this case suggesting that the antecedent, though possible, is 
unlikely. These conditionals should also lead to a low belief in the antecedent. The 
remaining categories are harder to interpret. Both closed and open conditionals do 
                                                
 
36 This example seems equivalent to ‘If he DOES do that, he’ll be in big trouble.’  
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not, on Declerck and Reed’s account, require a commitment to the truth or falsity of 
the antecedent. It is plausible, though, that, here too, the probabilities may shift, 
depending on context.  
The framework above suggests a research program to explore belief change 
from different types of conditional, as these different types may prompt different 
patterns of belief revision. Notably, though, Declerck and Reed (2001) do not refer 
to source reliability; they refer, rather, to context and linguistic cues such as the verb 
form. Indeed, Declerck and Reed give many examples which have markedly 
different interpretations even with little or no context for the judgment of source 
reliability. This point raises doubts about the proposed mechanism by which prior 
probabilities are said to influence belief change. The diversity of examples also 
prompts the suggestion that a single model may not fit all types of indicative 
conditional. Instead, a series of models might be required. 
Before we leave the topic of modelling testimonial conditionals, it will be 
useful to summarize what the foregoing discussion reveals about learning a 
conditional. The experimental data suggest that, when we learn a conditional, we 
increase our judgment of the conditional probability. They also suggest that, under 
certain circumstances, we modify our judgments of the probability of the antecedent 
and the probability of the consequent. Considering the models reveals other 
possibilities. In both models, when RepX is set to true, then probabilities change 
simultaneously, not just at X, B (unless, in the first model, certain conditions hold), 
and (in the second model) A, but also at Rel. In other words, the models suggest that, 
when we hear a conditional, we systematically revise our beliefs about the reliability 
of the source. These model predictions should be tested in future work.  
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4.7.2 Probabilities and Beyond 
This thesis has focused on a small set of probabilities: the probability of the 
antecedent, the probability of the consequent, and the conditional probability. 
Although these probabilities seem closely implicated in testimonial conditionals, 
recent research suggests that people expect conditionals to come with more 
information. Intuitively, conditionals are strange if there is no link between 
antecedent and consequent, quite apart from the conditional probability. For 
example:  
If the capital of France is Paris, then the Earth is spherical.  
Since we are certain about the consequent, then P(Spherical|Paris) = 1, but this 
conditional is odd and very likely unassertable. One way to explain the oddity is to 
argue that the antecedent and consequent must be relevant. Relevance is understood, 
here, in terms of the relationship between two conditional probabilities, 
P(Consequent|Antecedent) and P(Consequent|NotAntecedent) (Skovgaard-Olsen, 
2016; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016b; Skovgaard-Olsen, Singmann, & Klauer, 
2016a): 
Positive Relevance:  
P(Consequent|Antecedent) > P(Consequent|NotAntecedent)  
Irrelevance:  
P(Consequent|Antecedent) = P(Consequent|NotAntecedent) 
Negative Relevance: 
 P(Consequent|Antecedent) < P(Consequent|NotAntecedent) 
On this view, when we hear a conditional, we first ask whether the antecedent is a 
sufficient reason for the consequent – that is, we ask whether there is positive 
relevance - then we evaluate the conditional probability. If antecedent and 
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consequent are positively relevant, then the probability of the conditional is simply 
the conditional probability. But if antecedent and consequent are irrelevant or 
negatively relevant, a penalty applies: the probability of the conditional is, 
consequently, lower than the conditional probability. Experimental data support this 
account (Skovgaard-Olsen, 2016; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016a, 2016b).  
This relevance-based approach implies that, when we learn a conditional, we 
learn that antecedent and consequent are positively related, that is, that 
P(Consequent|Antecedent) > P(Consequent|NotAntecedent). Collins et al. (2017) 
report another data set, as part of the study reported here, which included 
measurements of both conditional probabilities37. These data show that both 
assertion and expertise predict relevance: assertion shows a significant increase in 
relevance from null to single and null to multiple conditions (though a non-
significant decrease from single to multiple); and expertise shows a significant 
increase from null to inexpert, null to expert, and inexpert to expert conditions.   
It is not entirely clear how to characterize this relevance requirement. For 
instance, relevance might be fundamental to the conditional (Skovgaard-Olsen, 
2016; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016a, 2016b); it might, alternatively, arise merely out 
of discourse coherence, or apply to connectives more generally (Cruz, Over, 
Oaksford, & Baratgin, 2016). Suggestive data come from two studies by 
Krzyżanowska, Collins and Hahn (2017a,b). These studies explored whether 
probabilistic relevance is distinguishable from mere discourse coherence and 
whether conditionals and conjunctions have the same assertability conditions. The 
                                                
 
37 This data set is not reported here, for brevity’s sake. The study used the 
methodology of the original and replication study, and provided a further replication of those 
data, while collecting additional measurements.  
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resultant data suggested that, while simple conversations required only the same 
topic to be coherent, the same information expressed in conditionals required 
probabilistic relevance on top of topic coherence. Moreover, conditionals and 
conjunctions diverged in their assertability conditions. These data suggest, then, that 
probabilistic relevance is a fundamental and distinctive component of conditionals.  
4.7.3 The meaning of the conditional  
Since we have discussed the full set of data and attempts to model them using 
Bayesian belief networks, we are now in a better position to judge the implications 
for the meaning of the conditional. As we have seen, the data directly contradict 
predictions of two accounts: the material conditional; and a simple Bayesian network 
coupled with the Kullback-Leibler divergence. These accounts imply that, when a 
conditional is asserted, the probability of the antecedent should decrease. Chapter 2 
found no evidence for this effect, and this chapter has shown that the probability of 
the antecedent reliably increases when the prior probability is low. The data are 
consistent with the suppositional theory, in the weak sense that they do not 
contradict the theory but are not predicted by it. If the suppositional theory is 
supported by modelling with Bayesian belief networks, then it achieves better, but 
by no means perfect, predictive success. The data are also consistent with the notion 
that conditionals require some link between antecedent and consequent, be it 
relevance or some inferential relationship. But this is, again, a relatively weak 
consistency: relevance and inferentialism do not predict systematic changes to the 
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probability of the antecedent or the probability of the consequent. The data do not 
seem, then, to fit neatly with any particular theory of the conditional.38 
It is tempting, here, to invoke pragmatics: the experiments are, after all, 
pragmatic contexts. This chapter has already speculated on a pragmatic account. At 
work, in this account, are two guiding pragmatic maxims: the Maxim of Relevance, 
and the Maxim of Quantity. Take, first, the case when the prior probability of the 
antecedent is low. Here, the Maxim of Relevance operates: the speaker would not be 
uttering a conditional unless there was a substantial chance that the antecedent would 
obtain. When, in contrast, the prior probability of the antecedent is high, the Maxim 
of Quantity operates: the speaker is uttering a weaker statement than justified by the 
hearer’s prior; the speaker may then be implicating that there is insufficient evidence 
for the stronger statement. This account can be extended to the consequent: a 
conditional acquires relevance by having instances, hence some possibility of the 
consequent being true (Sperber, Cara, and Girotto, 1995). But if the consequent is 
known to be true, or highly probable, then a conditional may be weaker than the 
justifiable information content.   
Although the suggestions above are plausible, they are ad hoc. They are 
arguably an example of the pragmatic waste bin. Why so? The experiments do not – 
and, indeed, were not intended to – tease apart semantics and pragmatics. It is one 
thing to say that the leading semantic theories do not account for the data; it is quite 
another to say that the effects are, therefore, pragmatic. The experiments were 
intended to explore belief change from testimonial conditionals and, from the point 
                                                
 
38 The listed theories are not the only accounts of the conditional. However, they are 
particularly influential at present. A principal alternative, the Stalnaker conditional, does not 
seem to make clear predictions without extra assumptions (Douven, 2012).  
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of view of testimony, what is crucial is the information communicated and accepted, 
not whether that information is communicated semantically or pragmatically. 
Nevertheless, it is an interesting and theoretically important question for linguistics, 
the philosophy of language, and the psychology of reasoning, whether the effects are 
semantic or pragmatic.  
 Since, to repeat, the present experiments were not designed to tease apart 
semantics and pragmatics, they used a dependent measure that is too crude for that 
purpose. A variety of dependent measures feature in the experimental literature on 
the conditional. Within the psychology of reasoning, the measures are 
overwhelmingly ratings scales: ratings of truth, probability, believability, 
assertability, or acceptability. The first three ratings scales – truth, probability, and 
believability – are often treated as accessing semantics (on truth and believability, 
see Douven & Krzyżanowska, 2017; on probability, see Evans & Over, 2004, or 
Over, 2016); the remaining ratings scales, as accessing pragmatics. However, it is far 
from clear that any scale isolates semantics or pragmatics. Take, for example, the 
following sentence from Douven and Krzyżanowska (2017): 
Princess Diana died in a car accident and she divorced Prince Charles.  
A textbook account is that such sentences are semantically true but pragmatically 
false because of an order implicature: the sentence implicates, nonsensically, that the 
death happened before the divorce. A hearer could reasonably respond ‘Yes, but not 
in that order’, or ‘No, she divorced Prince Charles before she died in a car accident.’ 
There is, moreover, no a priori reason to discount the possibility that hearers would 
judge the probability of the sentence above to be different from a sentence with a 
more natural ordering. Plausibly, the sentence’s believability will also depend on the 
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ordering (Douven, 2010). And semantic factors seem likely to contribute to the 
assertability and acceptability of the statement39.  
Although ratings scales do not pick out semantics or pragmatics uniquely, we 
could nevertheless argue that some scales are more sensitive to one or the other, use 
all scales together, and then interpret differences among these scales. However, 
recent empirical data suggest that there are, in fact, no clear differences in data 
among ratings scales. Douven and Krzyżanowska (2017) presented participants with 
a range of sentences which were semantically true but pragmatically false, such as 
the Princess Diana example above. They asked participants to rate the truth, 
assertability, or believability of the sentences. The resultant data showed no 
difference among the ratings scales, either in a two-option forced-choice task or with 
Likert-style scales. These data cast further doubt on the use of ratings scales to 
separate semantics and pragmatics.  
A more promising strategy is to borrow methods from psycholinguistics. In 
psycholinguistics it is common to use both offline and online measures: offline 
measures include grammaticality or truth-value judgments; online measures include 
reaction times, reading times in self-paced reading tasks, eye movements, and event-
related potentials (Harley, 2013). Online measures can provide crucial information 
about factors such as the time course of processing: when certain types of 
information become available. There is, for instance, a vigorous debate about when 
the word ‘some’ is enriched to mean ‘not all’ (e.g. Breheny, Ferguson, & Katsos, 
2013; Breheny, Katsos, & Williams, 2006; Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 
                                                
 
39 Krzyżanowska, Collins, and Hahn (2017a, b) find differences in assertability 
when conversational contexts are kept constant. These differences suggest that ratings of 
assertability are sensitive to semantics.  
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2010). Information about time course can also bear on whether a phenomenon is 
semantic or pragmatic. Semantic information tends to be instantly available, whereas 
pragmatic information takes additional processing, and may therefore be somewhat 
delayed40 (A. Stewart, personal communication, October 7, 2016). Such data are not, 
of course, watertight (see, e.g., Douven & Krzyżanowska, 2017), but they are, 
nevertheless, suggestive.   
We bring this chapter to a close by considering how the data reported in 
Chapters 2 to 4 bear on the triangular scheme. These chapters have focused on the 
link between pragmatics and sources. The third component, rationality, has remained 
largely in the background, although it is implicit in any discussion of testimony. We 
can draw out the role of rationality by reconsidering Crupi’s model for detecting (ir-
)rationality in cognitive experiments. In this model, a crucial component is the match 
between experimenters’ and participants’ understanding of the premises. According 
to Crupi’s model, we cannot pronounce on rationality until we have a theory of how 
participants understand the premises. But Chapters 2 to 4 have argued, conceptually 
and empirically, that cognitive science lacks a good theory of testimonial 
conditionals. Since testimonial conditionals feature in any experiment on conditional 
reasoning, we must remain cautious about pronouncing on the (ir-)rationality of 
people’s conditional reasoning.  
This abstract point can be made clearer with an example. Take the debate on 
centring inferences: inferences of the type ‘P and Q. Therefore, if P then Q.’ and ‘P. 
Q. Therefore, if P then Q’. Although such inferences seem counter-intuitive, they are 
                                                
 
40 There are competing models of utterance processing, some of which do not take 
literal meaning to be processed faster than non-literal meaning in all cases. There is 
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licensed by major theories of the conditional, including the material interpretation 
(Grice, 1989; Jackson, 1979), the Stalnaker conditional (Stalnaker, 1975) , Mental 
Models Theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002), and the suppositional theory 
(Adams, 1975; Edgington, 1995; Evans & Over, 2004). Centring is not licensed by 
theories which assume that conditionals require relevance or explanatory relations 
between antecedent and consequent (Douven, 2015; Krzyżanowska, 2015; 
Skovgaard-Olsen, 2016; Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016b). Empirical studies produce 
contradictory results, suggesting that people endorse (Cruz, Baratgin, Oaksford, & 
Over, 2015) and do not endorse centring (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016a).  
Is centring a rational inference? To ask this question amounts to asking how 
people interpret conditionals in an inference task: in a given task, do people interpret 
a conditional as requiring a relevance or explanatory relation, or will the conditional 
probability suffice? To predict people’s inferences in context and judge their 
rationality, we will need to predict people’s interpretations in context. Chapters 2 to 
4 suggest that we are some way off having a robust theory of the semantics and 
pragmatics of the conditional. Developing such a theory will be an essential 
complement to the rich existing literature on conditional reasoning.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
reasonable evidence, though, that properly inferred meanings take longer. For discussion, 
see, for example, Giora (1999, 2002, 2009) 
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5 Framing and utility conditionals  
Chapter 1 introduced a triangular scheme, arguing that rationality, pragmatics, 
and sources are intimately related and that we benefit from studying them together. 
Chapters 2 and 4 focused on the link between pragmatics and sources in testimonial 
contexts, demonstrating how assertion and expertise influence people’s judgments of 
conditionals’ information content. This chapter focuses on the link between 
pragmatics and rationality, using goal framing as a case study to illustrate what 
pragmatics can tell us about rationality and rationality about pragmatics. This 
chapter will, first, re-introduce framing as a general topic, before introducing goal 
framing as the research focus. It will argue that utilities draw together pragmatics 
and rationality: people use utilities to interpret conditionals, and to assess conditional 
arguments; how they do this directly impacts on theories of framing, since key 
framing effects rely on the conditional.  
As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, framing is a key phenomenon in the 
psychology of rationality. Framing effects are taken as important evidence that 
human judgment and decision making is suboptimal. These effects take different 
forms, which vary in complexity. In each case, though, people make different 
judgments or decisions on the basis of different but supposedly equivalent 
descriptions, hence (again, supposedly) violating the principle of description 
invariance (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Much rides on the notion of equivalence: 
although non-equivalent frames are also researched, they do not have such obvious 
implications for rationality (Druckman & McDermott, 2008).  
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5.1.1 Prospect Theory and the Asian Disease Paradigm  
The most influential account of framing is due to Tversky and Kahneman 
(1981). The account runs thus. Framing occurs when people are faced with a 
decision problem. Decision problems are defined by the available options, the 
attendant outcomes, and the conditional probabilities of these outcomes given the 
available options. Decision makers approach decision problems by, first, establishing 
a decision frame (a stage often called ‘editing’) and then evaluating the options. 
Decision frames are  ‘[the] decision maker’s conception of the acts, outcomes, and 
contingencies associated with a particular choice’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 
p.453). Which frame is chosen is a highly contextual matter. The frame is ‘controlled 
partly by the formulation of the problem and partly by the norms, habits, and 
personal characteristics of the decision-maker (1981, p.453).’ A key aspect is 
whether outcomes are formulated as gains and losses. This formulation affects how 
people evaluate options. People evaluate options against a neutral but movable 
reference point. Relative to this reference point, people are risk-averse with gains 
and risk-seeking with losses (for exposition in terms of the valuation function see, 
e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  
The above account applies most straightforwardly to risky-choice framing. A 
clear example is the Asian disease paradigm discussed in Chapter 1. It will be useful 
to briefly repeat the description of the paradigm and the prospect-theoretic 
explanation here. In the Asian disease paradigm, participants see the following (or 
equivalent) materials:   
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian 
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to 
combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific 
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estimate[s] of the con- sequences of the programs are as follows: 
[Usually seen by one group] 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, 
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
 
[Usually seen by another group] 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 
probability that 600 people will die.  
     (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453) 
Programs A and B appear under gain framing: the frame is ‘lives saved’, which sets 
the reference point at 600 deaths. Any life saved is a gain relative to this reference 
point. Since gains prompt people to be risk-averse, people prefer the certain option, 
Program A. Programs C and D, in contrast, appear under loss framing: the frame is 
‘will die’, which sets the reference point at 0 deaths. Any death is a loss relative to 
this reference point. Since losses prompt people to be risk-seeking, people prefer the 
risky option, Program D. With these (and equivalent) materials, this preference 
reversal replicates well (Kühberger & Tanner, 2010), though it is unclear whether 
the preference reversal is robust to variations in the specified information (Chick et 
al., 2016; Kühberger & Tanner, 2010; Mandel, 2014).  
5.1.2 Towards goal framing  
This chapter focuses on a different but related framing effect, known as goal 
framing. Although there are subtle differences between the effects, goal framing, too, 
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is taken to challenge rationality (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 2002; Levin et 
al., 1998). Goal frames are frames such has the following:  
Positive frame: If you decide to get HIV tested, you may feel the peace of 
mind that comes with knowing about your health.  
Negative frame: If you do not decide to get HIV tested, you may not feel the 
peace of mind that comes with knowing about your health.  
       (Apanovitch et al., 2003) 
Goal framing differs from ‘Asian disease’ framing in how it applies to actions. In 
both cases, there are two choices. In the ‘Asian disease’ paradigm, the choice is 
between two alternative actions; framing occurs if there are preference reversals. In 
goal framing, the choice is to perform or not perform a particular action (Levin, 
Schneider & Gaeth, 1998). Goal frames, that is, argue in favour of an action either 
by stressing the positive consequences of undertaking an action or by stressing the 
negative consequences of not undertaking it (Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998). In 
goal framing, framing occurs if one frame or the other prompts higher ratings of 
persuasiveness, attitude, or intention to perform, or prompts more people to actually 
undertake the action (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012).  
The types of framing also differ with respect to both probabilities and utilities. 
These differences can be understood more precisely by considering the structure of 
the conditionals themselves. Take, first, the component utilities. The typical ‘Asian 
disease’ conditional has the form ‘If Program A is adopted, then 200 people will be 
saved.’  The antecedent -  ‘Program A is adopted’ – has no obvious utility; there is 
no information about Program A itself, other than the outcome specified in the 
consequent, ‘200 people will be saved’. Only the consequent has clear utility. In 
contrast, the typical goal-framing conditional has the form ‘If you decide to get HIV 
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tested, you may feel the peace of mind that comes with knowing about your health’. 
Here, the antecedent does have (dis)utility: although the precise value will vary 
subjectively, HIV tests are associated with at least mild inconvenience and 
discomfort. The consequent – ‘you may feel the peace of mind…’ – again specifies 
an outcome with utility. There are also differences in the conditional probabilities. In 
‘Asian disease’ conditionals, the conditional probabilities are specified. This 
specification is implicit for Programs A and C: presumably, for example, P(200 
saved|Program A) = 1. It is explicit for Programs B and D: for instance, P(600 
saved|Program B) = 1/3. In goal-framing conditionals, there are typically no 
probabilities (Rothman & Salovey, 1997). 
Despite these differences, goal-framing research has come to test the same 
prospect-theoretic predictions as ‘Asian disease’ framing (Rothman & Salovey, 
1997). This process started after the failure of an early theory: that, because people 
are loss averse and have a negativity bias, loss frames should be more effective 
across the board (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987). An early goal-framing study 
explored this prediction in communication about breast self-examination 
(Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987). Participants read pamphlets promoting breast-self 
examination which used gain or loss framing or no arguments. For example,  
By (not) doing BSE now, you can (will not) learn what your normal, health 
breasts feel like so that you will be better (ill) prepared to notice any small, 
abnormal changes that might occur as you get older.  
    (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987, p. 504) 
Participants who read loss-framed pamphlets showed more positive attitudes, 
intentions and behaviours with respect to breast-self examination. Subsequent 
research has produced less clear results. Some studies show no effect (Lalor & 
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Hailey, 1989); others suggest moderation by variables such as efficacy, personal 
involvement, threat, or mood (Block & Keller, 1995; Rothman, Salovey, Antone, 
Keough, & Martin, 1993; Wegener, Petty, & Klein, 1994). Meta-analyses 
demonstrate, however, that, overall, loss frames are not more persuasive than gain 
frames (O’Keefe, 2011; O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006, 2007, 2009).  
Apparent inconsistencies among studies led Rothman and Salovey (1997) to 
reanalyze goal framing and introduce new theoretical distinctions to attempt to 
explain the divergent results41. They introduced two principal innovations: a 
distinction between advocated behaviours; and a distinction between phrasings. Take, 
first, the distinction in behaviours. Different behaviours, they argued, differ 
systematically in risk, understood in a specific and unusual way:  
‘the risk associated with a behavioural alternative usually cannot be defined 
in terms of the actual likelihood of a particular outcome. Instead, risky 
reflects the subjective perception that to perform a behaviour may involve an 
unpleasant outcome’ 
      (Rothman & Salovey, 1997, p. 5) 
‘Risk’, here, would perhaps be better understood as utility. Nevertheless, Rothman 
and Salovey used this notion of risk to justify a (somewhat questionable) move to 
Prospect Theory, according to which gain frames prompt risk aversion and loss 
frames prompt risk-seeking behaviour. Prevention behaviours include eating 
healthily, exercising, and taking preventative medicines. Prevention is taken to be 
                                                
 
41 O’Keefe (2011) has suggested that the loss aversion explanation– and the 
subsequent prevention/detection distinction – survived so long because researchers have 
favoured narrative reviews, where conclusions are based on the presence or absence of a 
statistically significant result. It was, on his view, the switch to meta-analytic methods which 
cast doubt on both accounts.  
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low in risk: that is, the ‘relatively certain’ outcome is positive (Rothman & Salovey, 
1997, p. 10). Detection behaviours include health screening, and are taken to be high 
in risk: there is a chance of a negative outcome (detecting an illness), at least in the 
short term. It is the short-term consequences, on this account, that are crucial. The 
second principal distinction is in phrasing: the general terms ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ can be 
realized in the follow ways: 
Gain: Attain Gain  If you get HIV tested, you may feel the peace 
of mind which comes with knowing about your health. 
 Avoid Loss If you get HIV tested, you may not suffer the 
anxiety of not knowing about your health.  
Loss Avoid Gain If you don’t get HIV tested, you may not feel 
the peace of mind which comes with knowing about your 
health.  
 Attain Loss If you don’t get HIV tested, you may suffer the 
anxiety of not knowing about your health.  
These different phrasings could, in principle, affect persuasive outcomes: the ‘attain 
gain’ and ‘attain loss’ frames may have simpler representations than the ‘avoid loss’ 
and ‘avoid gain’ frames (Brendl, Tory, & Lemm, 1995). 
5.1.3 Goal framing: the empirical data 
How do these distinctions map onto the data? Although Rothman and 
Salovey’s (1997) distinctions are plausible, they lack clear evidence. One meta-
analysis showed a small but significant advantage of gain frames for prevention 
behaviours, but this was largely driven by a larger effect in data on dental health 
(O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007). Another meta-analysis showed a small but significant 
advantage of loss frames for detection behaviour, but this was largely driven by a 
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larger effect in data on breast-cancer detection (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2009). More 
problematically, a subsequent large-scale meta-analysis has shown a small but 
significant advantage of gain frames for prevention behaviours, especially for skin-
cancer prevention, smoking cessation and physical activity, but no significant 
difference in data on attitudes, intentions or detection behaviours (Gallagher & 
Updegraff, 2012). The data on phrasing is similarly inconclusive. Few studies have 
used the necessary manipulations, and those studies produce contradictory results: 
Detweiler, Bedell, Salovey, Pronin, and Rothman (1999) found no difference 
between the types of gain and loss frames; Nan (2007), however, only found framing 
when using ‘avoid loss’ and ‘attain loss’ frames (see, also, O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006, 
2007, 2009).  
Why do the data not support framing? We will consider three options here: 
that Prospect Theory simply does not apply to the standard approach; that any 
framing account is based on a false assumption of equivalence between frames; and 
that the literature has not systematically manipulated crucial predictors.  
Take, first, the possibility that Prospect Theory simply does not apply to the 
standard goal-framing task. The plausibility of this suggestion hinges on two points: 
the interpretation of ‘risk’, and the options available. The definition of ‘risk’ in goal-
framing research seems to have evolved. As we have already seen, Rothman and 
Salovey (1997) interpreted ‘risk’, in effect, as utility: this interpretation is at play in 
the distinction between prevention and detection behaviours. It is by no means clear 
that Prospect Theory applies with this interpretation of risk. However, by 
Apanovitch et al. (2003), the interpretation shifted to focus on perceptions of 
certainty, an interpretation which is more congenial to Prospect Theory. Apanovitch 
et al. claimed, without citing empirical data, that prevention behaviours are typically 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 196 
viewed as having more certain outcomes than detection behaviours.  Although their 
evidence for this claim is unclear, their experiments did, indeed, suggest that 
perceived certainty is an important factor: perceived certainty led to an advantage for 
gain frames in HIV testing. Their focus on certainty does not, however, seem to have 
been widely shared (for exceptions, see Block & Keller, 1995; Gerend & Cullen, 
2008; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 2004; O’Connor, Ferguson, & O’Connor, 2005; 
Schneider et al., 2001). 
The emphasis on perceived certainty brings goal framing closer to Prospect 
Theory, but not close enough to derive reasonable predictions. The culprit, here, is 
the number of options available to participants. Recall that in the Asian Disease 
Paradigm, where Prospect Theory straightforwardly applies, participants choose 
between two options: a certain and a risky option. It is this choice that framing acts 
on: gain frames prompt the choice for the certain option; loss frames, for the risky 
option. In contrast, in gain framing participants choose between compliance and non-
compliance with the advocated behaviour, but these options need not differ in 
certainty (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007). To borrow O’Keefe and Jensen’s examples:  
1.a. If I brush my teeth regularly, I’ll almost certainly avoid cavities.  
1.b. If I don’t brush my teeth regularly, I might avoid cavities or I might not.  
2.a. If I get the flu jab, I might or might not get the flu.  
2.b. If I don’t get the flu jab, I might or might not get the flu.  
1.a. and 1.b. differ in certainty; 2.a. and 2.b. do not. Note that the behaviours 
mentioned are prevention behaviours. These variations suggest that there is limited 
scope for general predictions from Prospect Theory; that they are variations within a 
single class of behaviour, prevention behaviours, is further evidence against a helpful 
role for the prevention/detection distinction.  
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Let us temporarily assume, for the sake of argument, that the notions of risk 
and the behavioural options are no obstacle to applying Prospect Theory to goal 
framing. We, nevertheless, encounter another reason for the failure of prospect-
theoretic predictions: these predictions are based on a false assumption that the 
frames are equivalent. Earlier in this chapter, we saw that equivalence is crucial to 
the interpretation of framing. The goal-framing literature assumes that positive and 
negative frames convey equivalent information (for discussion, see Corner & Hahn, 
2010). That is, the literature assumes that ‘If P then Q’ and ‘If not P then not Q’ are 
equivalent. The question naturally arises ‘Which standard should we use for 
equivalence?’ A natural candidate is classical logic: according to classical logic, if 
the frames are equivalent, then they should entail each other. But classical logic 
prohibits the inference ‘If P then Q; therefore if not P then not Q’ and vice versa. 
Classical logic does licence the inferences ‘If P then Q; therefore if not Q then not P’ 
and (simplifying somewhat) ‘If not P then not Q; therefore if Q then P’. But this 
inference is not useful in the appropriate contexts: there is no persuasive value in 
inferring ‘If your risk of cancer does not decrease, then you are not wearing 
sunscreen’ from ‘If you wear sunscreen, then your risk of cancer decreases.’ An 
alternative standard is probability. But with probabilities, too, frames are not 
necessarily equivalent. While the conditional probabilities 
P(Consequent|Antecedent) and P(Not Consequent | Not Antecedent) may 
contingently be the same, they do not have to be. That is, they do not formally 
constrain each other. Considering these inferences alone is enough to reject 
equivalence. The content of the conditionals may increase the non-equivalence still 
further. For instance, there is no reason to assume that hearers will assess the 
relevant utilities equivalently under positive and negative frames, from the point of 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 198 
view either of estimating the speaker’s assessment of the utilities or of making their 
own subjective estimates.   
The non-equivalence of frames may account for the failure to support 
predictions from Prospect Theory. It may also explain the lack of systematic 
differences between positive and negative frames: the literature has simply not 
manipulated the appropriate predictors. One key predictor is the conditional 
probability. This thesis has reviewed an extensive literature which suggests that the 
conditional probability is central to the information content of the conditional. It has 
also presented empirical data in support of this suggestion.  We should strongly 
expect, then, that the conditional probability is important to these conditional frames.  
As we have seen, though, probabilities have largely been set aside by goal-framing 
researchers, because ‘the risk associated with a behavioural alternative usually 
cannot be defined in terms of the actual likelihood of a particular outcome’ 
(Rothman & Salovey, 1997, p. 5). The decision is based on questionable reasoning. 
Whether or not such risks can be defined in terms of the objective likelihood (and, 
for many health behaviours, such information may well be available), they can be 
estimated subjectively, and participants’ subjective estimates could be manipulated 
using experimental materials. This neglect of probabilities, then, is unnecessary as 
well as problematic.  
Important though probabilities are, this chapter will focus on a manipulation 
which is closer to the existing literature: namely, utilities. Doing so will allow us to 
consider the relationship between pragmatics and rationality from a fresh perspective 
for this thesis. This chapter will focus on the two utilities which are directly 
implicated in goal frames: the utility of the antecedent and the utility of the 
consequent.  
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Neither utility seems to have been explored satisfactorily in empirical 
research. Take, first, the utility of the antecedent.  Some researchers have assumed 
that the antecedent is inert with respect to utilities: that the antecedent is a good thing 
to do, so its utility can be ignored in experiments (Levin et al., 1998). This 
assumption is intuitively unsatisfactory, since antecedent behaviours can clearly vary 
in their intrinsic utility. Compare, for instance, two prevention behaviours: taking 
regular medicines to prevent heart disease, and undergoing surgery to prevent breast 
cancer. While both the antecedent behaviours may lead to positive consequences, 
they differ starkly in their intrinsic utility; this difference seems intuitively likely to 
contribute to the persuasiveness of an argument. Other researchers have explored the 
utility of the antecedent through the prevention/detection distinction: this relies on 
another assumption, in early accounts of this distinction, that prevention behaviours 
have positive utility (or are, in their terms, low risk) and detection behaviours have 
negative utility (or are, in their terms, high risk) (Rothman & Salovey, 1997; 
Rothman et al., 1993). But this manipulation is not systematic: prevention 
behaviours can differ widely from each other in utility, as can detection behaviours. 
Still other researchers collect participants’ utility judgments indirectly, through 
measures of attitude towards the health behaviour in question (e.g. Uskul, Sherman, 
& Fitzgibbon, 2009; van Assema, Martens, Ruiter, & Brug, 2001). But these data are 
natural variations among participants, not systematic manipulations. It may, of 
course, be unfeasible to manipulate antecedent utilities in a task whose materials 
simulate a health campaign: the utilities are constrained by the facts of the matter.  
But, as we will see below, more abstract experimental tests are both possible and 
desirable: they allow us to investigate the mechanisms underlying the persuasiveness 
of these frames, mechanisms which can later be explored in more naturalistic tasks. 
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Matters are somewhat different for the utility of the consequent. There is a 
fair amount of relevant evidence which has been generated to test other hypotheses. 
O’Keefe (2013) argued that a wide range of goal-framing studies (indeed, persuasion 
studies more generally) can be re-interpreted as exploring the desirability – hence, 
utility – of the consequences. Many studies have, for instance, sought moderating 
variables for goal framing, typically individual-difference variables such as people’s 
concern for the future or their regulatory focus (for discussion, see O’Keefe, 2013). 
For example, Orbell and Hagger (2006) investigated how people’s concern for future 
consequences affected their responses to messages about diabetes screening. People 
who showed low concern were more persuaded by messages focusing on short-term 
positive, and long-term negative, consequences. People who showed high concern 
were, conversely, more persuaded by messages focusing on short-term negative, and 
long-term positive, consequences. Cesario, Grant, and Tory (2004) found similar 
persuasive differences according to regulatory focus. They presented arguments for 
an after-school program which described the program as either promoting success or 
preventing failure. Persuasiveness was predicted by the fit with participants’ 
regulatory focus: participants who were promotion-focused (motivated more by 
achieving gains) were more persuaded by arguments emphasizing achievement of 
gains (promoting success); participants who were prevention-focused (motivated 
more by avoiding losses) were more persuaded by arguments emphasizing 
avoidances of losses (avoiding failure).The data from these studies can be interpreted 
as suggesting that frames with desirable consequents are more persuasive. Indeed, 
O’Keefe suggests that these data add further to support to what he calls the single 
best supported empirical generalization about persuasion: arguments with desirable 
consequences are likely to be persuasive. O’Keefe’s analysis suggests, then, that the 
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utility of the consequent, like that of the antecedent, should be systematically 
manipulated to explore the persuasiveness of goal framing. Such systematic 
manipulation does not feature in the experimental literature.  
Considering utilities in this way argues for taking a somewhat simpler 
approach to goal framing than has been taken so far in the literature. To understand 
the frames, we can abstract away from complex simulations of health campaigns and, 
instead, systematically manipulate components of the frames themselves. The 
research question will be whether the effectiveness of a frame depends on the 
subjective utility of the antecedent and the subjective utility of the consequent. As 
we will see, considering the utilities of the frames will reveal subtle phenomena that 
were otherwise hidden in more complex designs.  
5.1.4 Towards an experimental paradigm: utilities in argumentation and 
pragmatics 
While utilities do not feature systematically in the goal-framing literature, 
they have received far more attention in two parallel literatures: in the study of 
arguments from consequences, and in pragmatics. These literatures treat inextricably 
linked, though not identical, phenomena. They also suggest an experimental 
paradigm.  
As we have already seen, a large body of research on persuasion suggests 
that people are sensitive to consequences and, in particular, supports a role for the 
utility of the consequent. A parallel literature, in pragmatics, has manipulated the 
utility of the antecedent and the utility of consequent. This literature focuses on 
inducive speech acts: acts of inducing or persuading someone to do something 
(Bonnefon, 2012). It may seem surprising to think of inducement or persuasion as a 
pragmatic phenomenon. However, speech acts have long been viewed from the 
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perspective of their effects – or, in Austin's (1965) term, perlocutions  - including 
their persuasive effects. Indeed, the very aim of speech acts is to have an effect on 
someone, be it on their feelings, thoughts, or actions (Austin, 1965; Marcu, 2000). 
Inducive speech acts are relevant and assertable in virtue of the utilities of antecedent 
and consequent and the conditional probability of the consequent given the 
antecedent (Evans, Neilens, Handley, & Over, 2008; Ohm & Thompson, 2004). For 
instance, tips and promises are effective when the cost of the antecedent is low, the 
benefit of the consequent is high, and the conditional probability is high; warnings 
and threats are effective when the benefit of the antecedent is low, the cost of the 
consequent is high, and the conditional probability is high (Evans et al., 2008). 
A broader account has been laid out by Bonnefon in his theory of utility 
conditionals (Bonnefon, 2009, 2012, 2016, Bonnefon et al., 2011, 2013; Bonnefon & 
Sloman, 2013). This account has both rational and pragmatic components: it is 
intended to integrate both work oriented more towards rationality (Corner, Hahn, & 
Oaksford, 2011) and work oriented more towards pragmatics (Evans et al., 2008). At 
the heart of the theory is a formal device, the utility grid, presented in annotated form 
below:  
If x u y 
Then x’ u’ y’ 
 Actor Utility Target 
 
To illustrate, consider the conditional ‘If I let you get away with it, then my boss will 
fire me’: 
If s + h 
Then e - s 
 Actor Utility Target 
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The actor in the antecedent is the speaker, s; the antecedent is about the speaker 
performing an action with positive utility (+) for the hearer, h. The actor in the 
consequent is a third party, the boss, who is neither the speaker nor the hearer, and is 
represented as e. The consequent is about the boss performing an action with 
negative utility (-) for the speaker. Any entity can be an actor or target; for events 
without an agent, then the neutral agent w, for the World, can be assigned. Utilities 
are represented using a simple ordinal scale: --, -, 0, +, ++, on the justification that a 
continuous scale is psychologically implausible (Bonnefon, 2009). It is probably 
more usual, in fact, to assume a continuous scale (Read, 2007), but there will be no 
need, in this thesis, to take a stand on this issue.  
Alongside the utility grid is a set of folk axioms: assumptions that ordinary 
reasoners are presumed to make about human decision making. Reasoners are taken 
to assume that people generally take actions that increase their own personal utility 
and avoid actions that decrease it; that other people should take actions that increase 
their (the reasoner’s) utility, and avoid actions that decrease it; and that people take 
actions that increase other people’s utility as long as doing so does not decrease their 
own personal utility, and avoid actions that decrease other people’s utility as long as 
doing so does not increase their own personal utility (Bonnefon, 2009).  
Armed with the utility grid and the folk axioms, Bonnefon can account for a 
wide range of data on conditionals with valued antecedents and consequents. His 
framework can be used to predict participants’ inferences about a speaker’s intention 
or about the likely behaviour of one of the mentioned people (actors or targets) 
(Bonnefon, 2012). These successful predictions are remarkable given that the theory 
includes a small set of ordinal utilities: the more so because, for technical reasons, 
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the theory eschews probabilities42 (Bonnefon, 2009). Bonnefon’s framework can 
also be used to predict the persuasiveness of utility conditionals. For present 
purposes, the most relevant example is goal frames:  
‘If you use sunscreen, your risk of skin cancer will decrease’.  
(h – h; w ++ h) 
It is plausible to assume, here, that, for many people, applying sunscreen is mildly 
inconvenient, hence has mild disutility, and that one’s risk of skin cancer decreasing 
has considerable utility. For such people, the aggregate utility (U(Antecdent) + 
U(Consequent)) is mildly positive (+). Assuming that people favour actions which 
increase their personal utility, then this conditional should be persuasive. For any 
individual, though, the actual persuasiveness will depend on their subjective utilities. 
In this simple case, probabilities may not be relevant: the relationship between 
antecedent and consequent seems deterministic, although there will presumably be a 
distribution over the sizes of risk decreases. This simple analysis is trivial from the 
point of view of the theory of utility conditionals, but nevertheless offers an advance 
over the goal-framing literature, because both the key utilities are considered.  
As we have seen, goal framing requires a pair of conditionals, generally of 
the form ‘If (not) P then (not) Q’. The question naturally arises of how to represent 
the negative frame. This apparently straightforward question does not meet with a 
simple answer in the literature: neither the argumentation literature nor the 
pragmatics literature appears to have addressed this issue. Jean-François Bonnefon 
(personal communication, September 15, 2015) has suggested one possible option:  
                                                
 
42 Bonnefon (2009) does not deny that probabilities are important in reasoning with 
utility conditionals; he simply argues that it is impossible to integrate probabilities and 
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‘If you do not use sunscreen, your risk of skin cancer will not decrease.’ 
(h 0 A; w - - h)43 
Here, not using sunscreen amounts to doing nothing, and therefore has neither utility 
nor disutility. In contrast, not decreasing one’s risk skin cancer is treated as a loss. 
This asymmetry may seem surprising. One way to justify it is to argue for a 
distinction between the utility of an action and its consequences. There is something 
more immediate and more certain about the utility of the antecedent: it is, in 
Bonnefon’s (2009) term, the proximal utility. The utility of the antecedent is the 
intrinsic, unavoidable utility of an agreeable activity or the intrinsic, unavoidable 
disutility of a disagreeable activity, in both cases separate from whatever 
consequences may follow from (not) performing the activity.  The utility of the 
consequent, in contrast, is less immediate and less certain: it is, in Bonnefon’s (2009) 
term, the distal utility. Given this greater distance and uncertainty, it makes sense to 
consider these utilities as potential gains and losses. Nevertheless, other utility 
assignments are plausible, and will be discussed below.  
If we adopt the utility assignment above, we can derive a set of predictions 
for goal frames, which can (and will) be tested experimentally. The goal-framing 
literature typically explores frames which advocate an action which has at least mild 
intrinsic disutility but gives rises to consequences with at least mild utility. Table 5.1 
reports the aggregate utilities for all possible goal frames based on the above 
assumptions.  
                                                                                                                                     
 
ordinal utilities without making tenuous assumptions. He suggests a possible workaround for 
this issue.  
43 By convention, in a utility grid 0 utility has a target of A, which stands for 
‘everyone’.  
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Table 5.1. Utilities for goal frames. 
Frame Antecedent Consequent Aggregate 
Positive  P1 - + 0 
   P2 - ++ + 
   P3 -- + - 
   P4 -- ++ 0 
Negative N1 0 - - 
   N2 0 -- -- 
   N3 0 - - 
   N4 0 -- -- 
 
The aggregate utility corresponds to the strength of the frames as argument. The 
strength of a positive frame increases as its positive utility increases. A positive 
frame is persuasive if its aggregate utility is positive: the more positive, the more 
persuasive. A negative frame is persuasive if its aggregate utility is negative: the 
more negative, the more persuasive. To elaborate, a negative frame succeeds by 
being an argument against the antecedent: against not performing the action. 
Averaged across the individual frames, positive frames should be weak (on average 
0); negative frames should, in contrast, be persuasive (at least -). This higher-level 
prediction is indistinguishable from the hypothesis of generalized loss aversion, 
which has already been considered in the literature (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987). 
At a lower level, there are more distinctive predictions: the strongest arguments are 
N2 and N4, followed by P2, N1 and N3. Arguments P1 and P4 are unpersuasive; 
argument P3 is so unpersuasive that it should backfire; that is, it is, in effect, an 
argument for not doing the antecedent action.  
We are now in a position to test the framework above against empirical data.  
 
5.2 Experiment 5.1 
Experiment 5.1 is a first attempt at exploring goal framing from the point of 
view of utility conditionals. The experiment allows a test of two levels of predictions 
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based on the utility assignment discussed above: the high level prediction that 
negative frames should be more persuasive than positive frames; and the lower level 
predictions about the comparative persuasiveness of individual frames. The 
experiment assumes Bonnefon's (2009) extended set of simple ordinal utilities: --,-
,0,+,++. These are realized by the following simple actions and outcomes: 
Taking a mildly unpleasant medicine (-) 
Undergoing painful surgery (--) 
Your risk of catching H1, a minor infection, decreasing (+) 
Your risk of catching the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, decreasing (++) 
These actions/events were embedded in frames of the following form: 
Positive Frame. If you take this mildly unpleasant medicine (undergo this 
painful surgery), your risk of catching the H1, a minor infection (the DX 
virus, a life-threatening illness), will decrease. 
Negative Frame. If you don’t take this mildly unpleasant medicine (undergo 
this painful surgery), your risk of catching the H1, a minor infection (the DX 
virus, a life-threatening illness), won’t decrease. 
In these contexts, the antecedent actions are both preventative behaviours. 
Participants saw all the permutations of the utilities shown in Table 5.1, and rated 
these on a scale of argument convincingness from -5 to 5. This scale was chosen to 
allow participants to indicate that an argument was so poor that it backfired (an 
explanation was provided; see below). The experiment was designed to explore the 
effectiveness of framing using Bonnefon’s (personal communication, September 15, 
2015) suggested utility assignments. To check whether participants did behave in the 
suggested way, the experiment included a manipulation check in which participants 
rated the utility of the actions and consequences.  
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5.2.1 Methods  
Design. This experiment manipulated the full set of utilities from Table 5.1, 
which correspond to the gain/loss framing. There are two types of frame: positive 
and negative. The main overarching prediction is that negative frames will be 
stronger than positive frames. If this prediction holds, further comparisons are 
possible among the items, to check the precise predictions of the utility grid. This 
was a within-subjects design. 
Participants. 92 participants (42 female; average age 39.30 years) completed 
the task; 1 participant had previously been excluded since their first language was 
not English. This experiment used the same system as above for recruiting and 
remunerating participants. Participants were recruited via the intermediary MTurk 
Data (www.mturkdata.com). High qualifications were set for the task to improve the 
quality of the data and maximize the number of native English speakers: participants 
had to be resident in the US, and have an overall approval rating of 99% for 1,000 
previously completed tasks. Participants received a small fee, chosen to exceed the 
US minimum wage per minute.  
Materials. These were eight conditionals: four positive, four negative. The 
materials manipulate antecedent and consequent utility.  
Positive 1: If you take this mildly unpleasant medicine, your risk of catching 
H1, a minor infection, will substantially decrease. (h – h; w + h) 
Positive 2:  If you take this mildly unpleasant medicine, your risk of 
contracting the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, will substantially decrease. 
(h – h; w ++ h)  
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Positive 3: If you undergo this painful surgery, your risk of catching H1, a 
minor infection, will substantially decrease. (h - - h; w + h)   
Positive 4: If you undergo this painful surgery, your risk of contracting the 
DX virus, a life-threatening illness, will substantially decrease. (h - - h; w + + 
h) 
Negative 1: If you don’t take this mildly unpleasant medicine, your risk of 
catching H1, a minor infection, will not substantially decrease. (h 0 h; w - h) 
Negative 2: If you don’t take this mildly unpleasant medicine, your risk of 
contracting the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, will not substantially 
decrease. (h 0 h; w - - h)  
Negative 3:  If you don’t undergo this painful surgery, your risk of catching 
H1, a minor infection, won’t substantially decrease’. (h 0 h; w - h) 
Negative 4: If you don’t undergo this painful surgery, your risk of contracting 
the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, won’t substantially decrease. (h 0 h; 
w - - h) 
Procedure. After giving informed consent, participants read the following 
instructions:  
Thank you for taking part in this study. We would like you to imagine that 
you are talking to a doctor. Your doctor is helping you decide whether to go 
through some medical procedures. While you are not required or expected to 
undergo them, there are arguments to consider.  
You will be asked to say how convincing you find 8 short arguments. You 
might read, for example, 'If you take this medicine, you will feel better'. Here, 
you would be asked to say how convincing this is as an argument for taking 
the medicine. You will give your answers on a scale from -5 to 5. '-5' means 
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that the argument is completely unconvincing. You should understand this as 
meaning so unconvincing that it backfires. For example, if you give the 
example argument -5, that would mean that you think the argument above is 
so bad that it would actually convince you NOT to take the medicine. '5' 
means that the argument is completely convincing. So if you give the 
example argument 5, that would mean you think it would definitely convince 
you to take the medicine.   
Please read the arguments carefully. They might sound similar, but the 
arguments don't repeat. Each one is subtly different. You will also be asked 
some follow-up questions.  
Participants were assigned round-robin style to one of eight surveys containing all 
eight arguments. In the first of these surveys, the items were ordered according to a 
random sequence generated using an online random-sequence generator. In the 
remaining seven surveys, the order was counterbalanced.  Participants rated all 
arguments on the scale provided. After so doing, participants then contemplated the 
manipulation check. To do so, participants rated the utility of the actions and 
outcomes mentioned in the arguments. They were instructed as follows: ‘Finally, 
we’d like to know how good or bad you think certain events are. Please reply using 
the dropdown lists’. The drop-down list comprised the following options always in 
the following order: 
Very bad  
Bad 
Neither bad nor good 
Good 
Very Good 
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The rated events were the following, the order for which was reversed in half the 
surveys:  
Taking a mildly unpleasant medicine  
Not taking a mildly unpleasant medicine  
Undergoing painful surgery  
Not undergoing painful surgery  
Your risk of catching H1, a minor infection, decreasing 
Your risk of catching H1, a minor infection, not decreasing  
Your risk of catching the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, decreasing  
Your risk of catching the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, not decreasing  
Finally, participants received debriefing information.  
5.2.2 Results  
The most fundamental prediction was that negatively framed conditionals 
would be more persuasive than positively framed conditionals. Figure 5.1 shows the 
descriptive data. 
  
Figure 5.1. Argument convincingness by frame; error bars are standard error 
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The data clearly suggest the opposite of the predicted trend: positive frames (M = 
1.77, SD  = 2.78) are more convincing than negative frames (M = - 1.07, SD = 2.99). 
While the standard deviations suggest considerable spread, this would be expected 
because of the variation in the utilities. These data were analysed using a crossed 
random-effects model in which convincingness was predicted by Frame (positive, 
negative), and the slope of Frame was allowed to vary randomly across participants 
and items44. The model also included random intercepts for participants and items. 
These analyses were performed in the Bayes Factor package45(Morey & Rouder, 
2015). Here, and throughout this chapter, the analysis used uninformative pre-set 
priors, selecting a wide prior for the fixed effects and a ‘nuisance’ (ultra-wide) prior 
for the random effects. The latter prior type is recommended for analyses where 
medium-to-large effect sizes are possible but not of interest, such as variance due to 
participants (Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2015).  
A model containing Frame was compared with a null model, which differed 
only by excluding Frame. There was anecdotal evidence in favour of the model 
including Frame, BF = 2.20. Table 5.2 displays the estimates of the fixed effects. 
Note that the Bayes Factor package uses effect coding: the intercept is the grand 
mean; the slopes are deflections from the grand mean. Parameter estimates 
throughout this chapter are the mean estimate based on 10,000 simulations of 
                                                
 
44 Note that ‘item’ here, and throughout this chapter, refers to the four combinations 
of events (taking the medicine and reducing the risk of minor infection; taking the medicine 
and reducing the risk of the life-threatening illness; and so on), which appear under positive 
and negative frames.  
45 Later in the chapter it will be helpful to use Bayesian parameter estimation when 
exploring the manipulation check data, to minimize the risk of false positives. For 
consistency, therefore, Bayesian analyses are used throughout this chapter.  
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parameter values. The 95% percentile interval reports the middle 95% of these 
simulations.46   
Table 5.2. Fixed effects of Frame on Convincingness 
Fixed Effect Parameter  95% PI 
Intercept  b = .35 .16, .55 
Positive Frame b = 1.14 -.29, 2.40 
Negative Frame b = -1.14 -2.40, .29 
The manipulation check gives some insight into why the data do not support the 
predictions. Table 5.3 shows the frequencies of each category of utility for each 
antecedent47. 
Table 5.3. Counts for antecedent utilities 
Utility Medicine Not Medicine Surgery Not Surgery 
Very Bad 0 2 49 0 
Bad 28 12 30 5 
Neither 
Bad/Good 
48 34 8 16 
Good 14 37 4 24 
Very Good 1 6 0 42 
 
These counts suggest that, for ‘Not [Antecedent]’ conditionals, the distributions shift 
towards more positive ratings. The modal response for taking a mildly unpleasant 
medicine is neither bad nor good; for not taking it, (narrowly) good. The modal 
response for undergoing painful surgery is very bad; for not undergoing painful 
surgery, very good. The manipulation check does not, therefore, support the utility 
assignments for the antecedents in Table 5.1.  
                                                
 
46 Together, the mean estimate and 95% PI give a reasonable summary of the data. 
Note that values outside of the 95% PI can, however, be more probable than values within. 
Later sections will report the 95% HDI, which is the narrowest interval into which 95% of 
the estimates fall. This interval can be understood more simply as the 95% most plausible 
values. This interval is not available in the Bayes Factor package.  
47 Note that a technical fault led to one participant’s manipulation-check data not 
being recorded.   
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Table 5.4 shows the frequencies of each category of utility for each 
consequent. 
Table 5.4. Counts for consequent utilities; 'Minor Protection' is protection against a minor 
infection, 'Major Protection' against a life-threatening illness 
Utility Minor 
Protection 
Not Minor Major 
Protection 
Not Major 
Very Bad 1 9 3 43 
Bad 7 51 4 36 
Neither 
Bad/Good 
7 26 3 9 
Good 67 5 22 3 
Very Good 9 0 59 0 
 
These data show a similar, if more pronounced, pattern to the data on the antecedent 
utilities. The modal response for being protected against a minor infection is good; 
for not being protected, bad. The modal response for being protected against a life-
threatening illness is very good; for not being protected, very bad. These data are 
more in line with the utility assignments for the consequent in Table 5.1.   
Since participants did not assign utilities in the way predicted in Table 5.1, 
there is no sense in testing those lower-level predictions. Instead, a supplementary 
analysis was performed, using participants’ actual utility assignments as a predictor. 
Since participants saw all the manipulation-check questions at once, and the order 
was only reversed (not randomized) across surveys, this analysis should be viewed 
as suggestive rather than definitive. To perform this analysis, the utility ratings for 
negative frames needed transforming: recall that argument strength for positive 
frames is determined by positive utility; for negative frames, by negative utility. The 
utilities for the negative frame were transformed by multiplying by -1. Figure 5.2 
summarizes the descriptive data. 
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Figure 5.2. Descriptive data by Utility and Frame. Circles are data points for positive 
frames; triangles are data points for negative frames. The solid line is the regression for 
positive frames; the dotted line for negative frames. Shading represents the standard error.  
The descriptive data suggest a similar effect of Utility for both positive and 
negative frames. The data were analysed using Bayesian crossed random-effects 
models. Firstly, a model was fit including Frame and Utility and an interaction term 
as predictors, with random slopes of Frame across participants and items and random 
intercepts for participants and items. There was no support for the interaction: 
compared with the full model, there was moderate evidence in favour of the model 
without the interaction, BFInteraction =  .21/BFAdditive = 4.77. Table 5.5 reports the fixed 
effects.  
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Table 5.5. Fixed effects of Utility, Frame, and Interaction on Convincingness 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% PI 
Intercept  b = .36 .18, .54 
Positive Frame b = 1.13        .-.22, 2.34 
Negative Frame b = -1.13        -2.34, .22 
Utility  b = .87        .71, 1.02 
Utility * Positive b = -.12        -.30, .06 
Utility * Negative b = .12        -.06. 30 
 
Subsequent analyses removed the interaction term, and tested the significance of the 
remaining fixed effects by comparing the full additive model with a model without 
the relevant fixed effect (the respective null models). There was very strong evidence 
for the inclusion of Utility, BF = 5.18e+23. There was anecdotal evidence for the 
inclusion of Frame, BF = 2.59. The best model, then, is the full additive model. 
Table 5.6 reports the fixed effects for the full additive model.  
Table 5.6. Fixed effects of the full additive model 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% CI 
Intercept  b = .35 .17, .53 
Positive Frame b = 1.15        -.11, 2.29 
Negative Frame b = -1.15 -2.29, .11 
Utility  b = .87 .71, 1.02 
 
5.2.3 Discussion  
This experiment explored the persuasiveness of goal frames from the 
perspective of the theory of utility conditionals. A plausible utility assignment is that 
negated antecedents have neutral utility and negated consequents positive utility. 
According to this assignment, negative frames should be more persuasive. This 
experiment supports neither an advantage for negative frames nor the assumed utility 
assignment. The experiment offered evidence that positive frames were, in fact, 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 217 
stronger. The manipulation check suggested that this effect was due to negation 
shifting participants’ antecedent utilities towards the positive end of the utility scale, 
while it shifted participants’ consequent utilities towards the negative end of the 
utility scale. Consequently, negative arguments are rather unconvincing. The 
supplementary analysis suggested that the frames were considerably less important 
than participants’ actual utility assignments. 
There are a number of limitations to the present experiment. Firstly, the 
manipulation check raises doubts about the suggestive supplementary analysis. All 
manipulation-check items appeared together, and the order was reversed in half the 
surveys, not randomized or counterbalanced. It is possible that seeing positive and 
negative events together prompted an artificial symmetry in utility assignments. 
Better data would result from separating positive and negative events, and from 
varying the order more thoroughly. Secondly, the response scale was problematic. A 
scale from -5 to 5 is not, in itself, problematic, but the description may not have been 
transparent. The description emphasized that -5 meant that the frame was so 
unconvincing that it backfired. This description allowed a test of the ultimately 
redundant lower-level predictions. But is worth replicating these data with a more 
transparent scale.  
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5.3 Experiment 5.2 
5.3.1 Methods 
Design and Materials. 
This experiment used the same materials as Experiment 5.1 to explore the 
effects of framing (Frame) and utility assignments (Utility) on the convincingness of 
the frames as arguments for undertaking a medical procedure.   
Participants.  
91 participants (42 female; average age 38.49 years) completed the task. This 
experiment used the same system as above for recruiting and remunerating 
participants. Participants were recruited via the intermediary MTurk Data 
(www.mturkdata.com). High qualifications were set for the task to improve the 
quality of the data and maximize the number of native English speakers: participants 
had to be resident in the US, and have an overall approval rating of 99% for 1,000 
previously completed tasks. Participants received a small fee, chosen to exceed the 
US minimum wage per minute. 
Procedure.  
After giving informed consent, participants read the same instructions as 
above, except for the description of the scale. The new scale was described as 
follows:  
You will give your answers on a scale from 0 to 10. ‘0’ means that the 
argument is completely unconvincing. ‘10’ means that the argument is 
completely convincing.  
Participants were assigned round-robin style to surveys. Each survey contained all 
eight arguments, as in Experiment 5.1. In the first of these surveys, the items were 
ordered according to a random sequence generated using an online random-sequence 
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generator. In the remaining surveys, the order was counterbalanced.  Participants 
rated all arguments on the scale provided. Participants also rated the utilities of two 
sets of events: (1) the positive antecedents (taking the medicine, undergoing the 
surgery) and consequents (risk reduction for minor infection, risk reduction for 
serious illness); and (2) the negative antecedents (not taking the medicine, not 
undergoing the surgery) and consequents (no risk reduction). Sets (1) and (2) were 
presented on separate pages, either immediately before or immediately after the 
arguments, this ordering being counterbalanced across the surveys. Moreover, the 
order of events within the pages was counterbalanced. Participants were instructed to 
rate the utility of events on drop-down scales as follows:  
‘Firstly, we’d like to know how good or bad you think certain events are. 
Please reply using the lists below, where -5 means very bad, 0 means neither 
bad nor good, and 5 means very good.’  
Finally, participants received debriefing information.  
5.3.2 Results  
Figure 5.3 shows the descriptive data. 
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Figure 5.3. Descriptive data by Utility and Frame. Circles are data points for positive 
frames; triangles are data points for negative frames. The solid line is the regression for 
positive frames; the dotted line for negative frames. Shading represents the standard error. 
These data replicate the basic effects: a linear trend for Utility, with positive frames 
(M = 6.20, SD = 2.84) more convincing than negative frames. (M = 3.70, SD =2.74). 
The data suggest a possible interaction, with a steeper slope for positive frames. As 
above, these data were analysed using a Bayesian crossed random-effects model in 
which convincingness was predicted by Frame (positive, negative), Utility and the 
interaction, and the slope of Frame was allowed to vary randomly across participants 
and items. The model also included random intercepts for participants and items. 
Firstly, a model including the interaction was compared with one including only the 
main effects. There was anecdotal evidence against including the interaction, 
BFInteraction = .59, BFAdditive = 1.71.  
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 221 
Table 5.7. Fixed effects of Frame, Utility, and Interaction 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% PI 
Intercept  b = 5.00 4.80, 5.19 
Positive Frame b = 1.07        -.25, 2.27 
Negative Frame b = -1.07        -2.26, .25 
Utility  b = .19        .13, .25 
Utility * Positive b = .05        -.004,.11 
Utility * Negative b = -.05        -.11, .004 
 
The main effects were analysed by comparing the full additive model with models 
without each main effect. There was anecdotal evidence for the inclusion of Frame, 
BF = 2.64, and very strong evidence for the inclusion of Utility, BF = 9.46e+8. The 
best model, then, is the full additive model, though there was again far stronger 
evidence for the inclusion of Utility than Frame. Table 5.8 reports the fixed effects 
for this model. 
Table 5.8. Fixed effects for full additive model. 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% PI 
Intercept  b = 4.95 4.76, 5.14 
Positive Frame b = 1.08        -.23, 2.27 
Negative Frame b = -1.08        -2.27, .23 
Utility  b = .20        .14, .26 
 
We turn, now, to the utilities data. These data allow us to explore in greater 
detail how people assigned utilities to the events mentioned in the arguments. These 
data were analysed with Bayesian parameter estimation using the BEST package 
(Meredith & Kruschke, 2013). This method is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
It suffices, here, to note that the analysis used the default uninformative priors. The 
method fits a t-distribution to the data, using the following priors: for the mean, the 
prior is a normal distribution centred on the mean of the data, the spread being 
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determined by the precision equivalent to 100 times the standard deviation; for the 
standard deviation, the prior is a broad uniform distribution from 1/1000 to 1000 
times the standard deviation of the data; for the normality parameter, the prior is an 
exponential distribution giving roughly equal credibility to nearly normal and heavy-
tailed distributions (Kruschke, 2013). Since the analysis was exploratory – there 
were no predictions - we will consider only the posterior distributions of the mean 
utility ratings for each event. Note that the analyses also yield the 95% HDIs for 
these distributions: that is, the 95% most plausible values for the mean.  
Figure 5.4 contrasts the posterior distributions for the mean utility of taking 
the medicine and not taking the medicine.  
Mean
µ
−1.4 −1.2 −1.0 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0
95% HDI
−0.679 −0.0208
mean = −0.351
98% < 0 < 2%
Mean
µ
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
95% HDI
0.304 1.2
mean = 0.757
0.1% < 0 < 99.9%
 
Figure 5.4. Posterior distributions of mean utilities of taking medicine (left) and not taking 
medicine (right) 
Negation flips the utilities: taking the medicine has negative utility (Mestimate = -0.35) 
and not taking the medicine has positive utility (Mestimate= .76). This pattern recalls 
that in Experiment 5.1, though here taking the medicine has clearer disutility. Figure 
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5.5, below, shows the same pattern for undergoing and not undergoing surgery, 
again similar to that in Experiment 5.1. 
Mean
µ
−4 −3 −2 −1 0
95% HDI
−3.77 −2.86
mean = −3.32
100% < 0 < 0%
Mean
µ
0 1 2 3 4
95% HDI
1.44 2.71
mean = 2.07
0% < 0 < 100%
 
Figure 5.5. Posterior distributions of mean utilities of undergoing surgery (left) and not 
undergoing surgery (right)  
We turn to the utilities of the consequents. Figure 5.6 displays utilities for the minor 
infection. 
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Mean
µ
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
95% HDI
0.201 1.37
mean = 0.782
0.5% < 0 < 99.5%
Mean
µ
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0
95% HDI
−1.8 −1.07
mean = −1.43
100% < 0 < 0%
 
Figure 5.6. Posterior distributions of means of utilities for risk of minor infection decreasing 
(left) and not decreasing (right) 
This figure shows the now characteristic flip of utilities under negation, as do the 
utilities for the serious illness shown in Figure 5.7.  
Mean
µ
0 1 2 3 4
95% HDI
−0.046 1.67
mean = 0.815
3.1% < 0 < 96.9%
Mean
µ
−4 −3 −2 −1 0
95% HDI
−3.96 −2.89
mean = −3.44
100% < 0 < 0%
 
Figure 5.7. Posterior distributions of mean utilities for risk of major illness decreasing (left) 
and not decreasing risk (right) 
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It is perhaps surprising, here, that the 95% HDI for decreasing the risk overlaps with 
0, albeit by a very small amount, and that there appears to be no discernible 
difference in utility between the decrease in risk of a minor and major illness.  
5.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 5.2 replicated the results of Experiment 5.1 while removing 
potential confounds. Together the experiments suggest that participants used the 
utilities to judge the convincingness of the frames as arguments for having a medical 
procedure. In both experiments, there was some, weaker evidence that, controlling 
for utilities, there was still an advantage for positive frames. Experiment 5.2 offered 
greater insight into the utilities: there was a characteristic pattern for negation to flip 
the utilities.  
Why do participants treat the utilities this way? For reasons that will become 
clear later on, I will largely restrict my attention to the utility of the antecedent. The 
effect of negation recalls the shifting reference point of Prospect Theory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). While Prospect Theory does not strictly apply to this experiment 
– for the same reasons as cited in the introduction to this chapter – considering the 
similarities will prove informative. Negated clauses were evaluated, not relative to 
the actual world, but relative to the hypothetical world in which the action being 
considered was, in fact, taken. Consider the conditional ‘If you don’t undergo this 
painful surgery, your risk of catching the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, won’t 
decrease.’ The antecedent utility is evaluated relative to a world in which the hearer 
undergoes painful surgery; the consequent utility is evaluated relative to a world in 
which the hearer’s risk of catching the DX virus decreases. In these worlds, the 
antecedent utility is a gain; the consequent utility is a loss (though see Experiment 
5.3 for qualifications on the consequent).  
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We return, at this point, to the topic of pragmatics; for pragmatics has been 
suggested as a mechanism for the shifting reference point. Although we cannot call 
on Prospect Theory to explain the present data, we can call on pragmatics. McKenzie 
and colleagues (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003; Sher & McKenzie, 2006) have treated 
this issue from the perspective of attribute framing, the simple type of framing when, 
for instance, participants respond better to a product described as 95% fat-free than 
one described as having 5% fat. McKenzie and colleagues argued that such attribute 
frames imply an increase from a reference point in the relevant attribute: our 95% 
fat-free product is more fat-free than a reference point, the average of that type of 
product on the market. They have supported this account with experimental data 
suggesting that people are sensitive to reference points. When participants read that a 
glass was half-full, they inferred that it had previously been empty; when they read 
that a glass was half-empty, they inferred that it had previously been full. Likewise, 
when describing a glass, participants used ‘half-full’ if had been previously empty 
and ‘half-empty’ if it had previously been full. McKenzie and colleagues suggest 
that reference points are shifted through natural-language pragmatics.  
Such research is highly suggestive. Although the account is underspecified 
from the point of view of the linguistic processing, it suggests an explanation for the 
current data. Indeed, with negation, things may be somewhat clearer. Negative 
sentences show interesting patterns of assertability. For instance, the sentence ‘A 
whale isn’t a fish’ seems reasonable, but ‘A whale isn’t a bird’ is decidedly strange. 
We can reasonably expect that some people might think a whale is a fish - after all, it 
looks and acts like a fish in various ways - but not that people might think a whale is 
a bird (Wason, 1965). Negative sentences, in other words, invite the supposition that 
what is negated is expected to have been the case: the sentence ‘John isn’t home’ 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 227 
invites the supposition that John was expected to be at home (Clark, 1974). 48 
Psycholinguistic research has explored this phenomenon with negative natural-
language quantifiers, such as ‘few’, and suggests that negation pragmatically invites 
a focus on the complement set (Moxey, 2006; Moxey & Sanford, 1986, 2000; 
Paterson, Sanford, Moxey, & Dawydiak, 1998). To apply this account to the present 
topic, it makes little sense for you to consider assigning utility to not having an 
unpleasant procedure unless there is an expectation that you will have the procedure. 
Negation communicates precisely this expectation.  
Negative sentences bring to mind the complement set: the alternative 
scenarios in which the corresponding affirmative sentence holds. This is part of a 
more general phenomenon whereby utterances bring to mind sets of alternatives. 
This phenomenon may be implicated in framing more generally (Geurts, 2013). 
Geurts presents two sentences based on the materials of the Asian disease paradigm. 
Imagine a scenario in which 600 lives are at stake.  
It is good that 200 people survived.  
It is good that 400 people died.  
Let us assume, furthermore, that the numbers have an exact reading: exactly 200 
people survived, and exactly 400 people died. Although these sentences refer to a 
mathematically equivalent situation, they appear to contradict each other. Geurts 
suggests that the contradiction results from the alternatives that are brought to mind. 
On his account, in such contexts, evaluative adjectives like ‘good’ bring to mind 
                                                
 
48 Clark uses the term ‘supposition’ to hedge against conflating two potentially 
distinct phenomena. As he notes, sentences such as ‘Stop cheating on your exam’ and ‘Don’t 
stop cheating on your exam’ both presuppose that the addressee is cheating on his/her exam, 
whereas the sentences ‘John is present’ and ‘John isn’t present’ do not both suppose that 
John was expected to be present. Nevertheless, we can say that the speaker of a negative 
sentence presupposes that the corresponding affirmative sentence was expected to be true.  
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ordered scales of alternatives: it is good that 200 people survived; it would have been 
better if 201 people had survived; and so on. The sentence ‘It is good that 400 people 
died’ is odd because it gives rise to the following scale: it is good that 400 people 
died; it would have been better if 401 people had died; and so on (though adding 
‘only’ before the number term appears to reverse this scale). The implied scales 
contradict each other; hence the apparent contradiction between the two sentences.  
It is, as Geurts argues, a short step to framing: simply drop the explicit evaluative 
language and have participants themselves perform the evaluation, either explicitly 
on a rating scale or implicitly through their choice of options. Indeed, Geurts offers 
explanations of both attribute and Asian-disease framing, though these have yet to be 
empirically tested.  
The preceding paragraphs make an important point for the thesis: natural-
language pragmatics has a profound effect on the assignment of utilities. When this 
point is considered alongside the theory of utility conditionals, however, a tension 
arises which needs resolving. In the utility-conditionals theory, it is utilities that 
guide pragmatic inference, not pragmatic inference that guides utility assignment. A 
potential solution is to consider different types of pragmatic phenomena. As we have 
seen, a sentence such as ‘He’s not fat’ invites the supposition that the addressee 
might think otherwise. This supposition is rather basic and hard to deny. It is 
assumed to be part of the common ground and is not part of the ‘at issue content’ (on 
at issue content, see, e.g., Tonhauser, 2012). Hence, the addressee cannot simply 
reply ‘That’s not true’; doing so would amount to saying that the ‘he’ in question is, 
indeed, fat. The appropriate response is, for example, to say ‘I never thought that he 
was fat’. Something rather different is at stake in utility conditionals. Take a 
sentence such as ‘If I let you get away with it, then my boss will fire me’. Here, the 
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utilities guide us to the implicit – but very much at issue - point, of the utterance: the 
speaker means ‘I cannot let you get away with it’. The picture, then, is of a complex 
interplay between pragmatics and utilities: low-level pragmatic phenomena feed into 
the assessment of utilities, and utilities feed back into the generation of higher-level 
pragmatics. This interplay has not previously featured in the theory of utility 
conditionals, in large part because negation has also not featured in the theory.  
Although we have already seen that Prospect Theory does not apply to the 
current experiment, we might nevertheless be tempted to invoke the prospect-theory-
inspired predictions of Rothman and Salovey (1997). After all, the frames are about 
prevention behaviours and, as Rothman and Salovey predict for these behaviours, the 
positive frame is more persuasive. It is worth underlining why the data do not, in fact, 
support the Rothman and Salovey account. As the introduction to this chapter 
showed, the Rothman and Salovey predictions rely on prevention behaviours being 
viewed as low risk because they have certain, positive outcomes. Indeed, in this 
experiment the consequences of undertaking the behaviour are all positive. However, 
this experiment manipulated the utility of both antecedent and consequent; the 
aggregate utility significantly predicted the convincingness of the frames. There is 
no space in the Rothman and Salovey account for this predictor.  
Although Experiment 5.2 offers a substantial improvement on Experiment 
5.1, there are still important limitations. Firstly, there is an ambiguity over the 
wording of the consequent. Take, for instance, ‘your risk of contracting the DX virus, 
a life-threatening illness, decreasing’. This consequent could correspond equally well 
to the risk increasing and the risk staying the same, two events which would 
intuitively have rather different utilities. This ambiguity will need addressing before 
we can judge whether the foregoing discussion of utilities applies equally to the 
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antecedent and consequent. Lastly, there was anecdotal evidence that the type of 
frame predicted argument convincingness even after controlling for the utilities. 
There is no predictor in this design to account for this effect. One possibility is the 
conditional probability. Although participants could have read these conditionals as 
deterministic, they may nevertheless have read them as probabilistic. Since 
participants were asked to judge the convincingness of each item as an argument for 
performing the antecedent action, they may have been particularly focused on the 
conditional probability P(PositiveConsequent | PositiveAntecedent). The positive 
frames likely provide better evidence for this probability being high than the 
negative frames.  
5.4 Experiment 5.3 
The previous section identified an ambiguity in the wording of the 
consequent. This study addressed the ambiguity by adapting the test on the utilities. 
The experiment simply presented the consequent events from Experiments 5.1 and 
5.2 and required participants to judge their utility on a scale from -5 to 5. The 
experiment was between-participants. The consequent events were described in three 
different ways: the risk of an illness increasing; the risk not changing; and the risk 
staying the same. The last two phrasings are different ways of presenting the same 
event: the risk remaining at a constant value. However, given the account of negation 
in discussing the previous experiment, it seems plausible that the phrasings could 
lead to different utility assignments. Accordingly, we predict main effects of severity 
and phrasing, but no interaction. Additionally, we will ask whether the ‘stay the 
same’ and ‘not change’ phrasings have disutility or are neutral. 
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5.4.1 Methods  
Design.  
The design manipulated two independent variables: event severity (a minor 
infection, a life-threatening illness), and phrasing (the risk increasing, not changing, 
staying the same). The experiment was between-participants.  
Materials.  
The items were as follows: 
Your risk of catching H1, a minor infection, increasing 
Your risk of catching H1, a minor infection, not changing 
Your risk of catching H1, a minor infection, staying the same 
Your risk of contracting the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, increasing 
Your risk of contracting the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, not changing 
Your risk of contracting the DX virus, a life-threatening illness, staying the 
same 
Participants.  
241 participants (102 female; average age 34.71 years) completed the task; 
the data for 5 other participants were excluded since these participants reported a 
first language other than English. This experiment used the same system as above for 
recruiting and remunerating participants. Participants were recruited via the 
intermediary MTurk Data (www.mturkdata.com). High qualifications were set for 
the task to improve the quality of the data and maximize the number of native 
English speakers: participants had to be resident in the US, and have an overall 
approval rating of 99% for 1,000 previously completed tasks. Participants received a 
small fee, chosen to exceed the US minimum wage per minute. 
Procedure.  
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After giving informed consent, participants read the same instructions: 
Thank you for taking part in this study. We would like you to imagine that 
you are talking to a doctor. Your doctor is helping you decide whether to go 
through some medical procedures. While you are not required or expected to 
undergo these procedures, there are arguments to consider.  
On the following page, you’ll be told about an event. You will be asked how 
good or bad this event is, on a scale from -5 to 5, where -5 is very bad, 0 is 
neither good nor bad, and 5 is very good.   
Participants were then assigned, round-robin style, to a survey where they gave 
demographic information and rated a single item. Finally, they received debriefing 
information.  
5.4.2 Results  
Figure 5.8 shows the descriptive data by condition.  
  
Figure 5.8. Mean utilities by condition; error bars are standard error 
 There is a hint, here, of an interaction. For the minor infection, the utilities 
decrease steadily from the ‘increase’ condition (M = -1.87, SD = 1.79) to the ‘stay 
same’ condition (M = -.6, SD = 192) and the ‘not change’ condition (M= -0.41, SD = 
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1.84). For the major infection, the utilities decrease from the ‘increase’ condition (M 
= -3.54, SD = 1.94) to the ‘stay same’ condition (M = -0.46, SD = 0.30) before 
increasing again to the ‘not change condition (M = -1.36, SD = 0.44). Note that the 
‘stay same’ condition shows a different pattern from the other conditions, with the 
minor infection rated as having (very) slightly higher disutility than the major 
infection. The data were analysed, as above, using Bayesian regression analyses 
using a wide prior for the fixed effects. Two models were compared, with and 
without interactions: there was anecdotal evidence against including the interaction, 
BFInteraction = .88/BFAdditve = 1.14. Table 5.9 reports the parameter estimates for the 
full model.  
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Table 5.9. Parameters for model with interaction 
Fixed Effect Parameter 95% PI 
Intercept  b = -1.41 -1.67, -1.15 
Minor Infection b = .40        .15, .66 
Major Infection b = -.40        -.66, -.15 
Increase b = -1.25        -1.61, -.89 
Stay Same b = .80        .43, 1.16 
Not Change b = .46        .09, .81 
Interaction: Minor & 
Increase 
b = .38        .03, .74 
Interaction: Minor & 
Stay Same 
b = -.39        -.74, -.03 
Interaction: Minor & Not 
Change 
b = .001        -.34, .35 
Interaction: Major & 
Increase 
b = -.38        -.74, -.03 
Interaction: Major & 
Stay Same 
b = .39        .03, .74 
Interaction: Major &  b = -.001        -.35, .34 
Not Change           
 
There was good evidence for the inclusion of Severity, BF = 8.24, and very strong 
evidence for the inclusion of Phrasing, BF = 29964006. We now perform pairwise 
comparisons on Phrasing using independent-samples Bayesian t-tests in the Bayes 
Factor package, again using a wide prior for the effect. There was extremely strong 
evidence that the ‘increase’ condition had stronger disutility than the ‘stay the same’ 
condition, BF = 17273783, and ‘not change’ conditions, BF = 83312.19. There was 
moderate evidence that the ‘stay the same’ and ‘not change’ conditions did not differ, 
BFDifference = .19/BFNull = 5.26.  
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Finally, it was predicted that phrasing ‘stay same’ and ‘not change’ would 
still be reliably negative. These predictions were tested with one-sample Bayesian t-
tests. For the ‘stay same’ condition, there was equivocal evidence for a difference, 
BF = 1.24); for the ‘not change’ condition, in contrast, there was strong evidence for 
disutility, BF = 39.52, though note the moderate evidence above for equal means.  
Since Bayesian analyses are not sensitive to sampling intentions49 (Kruschke, 
2013, 2015), we can also directly compare Experiment 5.2’s ambiguous ‘not 
decrease’ conditions with the corresponding conditions in Experiment 5.3. These 
comparisons take the form of Bayesian independent-samples t-tests. Given the 
ambiguity of the 5.2 materials, we should not expect an exact match, because 
participants may have differed in their interpretations, but these analyses should 
nevertheless be suggestive. Because the designs of the studies differed, the simplest 
analysis is not possible, that is, directly comparing the ambiguous ‘not decrease’ 
items as a whole with the three separate phrasing conditions. Recall that, in 
Experiment 5.2, all participants rated all utilities; hence the data are not independent. 
We can, nevertheless, compare the individual conditions (‘not decrease’ plus minor 
infection, ‘not decrease’ plus major infection) with the new phrasings. For the major-
infection data, there was moderate evidence for equal means between the ‘not 
decrease’ and ‘increase’ conditions (BFDifference= .29/BFNull= 3.42); there was strong 
evidence for a difference between the ‘not decrease’ and ‘stay the same’ (BF = 
76249.17) and the ‘not decrease’ and ‘not change’ (BF = 41.36) conditions. For the 
minor-infection data, there was again moderate evidence for no difference between 
                                                
 
49 Frequentist t-tests would arguably be inappropriate here, because p-values depend 
on researchers’ sampling intentions (Kruschke, 2013, 2015). Being drawn from different 
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the ‘not decrease’ and ‘increase’ conditions (BFDifference= .33, BFNull = 3.03). There 
was anecdotal evidence of a difference between the ‘not decrease’ and ‘stay the 
same’ conditions (BF =2.29), and good evidence of a difference between the ‘not 
decrease’ and ‘not change’ conditions (BF = 7.28). Taken together, these data 
suggest that the closest correspondence is between the ‘not decrease’ and ‘increase’ 
conditions.  
5.4.3 Discussion  
This simple experiment sheds light on the way participants interpreted the 
negative conditionals in Experiments 5.1 and 5.2. In particular, the consequent ‘your 
risk of [illness] will not decrease’ is ambiguous between the risk not changing and 
the risk increasing. This experiment addressed the ambiguity using the wording 
‘your risk of [illness] will increase’ and two variants of no change: ‘your risk of 
[illness] will stay the same’ and ‘your risk of [illness] will not change’. 
Unsurprisingly, the ‘increase’ wording led to clearly greater disutility than the other 
two wordings, which were not reliably different from each other. Both the ‘increase’ 
and ‘not change’ wordings resulted in reliable disutility; the ‘stay the same’ wording 
did not.  
This experiment suggests that, in Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, negative frames 
depended for their persuasiveness on the ‘increase’ reading of the consequent. 
Accordingly, if negative frames were expressed unambiguously as the ‘stay the 
same’ or ‘not change’ readings, then they would fall even further behind positive 
frames. This point emphasizes further that we cannot simply assume the equivalence 
                                                                                                                                     
 
experiments, the data for these analyses were not collected with a specific sample in mind. 
Bayesian analyses do not suffer this disadvantage.  
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of positive and negative frames. There is no obviously correct reading of ‘not 
decrease’, and the information content depends on how this phrase is interpreted. 
Since readings equivalent to ‘stay the same’ and ‘not change’ are widespread in the 
framing literature, the current findings raise questions about the convincingness of 
these negative frames and how the convincingness bears on the equivocal findings of 
the literature.  
The data also prompt a caveat to the discussion of the previous results. In 
discussing Experiment 5.2, we considered whether utility assignments depend on 
pragmatics: more specifically, whether negations invite the hearer to suppose that the 
negative event was expected. This suggestion helps to explain why participants 
assigned positive utility to not doing an unpleasant action. Superficially, the same 
account applied to the consequents. But the data above suggest that this is not 
straightforwardly the case. For, if negation is the crucial factor, then ought there not 
to be a reliable difference between the ‘stay the same’ and ‘not change’ conditions?  
The lack of a difference between the relevant conditions prompts a more 
nuanced view of negation and utilities. In the present experiments, the antecedents 
are distinct actions: the action is either taken or not taken. In such cases, negation 
may give rise to a clear and distinct expectation: it was expected that the hearer 
would take the action. The consequents, however, are less clear. Experiment 5.3 
sought to remove the ambiguity with the wordings ‘increase’, ‘stay the same’ and 
‘not change’, but ‘not change’ is, in fact, still ambiguous in a crucial respect. Change 
may be expected, but the direction of change is unclear. In context, it seems 
plausible that participants understood ‘not change’ as implying that a decrease in risk 
was expected, because they were instructed to imagine that they were talking to a 
doctor about undergoing procedures to protect themse
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We do not, however, have direct evidence that this was how people interpreted ‘not 
change’.  These points suggest that more research is needed on the interplay between 
negation, expectations and utility assignment. Experiments could, for instance, cue 
different expectations and then assess the convincingness of different frames.  
The data above serve as a reminder that, to understand framing effects, we 
must understand how participants interpret the frames. Throughout this chapter, we 
have seen that negation, expectations, and utilities are key factors. To illustrate, let 
us return to a pair of frames from (Apanovitch et al., 2003): 
Positive frame: If you decide to get HIV tested, you may feel the peace of 
mind that comes with knowing about your health.  
Negative frame: If you do not decide to get HIV tested, you may not feel the 
peace of mind that comes with knowing about your health.  
Experiments 5.1 and 5.2 seem to imply that the antecedent in the positive frame will 
receive disutility and the antecedent in the negative frame will receive utility. At first 
blush, the consequents may seem equivalent: the use of ‘may’ implies a lack of 
certainty, from which it trivially follows that ‘may not’ is also true. But the 
experimental data above prompt us to look more closely. The consequent describes 
an event, feeling peace of mind, that is not ambiguous in the way that ‘change’ is. 
Plausibly, then, the negation-and-expectation account will hold for this consequent: 
that is, participants will infer that the expected outcome is feeling peace of mind. As 
a result, the consequents may differ in the expectations they give rise to.  
In sum, the data in this experiment argue for close consideration of individual 
frames. Subtle differences can, in principle, give rise to differences in 
convincingness. These differences will obtain within, as well as across, types of 
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frame; it seems plausible, then, that the effectiveness of frames will differ widely 
according to context.  
5.5 General Discussion  
This chapter has considered the relationship between utility and pragmatics, 
using goal framing as a test case. The experiments show how people interpret 
positive and negative frames, and how these interpretations feed into judgments of 
convincingness. The chapter set out to test predictions from the theory of utility 
conditionals, assuming a particular utility assignment. These predictions were not 
supported. However, there was good evidence that utilities matter to the 
convincingness of goal frames. Positive frames were more convincing than negative 
frames, the advantage being explicable in terms of the utilities of antecedents and 
consequents. Negative frames had antecedents with high enough utility to offset the 
negative utility of the consequent. The overall negative frames, then, had little utility 
or disutility, and consequently tended to be weak arguments.  These effects held 
across two different ways of measuring utility and convincingness. Finally, 
Experiment 5.3 probed further, unpicking the ambiguous consequent of the negative 
frames. The data suggested that participants had interpreted the lack of a risk 
reduction as an increase in risk. Alternative wordings had far less disutility (‘not 
change’) or no reliable disutility (‘stay the same’), suggesting that negative frames 
with these wordings would be still less persuasive. 
The experiments above emphasize the link between pragmatics and utilities; 
hence, the link between pragmatics and rationality. We have seen that the utility 
assignments can be understood with a negation-and-expectation account. We 
originally supposed that not performing an action has zero (dis-)utility, since it 
amounts to doing nothing. However, negation implies that the negated event was 
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expected to happen. If this expectation is strong, then it makes sense for people to 
treat missing out on an expected positive as a loss and escaping an expected negative 
as a gain. Experiment 5.3 complicated this picture by suggesting that it was the 
ambiguity of the consequent, and not expectations, that drove the utility assignments. 
In particular, the ‘not change’ phrasing did not differ reliably from ‘stay the same’. 
Nevertheless, the data do not contradict the negation-and-expectation account, 
because the ‘not change’ phrasing does not set up a clear expectation about the 
direction of change. The materials were under-specified in this respect. We should 
expect ‘not change’ to have different utilities if, say, the context suggested that the 
hearer should expect an increase in risk – say, they were moving to an environment 
in which an illness was endemic – or that the hearer should expect a decrease in risk 
– say, they were taking up a new healthy lifestyle. The data overall, then, are still 
compatible with a complex relationship between pragmatics and utilities: negations 
and expectations play a key role in determining utilities, which then feed back into 
justifying higher level pragmatic inferences. Given that people routinely make 
decisions based on descriptions of actions and outcomes, the literature would benefit 
from a far broader treatment of how people judge utilities under verbal negation.  
Utilities do not explain all the variance in the data. There is anecdotal 
evidence, from Experiments 5.1 and 5.2, that positive frames have an advantage over 
negative frames even controlling for utilities. It is possible that the remaining 
variance is due, at least in part, to probabilities. Although we have largely ignored 
probabilities in this chapter, we have already seen that probabilities play an 
important role in learning from conditionals and in the assessment of arguments.  
Indeed, probabilities are also implicit in the negation-and-expectation account: an 
expectation can, presumably, be understood as a probabilistic belief about the future. 
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The present experiments do not allow a straightforward test of probabilities, because 
the materials were designed to focus on utilities and, hence, suggested a 
deterministic relationship between antecedent and consequent. While it is possible 
that people nevertheless understood the conditional probabilistically, testing this 
possibility would require asking participants to provide a probability for a risk. It is 
not clear that this is a meaningful quantity for participants. Future experiments could, 
however, explore the role of probabilities by switching to more clearly probabilistic 
relationships, and could make it is easier to estimate these probabilities by using 
real-world materials.  
So far, the discussion has, in effect, been addressing the premise-
interpretation component of Crupi’s model. Knowing the information content of 
frames is a prerequisite for judging the rationality of people’s reasoning. While it is 
premature to judge this rationality – contrary, for instance, to nudge-inspired 
accounts – we can preview how to assess rationality at a later date. To judge 
rationality, in this case, the crucial quantity seems to be the expected utility of the 
conditional. So, for a conditional ‘If p then q’: 
EU(Conditional) =U(p)+P(q | p)*U(q)  
      (Evans et al., 2008, p. 114) 
More descriptive accounts argue that we should expect people to judge only the 
specific circumstances mentioned (Evans et al., 2008). By this reasoning we should 
expect sensitivity to the expected utility above alone. However, a more standard 
decision-theoretic approach would suggest that people should judge the expected 
utilities of all the actions under consideration and select an action by optimizing 
some utility function (Peterson, 2009). By this reasoning we should expect 
sensitivity to the expected utility of both the positive frame and the negative frame. It 
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remains to be seen whether people show sensitivity to either of these quantities. 
Nevertheless, if we wish to judge people’s rationality in reasoning from frames, we 
should aim to measure their behaviour against these yardsticks.  
The discussion above argues for a larger research program, investigating how 
people assign utilities under verbal negation, whether people are sensitive to 
probabilities, and whether they ultimately judge the expected utility of the frames. 
This program will directly bear on the framing literature. There is, however, a 
mismatch between the framing literature and the current studies. The current studies 
used convincingness ratings, a dependent measure which has been shown to be 
reliable in existing research (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). The framing literature, on the 
other hand, prefers measures such as attitude scales, ratings of intention to perform, 
or (more rarely) actual compliance with recommendations, with effects differing 
across these measures (Gallagher & Updegraff, 2012). It will be important to test 
whether the suggested research program produces results which generalize across 
different dependent measures50.   
This chapter has focused heavily on the relationship between pragmatics and 
rationality. But it is easy to see the importance of sources. Previous chapters have 
argued that, whenever a conditional appears in an experiment, it can be considered a 
testimonial conditional: the conditional has a source even if that source remains 
implicit. In the present experiments, the source was held constant: participants were 
asked to imagine that the source was their doctor. In real life, people, of course, 
receive information from sources of differing reliabilities; as Chapters 2 to 4 showed, 
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judgements of reliability impact on various probabilities associated with the 
conditional. We should expect, then, that source reliability will affect belief change 
from utility conditionals and, hence, will also matter to convincingness judgements 
and perhaps also to ratings of attitudes or intentions to perform or, indeed, to 
compliance behaviours. But there is no reason, a priori, to restrict belief change to 
the probability. If people hear a reliable source saying a utility conditional, they may 
also change their own utility assessments. In effect, a reliable source saying that an 
outcome is desirable may lead us to value that outcome more. These points further 
illustrate the tight connections between the components of the triangular scheme.   
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
50Generalizability could be tested in another respect: namely, how utility is 
measured. The decision-making literature does not widely use ratings scales to assess utility. 
A future study could test whether the effects survive using alternative utility assessments 
such as the Becker-Degroot-Marshak method (Becker, Degroot, & Marschak, 1964). 
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6 Testimony and Source Reliability 51 
This thesis has focused on a triangular scheme for the relationship between 
rationality, pragmatics, and sources. The preceding four chapters have explored 
different parts of this scheme. Chapters 2 to 4 focused on the relationship between 
sources and pragmatics, using the case study of conditionals in simple testimonial 
contexts. Chapter 5 focused on the relationship between rationality and pragmatics, 
using the case study of goal framing. This chapter will focus on the relationship 
between rationality and sources, using the case study of testimony. More specifically, 
the chapter will discuss the normative issues that are key to learning from sources; it 
will introduce two alternative normative models; and it will use these models to 
explore people’s behaviour. The chapter returns to the domain of testimony but from 
a different perspective. This contrast leads to the introduction of a crucial distinction 
for this thesis - between interpreting and accepting – so that pragmatics will 
resurface once again.  
6.1.1 Introducing Testimony  
Testimony, in the philosophical sense, is part of epistemology. Philosophers 
of testimony consider how we should, and how we do, learn from other people’s 
statements: when, in other words, should we trust people’s claims? These very same 
concerns animate research in a wide range of disciplines, albeit rarely under the label 
‘testimony’. Witness, for instance, classic research on the ‘wisdom of the crowds’ 
(e.g. Galton, 1907; Surowiecki, 2005), on judgment and decision making (e.g. 
Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983; Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979; Birnbaum, Wong, & Wong, 
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1976), on persuasion (e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1984, 1986; Petty, Cacioppo, & 
Goldman, 1981); and burgeoning research in developmental psychology (for a 
review, see Mills, 2013), in computer science (for a review, see Artz & Gil, 2007), as 
well as in philosophy (e.g. Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Coady, 1992). 
Testimony is an issue of fundamental social relevance. For we ‘massively 
depend on communication with others’ (Sperber et al., 2010) - on the information we 
receive from other people – and communication itself is testimonial, requiring a 
‘stance of trust’ (Sperber et al., 2010). That is, when interpreting other people’s 
utterances, we must be prepared to change our own beliefs. This stance of trust 
contrasts with Davidson’s principle of interpretive charity, whereby we supposedly 
take someone to be communicating ‘a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by 
our own standard’ (Davidson, 1984, p. 137; cited by Sperber et al., 2010). To 
illustrate, take Sperber et al.’s (2010, p. 368) example. We are asked to imagine that 
Barbara has asked Joan to bring a bottle of champagne to a dinner party. The 
following dialogue occurs:  
 Andy (to Barbara): A bottle of champagne? But champagne is expensive! 
Barbara: Joan has money.  
We are asked to imagine, further, that Andy has previously assumed that Joan is an 
underpaid academic. On Sperber et al.’s (2010) account, if Andy applies the 
principle of interpretive charity, he interprets ‘Joan has money’ to mean ‘some 
money, as opposed to none’ or, perhaps, an amount consistent with the salary of an 
underpaid academic. But if Andy is prepared to trust Barbara and revise his beliefs 
                                                                                                                                     
 
51 This chapter reports is adapted from Collins, Hahn, von Gerber, and Olsson (2015, 
2017).  
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about Joan, he can recover the intended meaning, ‘enough money to be easily able to 
afford champagne’.  
Although we can gain great benefits from information transmitted between 
people, we risk trusting inexpert sources, and we are vulnerable to being misled or 
deceived (Sperber et al., 2010). In other words, testimony is problematic from the 
point of accuracy and honesty. People can be decidedly unreliable sources even 
when well intentioned, by being inaccurate: take, for example, forgetting and the 
reconstructive nature of memory (for discussion, see  Hahn, Oaksford, & Harris, 
2012; on reconstructive memory, see, e.g., Loftus, 1975). People can also be 
decidedly unreliable sources by being dishonest. There is evidence, for instance, that 
people systematically engage in small acts of deception, exploiting opportunities to 
cheat as long as they can do so without challenging their self-conception, and even 
deceiving themselves in the process (see, e.g., Chance, Norton, Gino, & Ariely, 
2011; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008).  
Such systematic unreliability mandates vigilance towards people as sources 
and towards the content of their messages: it mandates, in Sperber et al.’s (2010) 
term, ‘epistemic vigilance’. An epistemically vigilant person may adopt an initial 
stance of trust towards a source, but will ultimately distinguish between 
comprehending a message and accepting it (Sperber et al., 2010). It is tempting, 
considering classic research, to dismiss out of hand the existence of epistemically 
vigilant sources. As we saw in Chapter 1, Gilbert and colleagues (D. T. Gilbert et al., 
1990, 1993) famously argued that people tend towards blind credulity. In their 
paradigm, participants read sentences such as ‘A Monishna is a star’ which were 
followed by the label ‘true’ or ‘false’. When disruptions were applied to false trials, 
participants tended to recall the information as true, suggesting a default assumption 
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that new information is true. However, this paradigm arguably confounds negation 
and informativeness: sentences such as ‘A Monishna is not a star’ are radically 
uninformative; a ‘Monishna’ could be infinitely many things (Hasson et al., 2005).  
Once this confound is removed, there is no difference in memory for false and true 
trials (Hasson et al., 2005). 
There is further promise of epistemic vigilance in the developmental 
literature (for a review, see Mills (2013). For example, children as young as 14 
months old show some ability to prefer reliable, and disprefer unreliable, informants 
(Poulin-Dubois, Brooker, & Polonia, 2011; Poulin-Dubois & Chow, 2009). Children 
as young as 3 years old show sensitivity to verbally expressed uncertainty (Sabbagh 
& Baldwin, 2001); to expertise (Robinson, Champion, & Mitchell, 1999); and to past 
accuracy (Ganea, Koenig, & Millett, 2011). At around 6 years old, children show 
sensitivity to deception (Mascaro & Sperber, 2009); at around 8 years old, to a 
source’s self-interest (Mills & Keil, 2005); and at around 10 or 11 years old, to a 
source’s partiality (Mills & Keil, 2008) and to distortions due to a source’s self-
report of evaluative traits (Heyman & Legare, 2005).  
There is considerable evidence that sensitivity to sources and message 
content continues into adulthood. This evidence comes from the psychology of 
persuasion (for a recent review, see Petty & Briñol, 2008). The early persuasion 
literature treated source and message as separate components. For Kelman (1958), 
people accepted a claim either by accepting an argument for it, a process he called 
internalization, or by identifying with the source, a process he called identification 
(for discussion, see Petty & Briñol, 2008). More recently, the literature has been 
dominated by more complex, dual-route models: most famously, the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (‘ELM’; e.g. Petty & Cacioppo, 1984; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
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Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (e.g. 
Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989). According to these models, there are two routes 
for persuasion: a central route, in which the audience focuses on systematically 
analyzing arguments; and a peripheral route, in which the audience focuses on 
heuristics such as general impressions or surface features of an argument. The routes 
also differ in how extensively audiences think about the issue in hand: in the 
technical parlance, elaboration. In the central route, there is high elaboration: 
audiences use the central route when they able, or motivated, to analyze an issue in 
depth. In the peripheral route, there is low elaboration: audiences use the peripheral 
route when they are less able or motivated.  
In its current incarnation, the ELM identifies five ways in which sources can 
induce persuasion (Briñol & Petty, 2009; Petty & Briñol, 2008). (1) Under 
conditions of low elaboration, sources can act as simple, heuristic cues. A classic 
study presented students with arguments of various strengths for a new university 
exam, and manipulated both source reliability and personal relevance (Petty, 
Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). When personal relevance was low, persuasiveness 
was due to source reliability; when personal relevance was high, persuasiveness was 
due to argument strength, that is, the actual content of the persuasive message. High 
or low personal involvement thus influences the choice of routes to persuasion. (2) 
Under conditions of high elaboration, sources can act as an argument or evidence. 
When an attractive source testifies to the effectiveness of a beauty product, the 
source’s appearance is visual evidence for the effectiveness of the product (Petty & 
Briñol, 2008). In other words, although source characteristics generally feature in the 
peripheral route, where they provide a heuristic cue, source information can, on 
occasion, have evidential value on the central route. (3) Sources can affect 
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metacognition. For example, it has been found that when source information comes 
after an argument, credible sources influence not the valence of thoughts, but rather 
people’s confidence in their thoughts (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala, 2004). (4) Sources 
can bias thinking. For example, source expertise can affect the direction of thoughts, 
so long as the message is ambiguous and the task is important (Chaiken & 
Maheswaran, 1994). (5) Sources can affect the extent of thinking. For example, 
when there are multiple sources for a claim, people tend to think longer, magnifying 
differences attributable to argument strengths: strong arguments become more 
persuasive; weak arguments, less persuasive (Harkins & Petty, 1981). In other words, 
(4) and (5) allow source information to affect analytic processing in ways that go 
beyond evidential value, by moderating the direction and amount of analytic 
thinking that takes place. 
The persuasion literature clearly suggests that people are sensitive to 
information about sources and, as such, it is relevant to the question of testimony. 
But testimony is a more basic phenomenon, whose proper treatment is logically prior 
to a full theory of persuasion. The persuasion literature focuses on persuasive texts in 
which informal arguments are presented52. But these texts are composed of claims 
and reasons which are not just abstract propositions, but also testimonial claims put 
forward by an arguer (Hahn, Oaksford & Harris, 2012). Moreover, a proper 
treatment of testimony is a step towards computational models of how individual 
claims and reasons are processed, which in turn are a step towards constrained, 
predictive models of persuasion. Such models could help to transform the field of 
                                                
 
52 Osgood & Tannenbaum (1955) developed an account of attitude change from 
testimonial claims, but this account was driven by the attitude, in the social-psychological 
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persuasion, in which there is a proliferation of rich descriptive accounts but a 
conspicuous lack of detailed processing accounts.  
Models of testimony have already proved a rich source of inspiration for 
psychological studies. We have already seen one such Bayesian model in Chapter 4 
and how this model can be extended to capture data on testimonial conditionals. At 
the core of these Bayesian models are three principles: the reliability of the source is 
evaluated; the probability of the claim is evaluated; and these evaluations are 
combined in some way. Bayesian modelling of testimony has inspired the 
development of norms for informal argumentation and the assessment of human 
behaviour against these norms (Hahn et al., 2009; Hahn, Harris, & Oaksford, 2013; 
Hahn et al., 2012). It has also inspired research in developmental psychology (Shafto, 
Eaves, Navarro, & Perfors, 2012), legal testimony (Fenton, Neil, & Lagnado, 2013; 
Friedman, 1987; Schum, 1981), and consensus among climate scientists (Hahn et al., 
2016).  
Since Bayesian models of testimony are normative and provide readily 
testable predictions, they allow research to contribute directly to the Great 
Rationality Debate in cognitive science. It is worth dwelling, for a moment, on their 
normative basis. Bayesianism in general can be justified on the grounds that, under 
certain conditions, Bayesian belief revision is demonstrably optimal (Leitgeb & 
Pettigrew, 2010b, 2010; Rosenkrantz, 1992). Bayesian models of testimony typically 
represent probabilities as subjective degrees of belief; revising these subjective 
probabilities in a Bayesian way maximises coherence. The case for Bayesian models, 
                                                                                                                                     
 
sense, towards the source and claim, and not by a critical examination of them as in 
testimony.  
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in particular, is especially strong when a phenomenon is clearly inferential (Hahn, 
2014).  
The Bayesian approach to testimony has generated two striking models 
which the experiments below will explore. In both of these models, source reliability 
plays a central role: a claim fares better if its source is considered reliable. But the 
models do not assume that sources come with their reliability obviously labelled. It 
is, of course, quite plausible that people will make initial judgments of 
trustworthiness based on stereotypes, personality characteristics, or mannerisms and 
behaviours such as voice characteristics, gestures or eye movements (DePaulo et al., 
2003; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). Such presumed evidence can contribute to the 
setting of prior reliability. Important, too, is the content of what someone says. 
Source reliability should obviously be damaged by a catastrophic error or an 
intentional lie. But what about when the truth is not so obvious? Both models allow 
the plausibility of claims to influence source-reliability judgments. There is, then, a 
bidirectional relationship between the content of a claim and the reliability of the 
source.  
We have already seen one of these Bayesian models of testimony: Bovens 
and Hartmann’s (2003) simple Bayesian belief network, discussed in Chapter 4. It 
will be useful to briefly recapitulate the details of this model. The model comprises 
three random variables: the variable Hyp is a proposition about the world, and has 
the states true and false; the variable Rel is the reliability of the speaker, and has the 
states true (reliable) and false (unreliable); the variable Rep is the report that ‘Hyp is 
true’, and has the states true (the report is made) and false (the report is not made). 
The variable Rep is dependent on Rel and Hyp, but these variables are (marginally) 
independent of each other. When a source is reliable (Rel = True) it makes a report; 
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when it is unreliable (Rel = False) it makes a report with some random degree of 
probability. If a report is made, then Rel and Hyp become dependent (i.e. are 
conditionally dependent), and their values are simultaneously revised. The revision 
depends on the prior probabilities of Hyp and Rel. If P(Hyp = True) < .5, then 
reliability (P(Rel=True) ) will be revised downwards; if P(Hyp = True) > .5, then 
reliability will be revised upwards. If the reliability is zero, then there will be no 
change in belief. For any higher reliability, P(Hyp = True) will increase, although 
this increase may be very small indeed with very low reliabilities; the higher the 
reliability, the bigger the revision in P(Hyp = True).  
An alternative model has been developed by Olsson and Angere, reported, 
for instance, in (Olsson & Vallinder, 2013). This model has important commonalities 
and differences. For present purposes, the most important are these. Both models 
predict that an expected claim (P(Hyp=True) > .5) will increase reliability and that 
an unexpected claim (P(Hyp=True) <.5) will decrease it. However, the Olsson and 
Angere model takes a different approach to reliability: specifically, while reliable 
sources cause an increase in P(Hyp=True), unreliable sources cause a decrease. In 
other words, sources can be, not just unreliable, but anti-reliable: their testimony can 
be negatively correlated with the truth.  
Anti-reliability is superficially similar to so-called backfire effects. In these 
effects, people decrease their belief in a claim despite its assertion (for discussion, 
see Cook & Lewandowksy, 2011). These effects are, however, importantly different. 
Backfire effects can occur when someone tries to correct popular misinformation: 
citing myths and debunking them can lead to a short-term correction but longer-term 
strengthening of the myth, as the audience finds the myth even more familiar and 
forgets the details of the correction (Skurnik, Yoon, Park, & Schwarz, 2005). 
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Backfire effects can also occur when someone argues against a belief by providing 
too many arguments, overburdening the audience (Cook & Lewandowksy, 2011; 
Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007). Lastly, backfire effects can occur when 
someone tries to persuade an audience that has an established world-view. Here, 
different audiences can polarize, despite receiving the same information, and 
strengthen their pre-existing views (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
These effects thus rely on the presence of strong pre-existing views and on specific 
processing mechanisms. In contrast, anti-reliability applies to any assertion and 
relies only perceptions of the source.  
Together, the Bayesian models make useful predictions about how people 
revise their beliefs in simple testimonial contexts. These predictions will form the 
basis of the experiments below. The models predict that people will use their beliefs 
about the world and about a source in revising their belief. Both models predict that 
reliability will increase in response to expected claims and decrease in response to 
unexpected claims. Both models predict that belief in a claim will increase in 
response to reliable sources; the models differ in their predictions for belief change 
from unreliable sources. If we draw on the persuasion and developmental literatures, 
these predictions seem plausible; but there is a lack of clear evidence on simple 
testimonial contexts. And it is these testimonial contexts that are closest to the 
crucial notion of epistemic vigilance. If people treat testimony critically, in the way 
the models predict, then there is a clear difference between comprehension and 
acceptance.  
The chapter reports three experiments which explore the model predictions in 
simple testimonial contexts.  Experiment 6.1 examined belief change from more or 
less reliable sources. Experiment 6.2. replicated this study. Experiment 6.3 examined 
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change in reliability after expected and unexpected claims Experiment 6.4 replicated 
this study. Finally, Experiment 6.5 used a different methodology which avoided any 
reference to source reliability in simple contexts with multiple sources, to test 
whether participants spontaneously used message content to revise beliefs about a 
source. It is worth noting that the experiments were not intended to provide a 
definitive test of competing models. Indeed, the two models can, to some extent, be 
viewed as complementary: Harris et al. (2016), for instance, implemented a Bayesian 
network which combines elements of both models. Rather, the experiments were 
intended as existence proofs: as providing evidence for the set of behaviours above 
and, in particular, source anti-reliability. 
 
6.2 Experiment 6.1: Belief change 
6.2.1 Method  
Predictions. This experiment tested the following predictions. Firstly, both 
models predict that reliable sources should increase belief in a claim. Secondly, the 
Bovens and Hartmann (2003) model predicts that unreliable sources should have, at 
worst, no effect on belief change. Thirdly, the Olsson and Angere model predicts 
that unreliable sources can decrease belief in a claim.  
Design. This experiment followed a 2x2 between-subjects design with the 
following factors: Claim Expectedness (Expected, Unexpected) and Source 
Reliability (High, Low).53  
                                                
 
53 The original design aimed to test a somewhat more complex set of predictions 
than discussed here; hence the 2 x 2 design. However, these predictions required lower 
scores on prior ratings than were actually achieved. The one-way predictions are appropriate 
to the achieved values.  
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Participants.  91 people (45 women; average age 38.62) completed online 
surveys posted on a US-hosted website for academic research 
(http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html). Participants were recruited both 
through this website and through university e-mail lists.  
Materials & Procedure. Participants read brief texts about six topics54. Each 
text took the following form. Participants first read a claim and rated its 
convincingness by responding to the question ‘How convincing is the claim?’ on a 
Likert-style scale from 0 (not at all convincing) to 10 (completely convincing). For 
example,  
‘One of the best remedies against a severe cough is valium’.  
 
Participants were then presented with a source making this claim:  
 
Now imagine that Michael, who is a clinical nurse specialist, told you the 
following: ‘One of the best remedies against a severe cough is valium’.  
 
Following this, participants re-rated the convincingness of the claim on the 
same Likert- scale. The full set of items are as follows:  
 
Unexpected and expected claims; expected claim in brackets 
(Unreliable and reliable sources; unreliable sources in brackets) 
 
                                                
 
54 The materials and design for Experiments 6.1 and 6.3 were developed by 
Professors Ulrike Hahn and Erik Olsson, and Dr Ylva von Gerber.  
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1. Claim: One of the best remedies against severe cough is valium (lots to drink, 
hot or cold). 
[Convincingness Rating] 
Now imagine that Michael, who is a clinical nurse specialist (drug addict), told 
you the following: ‘One of the best remedies against severe cough is valium (lots 
to drink, hot or cold).’ 
[Rating] 
 
2. Claim: The temperature in the Kitchen Mate oven varies a lot (keeps very 
steady), which is perfect for a fluffy and crispy bread.  
[Rating] 
Now imagine that Paula, who is a baker (a designer kitchen Kitchen Mate 
salesperson working on commission), told you the following: ‘The temperature 
in the Kitchen Mate oven varies a lot (keeps very steady), which is perfect for a 
fluffy and crispy bread.’ 
[Rating] 
 
3. Claim: The Australian horse ‘Thunderbolt’, who has beaten the British horse 
‘Lightening’ in the majority of races entered this season, will lose to (beat) 
‘Lightening’ at the upcoming Cheltenham Festival.  
[Rating] 
Now imagine that Robert, who is a senior sports reporter and has predicted the 
winner in the last 10 races he covered (a junior sports reporter and has failed to 
predict…), told you: ‘The Australian horse ‘Thunderbolt’, who has beaten the 
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British horse ‘Lightening’ in the majority of races entered this season, will lose 
to (beat) ‘Lightening’ at the upcoming Cheltenham Festival.’ 
 
4. Claim: In 2013, the maximum temperature in Stockholm in June was 15 
degrees (23 degrees) 
[Rating] 
Now imagine that Mary, who is a retired meteorologist (who is five years 
old and was given a weather station for Christmas), told you: ‘In 2013, the  
maximum temperature in Stockholm in June was 15 degrees (23 
degrees).’  
[Rating] 
 
5. Claim: The Land Rover Discovery has no problems (has problems) with the 
electricity and very  
cheap spare parts. 
[Rating] 
Now imagine that Patrick, who is a car enthusiast (a used car salesperson), 
told you: ‘The Land Rover  
Discovery has no problems (has problems) with the electricity and very 
cheap spare parts.’ 
[Rating] 
 
6. Claim: The Eclipse nightclub in Detroit (Ibiza) has the reputation of one of 
the coolest nightclubs in the world. 
[Rating] 
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Now imagine that Emma, who is a 26-year-old DJ and has established 
herself, has a leading figure in the club scene (who is a 45 year old housewife 
with three young children (between 5 and 12) who enjoys knitting)  
and regularly attends the Eclipse nightclub with her friends, told you: 
‘The Eclipse nightclub in Detroit (Ibiza) has the reputation of one of the coolest 
nightclubs in the world.’ 
[Rating] 
6.2.2 Results & Discussion 
All data in this chapter were analysed using robust Bayesian parameter 
estimation. The analyses are, in effect, Bayesian equivalents of classical one-sample 
t-tests (for Experiments 6.1 to 6.4) and independent-sample t-tests55 (for Experiment 
6.5). The Bayesian analyses are useful because they provide richer information than 
the classical tests – a posterior distributions over parameter values – and are not 
dependent either on assumptions about the data (e.g. normality) or on sampling 
intentions (Kruschke, 2013). The Bayesian analyses are also invaluable when testing 
models, because the analyses can lead to both rejection and acceptance of the null 
hypothesis (Kruschke, 2013).  
Firstly, change scores were calculated by subtracting the initial rating from 
the posterior rating; these were then averaged across items to create a mean change 
score for each participant. The data were then analysed in the following way, 
following Kruschke (2013). The analyses do not assume that the data are normally 
                                                
 
55 Recall that these experiments were intended as existence proofs. The experiments 
do not test whether one of the Bayesian models provides a general account of testimony. As 
such, the aim is not to generalize beyond the current set of materials. To so generalize would 
require a different design (avoiding one-sample tests), to permit the crossed random-effects 
analyses used in other chapters. On the generalization issue, see Baayen, Davidson, and 
Bates, (2008); H. H. Clark (1973); Raaijmakers, Schrijnemakers, and Gremmen (1999).  
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distributed, but instead describe the data with a t-distribution, which allows heavy 
tails. T-distributions have three parameters: the mean, µ; standard deviation, σ; and 
normality, ν.  Where the value of the normality parameter is large (ca. 100), the 
distribution is nearly normal; where it small, the distribution is heavy tailed 
(Kruschke, 2013).  
The one-group analysis for this experiment estimates the most credible 
parameter values, given the data, for the following model: 
P(µ,σ ,ν |D) = P(D |µ,σ ,ν )*P(µ,σ ,ν )P(D)  
The denominator is approximated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
methods, which simulate thousands of combinations of parameter values (for more 
technical details, see Kruschke, 2013). The analyses were carried out in R (R Core 
Team, 2015) and JAGS using the packages BEST (Meredith & Kruschke, 2013) and 
rjags (Plummer, 2003). The default values of the BEST programs were appropriate 
for the current design. By default, the MCMC chain has 100,000 steps, with no 
thinning to correct for autocorrelation. The default priors are uninformative. Since 
this is the first study to explore these content/source predictions, uninformative 
priors are justified. The prior for µ is a normal distribution centred on the mean of 
the data, the spread being determined by the precision equivalent to 100 times the 
standard deviation; for σ it is a broad uniform distribution from 1/1000 to 1000 times 
the standard deviation of the data; for ν it is an exponential distribution giving 
roughly equal credibility to nearly normal and heavy-tailed distributions (for further 
details, see Kruschke, 2013).  
The remainder of this section reprises the predictions, and reports the 
corresponding posteriors for the parameters. To decide whether the parameter 
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estimates (dis-)confirm the predictions, we need two further concepts: the highest 
density interval (HDI) and the regional of practical equivalence (ROPE). The HDI 
spans the most credible (highest probability) values of the posterior distribution: for 
instance, a 95% HDI, which we will use throughout, covers 95% of the distribution, 
and the values within it have a total probability of .95 (Kruschke 2013, 2015). When 
assessing predictions, we can ask whether the 95% HDI includes a specific point 
value: for example, for the null hypothesis, zero. In reality, requiring a point value 
may be too stringent. In such cases, a ROPE can prove helpful: values within this 
region are considered practically equivalent to the comparison value. Kruschke 
(2015) recommends that, in the absence of clear guidelines in the field, researchers 
establish a regional of practical equivalence (ROPE) around the comparison value, 
from -.1 to .1. Below, we will apply the ROPE to effect sizes, so that the relevant 
comparison value will be zero with a ROPE from -.1 to +.1. We will base our 
evaluations of the experimental predictions on these effect sizes and corresponding 
ROPEs. If the 95% HDI falls entirely outside of the ROPE, there is a clear effect; if 
it falls entirely within the ROPE, there is a null effect. In this case, the 95% HDI for 
effect size falls outside this conventional ROPE. Where there is overlap, the data do 
not allow a clear decision for the specific HDI and ROPE. It may, nevertheless, be 
informative to consider how much overlap there is, as this will give some indication 
of weaker conclusions.  
(1) Reliable sources should increase belief in a claim  
(2) (i) Unreliable sources should decrease belief in a claim. OR 
(ii) Unreliable sources should not affect belief in a claim.  
 
Figure 6.1 displays the mean belief change by reliability.  
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Figure 6.1. Mean belief change by reliability; error bars are standard error 
These means show the predicted increase in belief in the claim in response to 
testimonial evidence from a reliable source, and a decrease in response to the same 
evidence when coming from an unreliable source. In other words, the data 
suggestive anti-reliability (2i). These findings were analysed with two one-group 
analyses with a comparison value of 0, analogous to classical one-sample t-tests.  
Reliable Sources. The mean estimate for µ was 1.84 (95% HDI [1.37, 2.3]). 
The modal estimate for σ 1.39 (95% HDI [1.01,1.81]. The modal estimate for 
log10(ν) was 1.37 (95% HDI [.42, 2,04]. Lastly, the modal estimate for effect size – 
(µ-0)/σ – was 1.31 (95% HDI [.87, 1.80]), which falls outside the conventional 
ROPE. Figure 6.2 shows the posterior distribution for effect size and the ROPE. This 
analysis, then, shows that reliable sources credibly increased belief in a claim. 
0.0-0.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
0.87 1.80
Effect size
ROPE
mode = 1.31
 
Figure 6.2. Posterior distribution of effect size of beilef change from reliable sources. ROPE 
from -.1, to .1; dotted lines are 95% HDI 
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Unreliable Sources. The mean estimate for µ was -.72 (95% HDI [-1.15, -
.29]). The modal estimate for σ was 1.46 (95% HDI [.97,1.88]). The modal estimate 
for ν was 1.36 (95% HDI [.37,1.99]). Lastly, the modal estimate for effect size was -
.49 (95% HDI [-.87, -.17]), which falls outside the conventional ROPE. Figure 6.3 
shows the posterior distribution for effect size and the ROPE. Thus, this analysis 
shows that unreliable sources credibly decreased belief in a claim.  
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5
-0.87 -0.17
Effect size
ROPE
mode = -0.49
 
Figure 6.3. Posterior distribution of effect size of belief change from unreliable sources. 
ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI 
Summary. These data therefore support both predictions (1) and (2)(i): 
reliable sources increased belief in a claim; unreliable sources decreased belief in a 
claim. The data offer support, then, for source anti-reliability. The novelty of the 
findings argues for replication. Moreover, the data from Experiment 6.1 were 
collected via a university-hosted website for online experimental studies; this sample 
of self-selecting, interested volunteers is likely biased toward university students and 
staff.  Experiment 6.2 was posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Although samples 
on Mechanical Turk are also not representative of the general population, they are 
considered more diverse than college samples (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014), and, 
most importantly, are likely to be different in composition than the sample of 
Experiment 6.2. This offers a useful further test of the effects. 
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6.3 Experiment 6.2: Replicating belief change 
6.3.1 Methods  
Design. The experiments followed the same design as Experiments 6.1: a 2x2 
between-subjects design with the following factors: Claim Expectedness (Expected, 
Unexpected) and Source Reliability (High, Low). 
Materials and Procedure. Experiment 6.2 used the same materials and 
procedure as Experiment 6.1. Two minor changes were made to the materials to 
adapt them for a predominantly US audience. Firstly, for the Stockholm item, 
temperatures were given in both Centigrade and Fahrenheit. Secondly, for the 
nightclub item, US locations were given: Manhattan as an expected location for a 
prestigious nightclub, and Des Moines, Iowa, as an unexpected location. The Range 
Rover item was also removed because, in Experiment 6.1, participants’ prior beliefs 
showed that the intended expectedness manipulation had not worked.  
Participants. 79 people (27 women; average age 33.38) completed online 
surveys posted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a small job (HIT). The HIT was 
posted by an intermediary, MTurk Data. Participants were rewarded with a small fee 
equivalent to $0.20 per minute, calculated to exceed the rate of the US minimum 
wage. To maximize engagement and maximize the number of native English 
speakers, high qualifications were posted. To complete the task, participants needed 
to be resident in the US, Canada or UK, have a 99% approval rating for their 
previous HITs, and to have completed 1,000 approved HITs. In addition, a 
qualification guaranteed that people could not participate if they had completed the 
previous experiment. One participant’s data (not included in the above count) was 
excluded because that participant reported a first language other than English. 
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6.3.2 Results & Discussion 
(1) Reliable sources should increase belief in a claim.  
(2) (i) Unreliable sources should decrease belief in a claim. OR 
(ii) Unreliable sources should not affect belief in a claim. 
Figure 6.4 shows the descriptive data for Experiment 6.2. Qualitatively, the 
same patterns are observed as in Experiment 6.1.   
  
Figure 6.4. Mean belief change by reliability; error bars are standard error 
Reliable Sources. The mean estimate for µ was 2.23 (95% HDI [1.76, 2.7]). 
The modal estimate for σ 1.39 (95% HDI [1.09,1.79]. The modal estimate for 
log10(ν) was 1.49 (95% HDI [.75, 2.1]. Lastly, the modal estimate for effect size – 
(µ-0)/σ – was 1.58 (95% HDI [1.08, 2.10], which falls outside the conventional 
ROPE. Figure 6.5 shows the posterior distribution of the effect size and ROPE. This 
analysis, then, shows that reliable sources credibly increased belief in a claim. 
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Figure 6.5. Posterior distribution of effect size of belief change from reliable sources. ROPE 
from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI 
 
Unreliable Sources. The mean estimate for µ was -1.73(95% HDI [-2.28, -
1.18]). The modal estimate for σ was 1.58 (95% HDI [1.21, 2.11]). The modal 
estimate for ν was 1.48 (95% HDI [.6, 2.07]). Lastly, the modal estimate for effect 
size was -1.08 (95% HDI [-1.53, -.63]), which falls outside the conventional ROPE. 
Figure 6.6 shows the posterior distribution of effect size and the ROPE. This analysis 
shows that unreliable sources credibly decreased belief in a claim.  
−3.0 −2.0−2.5 −1.0-1.5 0.0 0.5-0.5
-1.53 -0.63
Effect size
mode = -1.08
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Figure 6.6. Posterior distribution of effect size of belief change from unreliable sources. 
ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI 
Summary. These data therefore support both predictions (1) and (2i): reliable 
sources increased belief in a claim; unreliable sources decreased belief in a claim.  
The data replicate the effects in Experiment 6.1, providing further support for source 
anti-reliability. 
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6.4 Experiment 6.3: Reliability change 
6.4.1 Methods 
Design. This experiment followed a 2x2 between-subjects design with the 
following factors: Claim Expectedness (Expected, Unexpected) and Source 
Reliability (High, Low). 
Participants.  131 people (45 women; average age 39.83) completed online 
surveys posted on a US-hosted website for academic research 
(http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet.html). Participants were recruited both 
through this website and through university e-mail lists.  
Materials & Procedure. Participants read texts on the same six topics as in 
Experiments 6.1 and 6.2.  The only difference concerned the dependent variables. 
Instead of providing an initial judgment on the convincingness of the claim, the 
participants first read about the source and rated its reliability by responding to the 
question ‘How reliable do you think [source name] is?’ on a Likert-style scale from 
0 (not at all reliable) to 10 (completely reliable). Next, participants read the same 
source information again, but this time together with a claim. For example, having 
read that ‘Michael is a drug addict’, some participants read the following: 
 
Now imagine that Michael told you the following: ‘One of the best 
remedies against a severe cough is valium.’ 
 
Participants re-rated source reliability on the same Likert scale. No definition 
of ‘reliability’ was provided. As in Experiment 6.1, each participant saw a script 
with six texts, with two orders of presentation to control for order effects. 
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6.4.2 Results & Discussion  
This experiment used the same method of analysis as Experment 6.1 and 2: 
namely, robust Bayesian parameter estimation  
(1) Expected claims should increase source reliability  
(2) Unexpected claims should decrease source reliability.  
The mean change in the perceived reliability of the source as a function of 
claim expectedness or unexpectedness is shown in Figure 6.7 below. These means 
suggest are in keeping with (1) and (2): expected claims led to increases in source 
reliability, unexpected claims to decreases.  
  
Figure 6.7. Mean change in reliability by expectedness; error bars are standard error 
The data were again tested with two one-group analyses with a comparison value of 
0.  
Expected Claims. The mean estimate for µ was .45 (95% HDI [.18, .74]). 
The modal estimate for σ was .93 (95% HDI [.75, 1.18]). The modal estimate for 
log10(ν) was 1.53. The modal estimate for effect size was .49 (95% HDI [.16, 0.79]), 
which falls outside the conventional ROPE. Figure 6.8 shows the posterior 
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distribution for effect size and the ROPE. Thus, this analysis shows that expected 
claims credibly increased source reliability.  
0.0-0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.16 0.79
Effect size
mode = 0.49
ROPE
 
Figure 6.8. Posterior distribution of effect size of reliability change from expected claims. 
ROPE is -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI 
Unexpected Claims. The mean estimate for µ was -1.12 (95% HDI [-1.43, -
.8]. The modal estimate for σ was 1.37 (95% HDI [1.09, 1.65]). The modal estimate 
for log10(v) was 1.16 (95% HDI[.59, 1.96]). The modal estimate for effect size was -
.82 (95% HDI [-1.11, -.56]), which falls outside the conventional ROPE. Figure 6.9 
shows the posterior distribution for effect size and the ROPE. Thus, this analysis 
shows that unexpected claims credibly decreased source reliability.  
−1.4 −1.0−1.2 -0.4-0.6-0.8 0.0 0.2-0.2
-1.11 -0.56
Effect size
mode = -0.82
ROPE
 
Figure 6.9. Posterior distribution of effect size of reliability change from unexpected claims. 
ROPE is -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI 
 
Summary. These data therefore support predictions (3) and (4). Expected 
claims increased source reliability; unexpected claims decreased source reliability 
As above, the novelty of the data argues for a replication. The same change 
was made to the materials, namely, dropping the Land Rover item. And, as above, 
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the replication was run on Amazon Mechanical Turk to allow a more representative 
sample.  
6.5 Experiment 6.4: Replicating reliability change 
6.5.1 Methods 
Design. The experiments followed the same design as Experiments 6.1 to 
6.3: a 2x2 between-subjects design with the following factors: Claim Expectedness 
(Expected, Unexpected) and Source Reliability (High, Low). 
Materials and Procedure. Experiment 6.4 used the same materials and 
procedure as Experiment 6.3. As for experiment 6.2, two minor changes were made 
to the materials to adapt them for a predominantly US audience. Firstly, for the 
Stockholm item, temperatures were given in both Centigrade and Fahrenheit. 
Secondly, for the nightclub item, US locations were given: Manhattan as an expected 
location for a prestigious nightclub, and Des Moines, Iowa, as an unexpected 
location. The Range Rover item was also removed because, in Experiment 6.1, 
participants’ prior beliefs showed that the intended expectedness manipulation had 
not worked.  
Participants. 79 people (31 women; average 35.9) completed online surveys 
posted on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk as a small job (HIT). Participants were 
recruited and rewarded in the same way as in the experiments above. In addition, a 
qualification guaranteed that people could not participate if they had previously 
completed in any of the experiments. As above, one participant’s data (not included 
in the above count) was excluded because that participant reported a first language 
other than English. 
6.5.2 Results & Discussion 
The analysis was the same as for Experiment 6.3.  
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(1) Expected claims should increase source reliability  
(2) Unexpected claims should decrease source reliability.  
The descriptive data, in Figure 6.10, qualitatively match the earlier findings 
  
Figure 6.10. Mean reliability change by expectedness; error bars are standard error 
Expected Claims. The mean estimate for µ was .51 (95% HDI [.2, .83]). The 
modal estimate for σ was .89 (95% HDI [.66, 1.19]). The modal estimate for 
log10(ν) was 1.51. The modal estimate for effect size was .56 (95% HDI [.19, 97]), 
which falls outside the conventional ROPE. Figure 6.11 shows the posterior 
distribution of effect size and the ROPE. Thus, this analysis shows that expected 
claims credibly increased source reliability.  
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Figure 6.11. Posterior distribution of effect size of reliability change from expected claims. 
ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI 
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Unexpected Claims. The mean estimate for µ was -.2 (95% HDI [-.64, .22]. 
The modal estimate for σ was 1.16 (95% HDI [.65, 1.7]). The modal estimate for 
log10(v) was .52 (95% HDI[.12, 1.77]. The modal estimate for effect size was -.18 
(95% HDI [-.53, .18]). Although this modal estimate is for a small effect, the 95% 
HDI includes an effect size of 0. Indeed, the 95% includes the entire ROPE (-.1 
to .1). It is therefore not possible to reject the null hypothesis. But since the 95% also 
includes effect sizes outside of the ROPE, it is also not possible to confirm the null 
hypothesis. Figure 6.12 shows the posterior distribution and the ROPE. Accordingly, 
these data do not allow us to make a decision on the effect of unexpected claims. 
0.0 0.2-0.2 0.4-0.4-0.6-0.8
-0.53 0.18
mode = -0.18
ROPE
Effect size
 
Figure 6.12. Posterior distribution of effect size of reliability change from unexpected 
claims. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI 
 
Summary. These data support prediction (1) but (in contrast to the preceding 
experiment) do not allow a decision on prediction (2). Expected claims increased 
source reliability; but there was no statistical evidence for (or against) unexpected 
claims decreasing reliability.  
The experimental data, thus far, are broadly consistent. They suggest that 
people use source reliability when assessing claims, and can consider sources to be 
anti-reliable or negatively correlated with the truth, as predicted by the Olsson and 
Angere model. The data also suggest that people use message content to judge 
reliability. The experiments above all tested single claims in a somewhat artificial 
format, requiring participants to assess a source’s reliability twice. Although this pre-
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test/post-test structure controls well for individual differences among participants 
(Slater & Rouner, 1996), such designs are notoriously prone to demand 
characteristics (Levine & Parkinson, 1994). For the above mechanism to play a 
major role in belief revision, these beliefs and perceptions should hold across 
multiple interactions and without the pre-test/post-test structure56. The next 
experiment explores this possibility.  
6.6 Experiment 6.5: Story version  
Experiment 6.5 adapted the materials from the previous experiments for use 
in a new paradigm. This paradigm examined the extent to which people 
spontaneously use message content to revise their beliefs about a source. This 
paradigm employed a story version of the previous experiments which avoided an 
explicit source-reliability variable. The idea was to test whether judgments of one 
claim would impact on judgments of a later claim. Participants read a short text 
comprising information about a source; a first claim, which varied in expectedness; 
and a neutral second claim, which participants then rated. If there were systematic 
differences in the rating of the second claim, this would reflect spontaneous and 
implicit revision of perceived reliability as the story unfolds.  This method 
approaches a more naturalistic version of the preceding experiments. To 
accommodate multiple claims, the structure of a trial now read as follows:  
                                                
 
56 For pre-test/post-test designs, demand characteristics are often explored using a 
Solomon Four-Group Design (for discussion, see, e.g., Levine & Parkinson, 1994). For 
present purposes, we could use the following format, illustrated here for the reliability task: 
Group 1: Pre-test  Treatment (Expected Claim)  Post-test 
Group 2: Pre-test  Treatment (Unexpected Claim) Post-test  
Group 3: No Pre-test Treatment (Expected Claim) Post-test 
Group 4: No Pre-test Treatment (Unexpected Claim) Post-test 
Comparing Groups 1 and 2 would replicate the present data. Comparing Groups 3 and 4 
would replicate the data in a post-test only form. Comparing Groups 1 and 3, and 2 and 4, 
would test whether pre-testing significantly affected the results.   
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Imagine you hear Michael, who is a clinical nurse specialist, telling someone 
“One of the best remedies for a severe cough is valium.” Later, Michael tells 
you the following: “The new medicine Fluentem can prevent heart attacks 
and strokes.” 
The first claim, to repeat, manipulated expectedness: here, the claim is unexpected. 
The second claim was intended to be neutral, with a prior probability of around 0.5. 
Participants rated their belief in the second claim on an eleven-point scale of 
convincingness. 
The key prediction was that participants would use the expectedness of the 
first claim to implicitly judge source reliability, and use this source reliability 
judgment to inform their judgment of the convincingness of the second claim. Hence, 
an expected first claim would lead to higher belief in a second claim than would an 
unexpected first claim. As before, the design was between-subjects: some 
participants saw expected claims followed by neutral claims (the expected condition), 
some unexpected followed by neutral claims (the unexpected condition). To aid 
interpretation of any implicit revision of source reliability in response to expected vs. 
unexpected claims, we added a third, baseline condition which presented participants 
only with the neutral, second claim (the null condition).  
Given this design, three comparisons are possible: the expected versus null 
conditions; the unexpected versus null conditions; and the expected versus 
unexpected conditions. The key prediction is for the expected and unexpected 
conditions to differ reliably. The null condition is expected to lie between these two, 
though there are no predictions concerning how far it should be from either, as it 
reflects how trusting people are initially. If the expected and unexpected conditions 
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were reliably different from the null condition, this would be a clear replication of 
the preceding studies.  
6.6.1 Methods  
Design. There was one independent variable: previous message content (null, 
unexpected, expected). The dependent variable was claim convincingness on a scale 
from 0 to 10.  
Participants. Two samples were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
using the same criteria as for Experiments 6.2 and 6.4; they were again remunerated 
at a rate of $.20 per minute. Two separate HITs were posted on different days and at 
different times of day. Participants were able to participate only in one HIT, and only 
if they had not previously taken part in Experiment 6.2 or 6.4. The first sample 
comprised 120 people  (45 women; average age 35.98). The second sample 
comprised 296 people (3 gender non-conformist, 123 female; average age 34.81). 
Note that, although classical methods do not allow samples to be compiled, Bayesian 
methods do (Kruschke, 2015).  
Materials and Procedure. This experiment used the same set of sources and 
first claims as Experiments 6.2/6.4. The new, second claim in each pair was as 
follows: for the valium item, ‘The new medicine Fluentem can prevent heart attacks 
and strokes’; for the oven item, ‘Pimlico Farm superfine flour is the best on the 
market for making pasta’; for the horse-racing item, ‘The yacht Azure will beat its 
competitor Orion at this year’s Cowes Week regatta’; for the Stockholm item, ‘It 
rained on 13 days in Tübingen, Germany, in May 2013’; for the clubbing item, ‘Kate 
Siggs is a rising star on the vibrant Australian jazz scene. Participants provided a 
rating for the second claim on a scale from 0 (not at all convincing) to 10 
(completely convincing). 
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To illustrate the new format:  
Imagine you hear Robert, who is a senior sports reporter and has predicted the 
winner in the last 10 races that he covered, telling someone the following: 
“The Australian horse Thunderbolt, who has beaten the British horse 
Lightening in the majority of the races entered this season, will lose to (beat) 
Lightening in the upcoming Cheltenham Festival races.” 
 Later, Robert tells you the following: “The yacht Azure will beat 
its competitor Orion at this year’s Cowes Week regatta.” 
  
  How convincing is this claim about Azure on a scale from 0 (not at 
all convincing) to 10 (completely convincing)? 
6.6.2 Results & Discussion  
To analyze the data we averaged the endorsement of the second claim across 
items to create a mean score for each participant. We then ran the analyses on these 
scores. There are three relevant analyses: expected condition versus null condition; 
unexpected condition versus null condition; expected condition versus unexpected 
condition. As with the one-group analyses, these analyses describe the data with a t-
distribution, and estimate the most credible parameter values given the data. For the 
two-group analyses, the following model applies: 
P(µ1,µ2,σ1,σ 2,ν |D) =
P(D |µ1,µ2,σ1,σ 2,ν )*P(µ1,µ2,σ1,σ 2,ν )
P(D)   
Subscripts identify group membership. Note that, in this model, there is only one 
parameter for normality. The technical details are the same as for the one-group 
analyses. The priors are, likewise, set in the same way. Below, for brevity’s sake, we 
report estimates for the differences between µ1 and µ2 and between σ1 and σ2, for the 
normality parameter, and for the effect size.  
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Figure 6.13 shows the descriptive data for the combined data sets.  
  
Figure 6.13. Mean belief by expectedness; error bars are standard error 
The descriptive data show the predicted pattern in that mean belief was 
higher in the expected condition, than in the neutral or unexpected condition. The 
fact that the unexpected condition showed lower mean belief than the null condition 
is also suggestive of anti-reliability.   
Expected v Null. The mean estimate for difference in means (µexpected – µnull) 
was .09 (95% HDI [-.33, .51]). Note that the 95% HDI includes a difference of zero. 
The modal estimate for difference in standard deviations (σexpected – σnull) was -.25 
(95% HDI [-.54, .07]). The modal estimate for ν was 1.72 (95% HDI [1.22, 2.17]). 
The modal estimate for effect size was .06 (95% HDI [-.19, .29]). Figure 6.14 shows 
the posterior distribution of effect size and the ROPE. Since the 95% HDI for effect 
size encompasses a conventional ROPE, there is insufficient evidence to determine 
an effect of preceding expected claims here.  
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Figure 6.14. Posterior distribution of effect size of difference between expected and null 
conditions. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depicts 95% HDI 
Unexpected v Null. The mean estimate for difference in means (µnull – 
µunexpected) was .56 (95% HDI [.12, .98]), suggesting a credible difference in means, 
with the unexpected condition lower than the null condition. The modal estimate for 
difference in standard deviations (σnull – σunexpected) was .13 (95% HDI [-.19, .44]). 
The modal estimate for ν was 1.73 (95% HDI [1.23, 2.18]). The modal estimate for 
effect size was .32 (95% HDI [.07, .55]). Notice that the 95% HDI excludes an effect 
size of zero. However, it also overlaps with the conventional ROPE (-.1 to .1) by .3. 
Figure 6.15 shows the posterior distribution of effect size and the ROPE. Although 
these data are suggestive, they do not allow us to decide whether or not there is a 
credible difference between unexpected and null conditions. 
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Figure 6.15. Posterior distribution of effect size of difference between unexpected and null 
claims. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar is 95% HDI 
Expected v Unexpected. The mean estimate for difference in means (µexpected 
– µunexpected) was .64 (95% HDI [.24, 1.05]). The modal estimate for difference in 
standard deviations (σexpected – σunexpected) was -.1 (95% HDI [-.4, .2]). The modal 
estimate for ν was 1.63 (95% HDI [1.1, 2.13]). The modal estimate for effect size 
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was .38 (95% HDI [.14, .63]). The 95% HDI falls outside the conventional ROPE.  
Figure 6.16 shows the posterior distribution of the effect size and the ROPE. There is 
therefore a credible difference between expected and unexpected conditions.  
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Figure 6.16. Posterior distribution for effect size of difference between expected and 
unexpected conditions. ROPE from -.1 to .1; black bar depics 95% HDI 
These data, therefore, suggest that people do, indeed, use the expectedness of 
claims to implicitly judge the reliability of a source, which in turn they use to judge 
later claims. There is a reliable difference between expected and unexpected claims. 
There is also a suggestion of anti-reliability, in that the vast majority of the 95% HDI 
for effect size of the difference between unexpected and null condition fell outside a 
conventional ROPE. However, since there was overlap, we must avoid a firm 
decision.  
6.7 General Discussion  
This chapter set out to explore the relationship between rationality and 
sources. It did so by taking the case of testimony and exploring how people respond 
to testimony from partially reliable sources. The aim was to test predictions from 
two different Bayesian models of testimony. The data offered some support for both 
models: ratings of convincingness increased with reliable sources; ratings of 
reliability increased with expected claims, and decreased with unexpected claims. 
But the data also showed reliable evidence for source anti-reliability – people 
decreased their belief when there was an unreliable source – which is a behaviour 
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predicted only by the Olsson and Angere model. Lastly, an experiment suggested a 
feedback mechanism: the expectedness of a first claim led to an implicit reliability 
judgement; this judgement then influenced the convincingness of a second claim.  
These experiments suggest that people are epistemically vigilant: people 
monitor the plausibility of incoming claims and the reliability of their sources. The 
findings are, therefore, broadly compatible with a wide range of research in other 
domains which offers indirect evidence of vigilance. These domains are the 
developmental psychology of trust and the psychology of persuasion. The present 
findings relate even more closely to existing research in Bayesian argumentation. In 
this nascent field, researchers argue that people are sensitive to the appropriate 
parameters for Bayesian reasoning about testimony, and that they can be considered 
at least qualitative, and perhaps noisy quantitative, Bayesian reasoners (Hahn et al., 
2009; Harris et al., 2016). What the present findings add is the distinction between 
two Bayesian models and the clear demonstration that sources can be anti-reliable.  
This chapter has evidenced people’s sensitivity to a key message 
characteristic – its expectedness. This finding coheres well with a rich literature in 
sociolinguistics, as well as data in social psychology, which suggest that people use 
message characteristics to form impressions of people. For instance, speed gives an 
impression of competence57; choice of register gives an impression of power or 
powerlessness; lexical diversity gives an impression of competence and control; and 
moving towards the interlocutor’s accent gives an impression of similarity and 
attractiveness (Holtgraves, 2002). Such characteristics have an impact on persuasion. 
Slater and Rouner (1996) manipulated messages so that they seemed interesting, 
                                                
 
57 Though excessive speed makes a speaker seem anxious.  
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 280 
well written, appropriately organized and styled, creative, and so on. Like the present 
experiments, they had participants assess sources before and after making claims; 
unlike the present experiments, the claims were extensive persuasive texts. Slater 
and Rouner found that message quality predicted source assessment, and partially 
mediated the relationship between initial and ultimate assessments. Message quality 
also predicted belief change, and partially mediated the relationship between initial 
source assessment and belief change58.  
The present experiments offer relevant evidence on the phenomenon of belief 
(or attitude) polarisation, in which different parties become more extreme in their 
beliefs as they consider evidence. Belief polarisation is a perennial issue in 
contemporary political science (Mann & Ornstein, 2013). Participants in the 
experiments above formed perceptions of reliability on the basis of claims’ 
expectedness, and used these perceptions in evaluating future claims. Participants 
were also prepared to consider sources anti-reliable, or negatively correlated with the 
truth. They were prepared to do all of this without knowing about the truth of the 
claims. These behaviours could be a potent combination. If the behaviours obtain in 
the real world, then real-world audiences may risk discounting sources solely 
because they found previous claims unexpected (Hahn & Harris, 2014). This 
discounting may be still more pronounced if expectedness is determined not just but 
by our probability estimates but by our likes and dislikes (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 
1955). Anti-reliability may provide a valuable complement to existing theories of 
polarization such as the accounts of backfire effects briefly surveyed in the 
introduction. 
                                                
 
58 Slater and Rouner (1996) made other predictions, but these are less relevant for 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 281 
From these considerations, a normative question arises: are the behaviours 
reported above normatively defensible? This chapter has explored two Bayesian 
models which are supposedly normative. Yet these models make different 
prescriptions about how to handle information from unreliable sources. Is one 
model’s prescription more rational? An approach to this question is to run 
simulations with agent-based models. Agent-based models comprise individual 
agents in an artificial environment (see, e.g., N. Gilbert, 2008). The agents are 
programmed with a simple set of behaviours, and then interact with other such 
agents. Agent-based modelling allows the study of complex, non-linear, and 
emergent behaviours. Of special relevance here, such models can test whether 
seemingly rational individual behaviour can result in seemingly irrational group 
behaviours such as polarisation.  This approach needs some independent assessment 
of rationality; such an assessment is not straightforward with polarisation (Jern, 
Chang, & Kemp, 2014). But it is essential to consider rationality at the group level. 
In parallel, to assess how rational people are being, we must ask a question that was 
set aside above: how far do the behaviours generalize? We have seen, for instance, 
that anti-reliability occurs. But is it the default behaviour or is it triggered in specific 
situations – for instance, when a source is biased? The normative question should, 
therefore, be pursued alongside a larger research program exploring testimony across 
different contexts.  
The Bayesian approach to testimony covers similar ground to accounts of 
persuasion such as the ELM (see the introduction to this chapter). There is, however, 
a marked difference in style. On the Bayesian approach, a rational agent should 
                                                                                                                                     
 
present purposes and were less clearly supported by the data.  
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 282 
always consider both the claim and the source, and combine this information 
multiplicatively in updating their beliefs. On the ELM account, an agent considers 
source information primarily only in the peripheral route. In specific cases, source 
information may actually form part of the argument; and it may, more generally, 
influence persuasion through processing effects or metacognition. But sources have, 
nevertheless, a secondary status in the two identified (i.e. central and peripheral) 
routes to persuasion. It is hard to test between Bayesian and ELM accounts, in large 
part because the ELM has so many parameters that it can account for seemingly 
contradictory data. For instance, the ELM does not, in fact, commit to the existence 
of only two routes to persuasion; it allows any number of unidentified intermediate 
routes, compatible with any number of relationships between claims and sources. 
The ELM does not, however, have as straightforward a fit as the Bayesian models do 
with the present experiments. The Bayesian models allow – indeed prescribe – a 
subtle two-way relationship between claims and sources, whether the context has 
high stakes and high motivation or low stakes and low elaboration. The Bayesian 
models are also grounded in a deeper, normative account: real-world agents may be 
behaving as they are because they are trying to process data optimally. There is no 
room for such normativity in the ELM.  
The present chapter has, like Chapters 2 to 4, explored source reliability, but 
it has produced a different pattern of results. The difference lies in the treatment of 
information from unreliable sources, and needs explanation. In this chapter, when 
participants received a claim from an unreliable source, they decreased their belief in 
the claim. Chapters 2 to 4 presented information in a different way: participants did 
not provide ratings for a claim before and after assertion. But since some participants 
rated probabilities without assertion and others with assertion, the data are similar 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 283 
enough to compare. In Chapters 2 to 4, participants reliably increased belief in 
response to unreliable sources, which is a different pattern from the current data. 
However, in Chapters 2 and 3, participants revised their belief only in the conditional 
probability, which raises the following possibility: people respond differently to 
source reliability when judging conditional relationships. There are, indeed, hints 
that this is so. Participants in a reasoning task were more sensitive to source 
reliability when they were rating a conditional premise than when they were rating a 
minor premise (Stevenson & Over, 2001). Participants arguably assume that 
knowledge of conditional relationships is more specialist than knowledge of simple 
facts: conditional relationships, for example, might map onto subtle features of 
causal systems (Stevenson & Over, 2001). It is not clear, though, that this point 
would explain why anti-reliability does not obtain for conditionals.  
There is a more straightforward explanation in the way reliability was 
operationalized. Chapters 2 to 4 manipulated source reliability in a slightly different 
way from this chapter. In Chapters 2 to 4, unreliable sources were merely 
comparatively low in the appropriate expertise for a specific scenario. For the most 
part, the manipulation amounted to simply telling participants who the source was; 
inexpert sources were intuitively less likely to have the relevant knowledge, but they 
could have it. For instance, in one scenario, an inexpert source was a medical student 
who claimed that, ‘If a patient on this ward has malaria, then they will make a good 
recovery.’ A medical student would surely have some relevant expertise, just less 
than the professor of medicine in the high expertise condition. In Chapter 6, in 
contrast, unreliable sources were demonstrably lacking in relevant expertise or 
accuracy, or were untrustworthy. The materials suggested precisely why the source 
was deficient for the issue in hand. The Chapter 6 sources were, in other words, 
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better candidates for anti-reliability. To explore this possibility, Chapters 2 to 4 
could be supplemented with new materials. The experiments in this chapter could 
also be supplemented with more extensive, real-world examples, with more varied 
manipulations of source reliability. These data would speak to the generalizability of 
source anti-reliability. 
Although this chapter has focused on the link between sources and rationality, 
the findings also bear on pragmatics. The findings suggest an important distinction 
between comprehension and acceptance. Participants surely understood the claim 
that the source was (fictionally) trying to communicate, but they did not blindly 
accept it. In fact, when they found the source sufficiently unreliable, they decreased 
their belief in the claim. This distinction is especially striking given that Chapters 2 
to 4 stressed the intimate relationship between pragmatics and testimony.  
How, then, can we understand the relationship between pragmatics and 
testimony? A good basis is the definition of communication which underpins 
contemporary natural-language pragmatics. The exact formalization is disputed 
(Grice, 1957; Schiffer, 1972; Searle, 1969; Strawson, 1964). But for present 
purposes the following definition will suffice: 
Informative Intention: to inform the audience of something.  
Communicative Intention: to inform the audience of one’s informative 
intention.  
This informal definition is due to Relevance Theory (B. Clark, 2013, pp. 113-4; see 
also Sperber et al., 2010; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). The informative intention is the 
intention to get the audience to believe whatever the speaker is saying; it is fulfilled 
only if the audience does, indeed, believe what the speaker is saying. The 
communicative intention is a second-order intention: it refers to the informative 
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intention, which is supposed to be overt and to be recognized by the audience. If 
either intention is fulfilled, then communication is successful. If the informative 
intention is fulfilled, then the audience believes what the speaker wants them to 
believe. If only the communicative intention is fulfilled, then the audience 
understands what the speaker wants them to believe but does not accept it. When 
both intentions are satisfied, then an audience understands a speaker’s claim and 
accepts it as true in virtue of the speaker’s epistemic authority (Sperber et al., 2010). 
This, in other words, is testimony.  
This framework offers a subtle way of explaining the intimate connection 
between testimony and pragmatics. Testimony requires pragmatics but emphasizes 
an assessment of epistemic authority (source reliability) and believability 
(expectedness) (Sperber et al., 2010). The word ‘emphasizes’, here, is key, for 
assessments of reliability and believability may also play a role in pragmatics; this 
role is simply less pronounced. Reliability is arguably required for pragmatics in the 
following sense: hearers need an initial stance of trust, a preparedness to change their 
beliefs, to entertain the cooperation required for demanding pragmatic inferences; 
and if this trust drops below a certain level, then pragmatics may simply stop 
(McCready, 2014; Sperber et al., 2010). Believability is, according to Sperber et al., 
also important in pragmatics. Indeed, Sperber et al. argue that the same mechanisms 
underpin the assessment of believability and interpretation. Both require the 
assessment of new information relative to background knowledge. Interpretation, 
they argue, occurs through a search for cognitive effects: new conclusions in light of 
new information and contextually activated beliefs; increased or decreased 
confidence in such beliefs; or the contradiction and revision of contextually activated 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 286 
beliefs. Interpretation identifies, in other words, inconsistencies with current beliefs; 
testimony is the business of dealing with these inconsistencies.  
The foregoing discussion gives rise to certain predictions. Firstly, pragmatic 
inferences are not automatic; they require trust. Thus, systematic unreliability should 
decrease the number of pragmatic inferences. Secondly, if, as theory and the present 
data suggest, there is epistemic vigilance towards sources and content, then speakers 
may have tools available to them to manage their reputations, so that they can 
maintain cooperation, hence pragmatics, while making claims for which they lack 
complete confidence (McCready, 2014; Sperber et al., 2010). The next chapter will 
address one proposed mechanism.  
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7 Evidential Language  
This chapter returns to the relationship between pragmatics and sources. 
Chapter 6 presented novel data which argue for vigilance to both the source and 
content of a message. This vigilance seems intuitively rational, but raises the 
possibility that full pragmatic communication simply stops when a source has given 
unexpected information, because reliability and attendant trust drop below some 
threshold. In other words, pragmatic inference depends on source factors. This 
chapter tests a mechanism which has been proposed to allow communication to 
continue in such contexts: hedging (McCready, 2014). 
 The experiments in Chapter 6 form the basis of this chapter. Chapter 6 
suggested that people take the perceived reliability of sources into account when 
revising their beliefs in response to testimonial evidence for a claim. The 
experiments also suggested that people spontaneously use the degree of (mis)match 
between a claim and their present priors for the claim to revise their beliefs about the 
source. This revision occurred even when no overt judgments of reliability were 
required, suggesting a fundamental bi-directional relationship between content and 
source in the processing of testimonial evidence. Such behaviour fits, at least 
qualitatively, with Bayesian accounts of testimony (e.g., Olsson & Vallinder, 2013) 
within the formal epistemology literature.  
When speakers make claims, their reliability is under threat, with damaging 
consequences. On the one hand, speakers are expected to give informative, relevant 
information (see, e.g., Grice, 1975; McCready, 2014). On the other, if speakers give 
information which turns out to be false – or even merely seems implausible - they 
face reputational damage which may impact on future cooperation and undermine 
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the very basis of communication (McCready, 2014). How then do people maintain 
trust and cooperation given that none of us, realistically, is perfectly reliable?  
McCready (2014) argues that reputation management is crucial to 
communication. He argues, further, that a crucial strategy is hedging, that is, 
qualifying assertions in such a way that they allow for exceptions. Take the 
following examples, where the hedges are italicized: 
(a) John is sort of stupid 
(b) I suspect that it is cold outside 
(c) I might be wrong, but Palin is not going to be elected. 
(d) This might not be true, but she doesn’t really care about you. 
(McCready, 2014, p. 39) 
These hedges all soften the assertions. But while (a) and (b) seem to modify the 
assertions rather directly, (c) and (d) seem to work more indirectly: a bold assertion 
is made, but a ‘shield hedge’, or disclaimer, is added (McCready, 2014).  
A wide range of evidential language could, in principle, function as hedges. 
Some languages, for instance, possess closed evidentiality systems. These are 
grammatical categories with restricted membership which convey degrees of 
evidence such as direct evidence from perception, indirect evidence inferred from 
perception, and evidence from hearsay (Matsui & Fitneva, 2009; Simons, 2007). 
Languages such as English possess open systems, which convey evidentiality in less 
routine ways through the lexicon (Matsui & Fitneva, 2009). For example, English 
speakers can signal evidentiality through verbs such as ‘see’, ‘hear’ and ‘feel’ 
(Simons, 2007). Similarly useful for hedging is the expression of speaker certainty, 
for instance, through modal expressions such as ‘possibly’, ‘probably’ and ‘certain’ 
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and propositional attitudes like ‘suspect’, ‘think’ and ‘am/is/are sure’ (Portner, 2009; 
Simons, 2007). 
The experiments reported below investigate whether hedging protects a 
speaker’s reputation, as suggested by McCready (2014). The experiments were 
simple belief-change tasks based on the source reliability task from Collins, Hahn, 
von Gerber, and Olsson (2015, 2017) reported in the previous chapter. Participants 
read an initial description of a source, whose reliability they then rated on a scale 
from 0 (not at all reliable) to 10 (completely reliable). They then read the source 
making a claim, after which they rated the source’s reliability again on the same 
scale. In a between-subjects design, some participants read unmodified claims; some 
read claims modified by a hedge; in Experiments 7.1 to 7.3 a final group read claims 
modified by ‘am certain’. Across the groups, we fixed the sources as reliable, to 
avoid floor effects, and fixed the claims as unexpected, since it is with unexpected 
claims that a downward revision of source reliability occurs.  
Experiments 7.1 to 7.3 included the strong claims, modified with ‘am certain’, 
on the following grounds. There are a wide range of propositional attitudes, 
including weaker ones, such as ‘suspect’, ‘suppose’, ‘think’ and ‘believe’, and 
stronger ones, such as ‘am certain’, ‘am sure’, ‘am convinced’ and ‘know’. It is more 
informative to consider the full range of propositional attitude strength. If people use 
propositional attitudes to calibrate source reliability, then, for consistency, weaker 
propositional attitudes should protect speakers against downward revisions and 
stronger propositional attitudes should increase the size of the downward revisions.  
This chapter reports the results of four experiments. These experiments all 
test the hypothesis that hedging with propositional attitudes protects speakers against 
the downward revision of source reliability. More specifically, they test the 
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hypothesis that, relative to a null condition, hedging should attenuate the downward 
revision of reliability. Where the strong (‘am certain’) condition is included, the 
hypothesis is that this propositional attitude will worsen the downward revision of 
reliability.  
 
7.1 Experiment 7.1 
7.1.1 Methods  
Participants. 160 participants completed web surveys; the data were retained 
for the 159 native English speakers (84 female; average age 37.35) who completed 
the web surveys. This sample size was selected to give high power (.8) for a medium 
effect size. 
Materials. There were five items which took the following form: 
Initial source information: Michael is a clinical nurse specialist. 
Claim: Now imagine that Michael told you the following: ‘One of the best 
remedies for a severe cough is valium.’ 
The item above corresponds to the null condition. In the ‘strong claim’ condition, 
participants read the claim embedded under ‘I am certain that…’ In the ‘weak claim’ 
condition, participants read the claim embedded under the ‘I suspect that’.  
Since the materials in Chapter 6 reliably produced an effect, we adopted 
items from those studies: namely, the reliable sources and the unexpected claims. A 
clinical nurse specialist claimed that valium was one of the best remedies for a 
severe cough. A baker claimed that the varying temperatures of a particular oven 
made it perfect for fluffy and crispy bread. A journalist with a good track record 
predicted that a horse would beat a competitor despite losing to that horse in the 
majority of races. A retired meteorologist claimed that the maximum summer 
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temperature in Stockholm in June 2013 was 15 degrees. And a respected DJ claimed 
that a club in Detroit had the reputation of one of coolest in the world. 
The propositional attitudes ‘am certain’ and ‘suspect’ were chosen after a 
pre-test of 36 propositional attitudes for a separate study, not reported in this thesis. 
In this pre-test, the words were randomly assigned to three separate lists to be rated 
by three corresponding groups of participants (20 per group). Participants read a 
neutral claim, such as ‘Louise has left town’, embedded under a propositional 
attitude.  Their task was to compare the strength of the claim to a fixed reference 
point, namely the claim modified by the non-factive verb ‘think’. The response scale 
range from 0 to 10, where 0 was labelled ‘much weaker’, 5 as ‘the same’ and 10 as 
‘much stronger’. The propositional attitudes ‘am certain’ and ‘suspect’ were chosen 
because they were far apart (M = 9.48 and M = 5.18, respectively); moreover, 
‘suspect’ specifically features in McCready’s (2014) analysis.  
Procedure. The experiments were posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk via 
the intermediary MTurk Data (www.mturkdata.com). We set high qualifications for the 
task:  participants had to be resident in the US and have an overall approval rating of 
99% for 1,000 previously completed tasks. These criteria effectively limited 
participation to native English speakers. On the consent page, participants were told 
that the task would assess how people judge information they receive from other 
people. No information was given about the specific manipulation. After giving 
informed consent, participants were assigned, round-robin, to a condition. They were 
shown the following instructions: 
Thank you for taking part in this study. You’ll be shown some descriptions of 
people, and will be asked to indicate how reliable these people seem, by 
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selecting the appropriate number on a scale from 0 (not at all reliable) to 10 
(completely reliable).  
Participants then saw 5 items, comprising initial source information and then a claim. 
Participants gave a prior rating after the initial source information, and a posterior 
rating after the claim. The order of presentation was counterbalanced. Finally, 
participants were given debriefing information, and were paid $0.75, a fee chosen to 
exceed the US minimum wage for reasonable completion times.  
7.1.2 Results  
First, change scores were calculated by subtracting the prior rating from the 
posterior rating. Change scores were then averaged across items to produce a single 
score per participant59. 
Figure 7.1 shows the descriptive data. These data do not show the expected 
pattern of data. In all conditions, there is downward revision of source reliability and, 
indeed, the ‘suspect’ condition prompts the biggest downward revision of source 
reliability.  
 
                                                
 
59 Note that this design and analysis were chosen for consistency with the previous 
chapter. The same restrictions apply: we must be cautious about generalizing beyond the 
existing items. However, McCready’s (2014) theory should apply to the present items. His 
theory at least requires a major restriction to explain why the present items should be exempt. 
Chapter 6 suggested a more generalized design for exploring source anti-reliability across 
contexts. This design could equally be used to test McCready’s theory.  
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Figure 7.1. Mean change scores by condition; error bars are standard error 
Inferential statistics support this picture. To correct for multiple comparisons, 
the significance level was set at p = .006 (the same applies to Experiments 7.2 and 
7.3). A one-way ANOVA showed no significant effect of propositional attitude, 
F(2,156) = .91, p =.40, partial η2 = .01. One-sample t-tests confirmed that, in each 
condition, there was a significant decrease in ratings of source reliability: in the 
‘certain’ condition, M = -1.46, 95% CI [-1.92, -.99], t(50) = -6.24, p <.001, d = .87; 
in the ‘suspect’ condition, M = -1.80, 95% CI [-2.20, -1.40], t(53) = -8.99, p <.001, d 
=1.22; and in the null condition, M = -1.42, 95% CI [-1.88, -.96], t(53) = -6.23, p 
<.001, d = .85. 
Since there were outliers in each condition, we followed the guidelines of 
Wilcox (2016) and checked the above findings against robust versions of the tests, 
using the WRS2 package (Mair, Schoenbrodt, & Wilcox, 2017). These analyses used 
20% trimmed means. A robust one-way ANOVA (‘t1way’ function) yielded a non-
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significant result of propositional attitude, F(2, 63.43) = 1.88, p = .16, ξ = .19. 60 
Robust one-sample analyses were carried out using the function ‘trimpb’, which 
calculates confidence intervals for trimmed means using a percentile bootstrap 
method. In each condition, these analyses indicated significant decreases in ratings 
of source reliability: in the ‘certain’ condition, Mtrimmed = -1.32, 95% CI [-1.75, -
0.90], p <.001; in the ‘suspect’ condition, Mtrimmed = -1.82, 95% CI [-2.19, -1.41],  p 
< .001; and in the null condition, Mtrimmed = -1.34, 95% CI [-1.82, -0.92], p <.001.  
 
7.1.3 Discussion 
The data above do not support the idea that a key function of hedges is the 
protection reputation (McCready, 2014) as no protective effects were obtained. 
There is no evidence of a reliable difference between conditions, and all claims, 
whether modified by a propositional attitude or not, prompted a significant 
downward revision of source reliability. It is precisely such a downgrade in 
reliability that McCready (2014) suggests hedging protects against. 
7.2 Experiment 7.2 
This experiment attempted to replicate the findings of Experiment 2 while 
ruling out the possibility that participants did not process the hedges themselves to 
sufficient depth. Two changes were made to the design. Firstly, we used a simple 
attentional device, putting the propositional attitudes in capitals. Secondly, we 
informed participants that they may have to perform a memory test on the items. 
                                                
 
60 ξ is a robust explanatory measure of effect size, and can be understood in the same 
way as r (Mair, Schoenbrodt, & Wilcox, 2017). Note that the effect size given, here, is not 
trivial, but the pattern is not as McCready (2014) would predict, with the largest 
antireliability being for ‘suspect’.  
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Participants in the ‘certain’ and ‘suspect’ conditions were, indeed, tested for whether 
they could remember the propositional attitudes used after rating all items.  
7.2.1 Methods  
Participants. 170 participants completed web surveys, the same selection 
criteria having been used. The data were retained for 165 participants (96 female; 
average age 39.93) who passed the manipulation check (see Procedure). As above, 
this sample size gave us high power (.8) to detect a medium-sized effect. 
Materials. The materials were identical to those in Experiment 1, except that 
the propositional attitudes were in capitals.  
Procedure. The procedure was also identical to that of Experiment 1 except 
for the addition of the memory test. Participants were informed about the memory 
test in the instructions, which were otherwise as in Experiment 1. The memory test 
occurred at the end of the experiment, and in a fixed order. Firstly, participants 
performed a recall test, which had the following instructions: 
On the previous pages you’ve seen people making claims. For example, one 
claim was ‘I…..that one of the best remedies for a severe cough is valium’, 
where the ‘…’ stands for a missing word or words. These claims were always 
introduced by the same word or words (in capital letters).  
They were then asked to type the word into a text box, or to type ‘don’t know’ if 
they could not remember. Secondly, participants performed a recognition test. The 
above instructions were repeated (introduced by ‘As you’ve just read’), and this time 
participants had to choose the correct word from a drop-down list. This list included 
the fillers ‘doubt’ and ‘am uncertain’. The order of this list was counterbalanced 
across participants. Finally, participants answered the following sincerity question, 
based on Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, and Musch (2013):  
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‘And, finally, it would be very helpful if you could tell us whether you have 
taken part seriously, or whether you were just clicking through to take a look 
at the survey. Please note, you will still get paid however you answer. Did 
you take part seriously?  
Participants selected their response from a drop-down list with the options ‘Yes – 
Keep my data’ and ‘No – Please throw my data away’.  
7.2.2 Results  
The recognition test was chosen as the minimum threshold for keeping the 
data. Five participants data were rejected for failing to pass the test. The threshold 
was waived in two cases, where participants in the ‘certain’ condition correctly 
recalled ‘am certain’ but then chose ‘suspect’ from the drop-down list. Since recall is 
the harder test, keeping the data is justified; these participants may have taken the 
repeated question to mean that they had made an error, and then selected the closest 
item from the drop-down list.  
The recall test provides a more stringent threshold.  Approximately 76% of 
participants passed the recall test, rising to 84% if we include near synonyms, such 
as ‘know’, ‘am sure’ and ‘guarantee’ for ‘am certain’ and ‘hear’, ‘believe’ and 
‘think’ for ‘suspect. However, removing those participants who only passed the 
recognition test made no difference to the significance of the results. We therefore 
report the analyses on all participants who passed the recognition test.  
As Figure 7.2 shows, the descriptive data suggest a similar pattern to 
Experiment 1, in that all conditions show substantial negative change scores, of 
comparable magnitude to above. Note, though, that ‘suspect’, this time, receives the 
smallest change scores.  
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Figure 7.2. Mean change scores by condition; error bars are standard error 
A one-way ANOVA supports this picture, and replicates the analyses above. 
There was no significant effect of propositional attitude, F(2,162) = .51, p = .60, 
partial η2 = .01. One-sample t-tests confirmed that, in each condition, there was a 
significant decrease in ratings of source reliability: in the ‘certain’ condition, M = -
1.54, 95% CI [-1.95, -1.14],  t(53) = -8.06, p <.001, d = 1.10; in the ‘suspect’ 
condition, M = -1.28, 95% CI [-1.55, -1.01],  t(51) = -9.66, p <.001, d = 1.34; in the 
null condition, M = -1.36, 95% CI [-1.76, -.96], t(58) = -6.53, p <.001, d = .85.  
Since there was an outlier in the null condition, and the suggestion of non-
normality in the residuals, the findings were checked against robust analyses using 
20% means. A robust one-way ANOVA (‘bwtrim’ function) produced a non-
significant effect of propositional attitude, F(2,66) = .38, p =.68, ξ = .09. As above, 
robust one-sample analyses were performed by calculating the 95% confidence 
intervals for the trimmed means. In each condition, these analyses indicated 
significant decreases in ratings of source reliability: in the ‘certain’ condition, 
Mtrimmed = -1.47, 95% CI [-1.92, -1.02], p <.001; in the ‘suspect’ condition, Mtrimmed = 
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-1.23, 95% CI -1.54, -.91],  p < .001; and in the null condition, Mtrimmed = -1.25, 95% 
CI [-1.69, -.84], p <.001.  
7.2.3 Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 even though it drew attention to the 
propositional attitudes, and even for participants who passed the memory test. There 
was, once again, no significant effect of propositional attitude – indeed, the effect 
sizes were smaller in Experiment 2 – and, contrary to the idea of shielding, ratings of 
source reliability dropped significantly in all conditions. These two data sets suggest, 
then, that hedging with propositional attitudes does not protect a speaker’s reputation 
when making unexpected claims.  
7.3 Experiment 7.3  
The data above are suggestive. But they rely on an assumption: that 
participants judged the strength of the propositional attitudes in the same way as the 
participants in the pre-test. It is possible (but perhaps unlikely) that, because of 
variation in dialects, the participants in Experiments 7.1 and 7.2 simply did not 
perceive enough of a difference between ‘am certain’ and ‘suspect’ to refrain from 
downgrading the sources’ reliability. This experiment extends the design of 
Experiment 7.2 by adding a manipulation check in which participants rated the 
strength of claims of the form ‘X happened’, ‘I suspect that X happened’, and ‘I am 
certain that X happened’.  
7.3.1 Methods  
Participants. 161 participants completed web surveys, this number being 
chosen to give high power (.8) to detect a medium-sized effect. The data were 
retained for 151 participants (75 female; average age 37.69) who were native 
speakers of English and passed the manipulation check (see Procedure).  
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Materials. The materials were identical to those in Experiment 7.2. 
Procedure. The procedure was also identical to that of Experiment 7.2 except 
for the addition of a manipulation test after the memory test. For the manipulation 
test, participants were given the following instructions:  
Below there are three statements. ‘X’, in the statements, stands for any event. 
Please rate how strong these statements are on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 
is ‘very weak’ and 10 is ‘very strong’.  
Participants then rated the sentences ‘X happened’, ‘I suspect that X happened’, and 
‘I am certain that X happened’; the order of these sentences was counterbalanced 
across surveys.  
7.3.2 Results 
First, change scores were calculated by subtracting the prior rating from the 
posterior rating. Change scores were then averaged across items to produce a single 
score per participant. Figure 7.3 shows the descriptive data. These data replicate the 
patterns in Experiments 7.1 and 7.2. In all conditions, there is downward revision of 
source reliability. 
  
Figure 7.3. Mean change score by condition; error bars are standard error 
RATIONALITY, PRAGMATICS, AND SOURCES  
 300 
Statistical analysis supported this interpretation. A one-way ANOVA showed 
a non-significant effect of condition, F(2,148) = .03, p = .97, partial η2 =. 0004. One-
sample t-tests showed that there was a significant decrease in perceived reliability 
for the ‘certain’ condition (M = -1.24, 95% CI [-1.63, -.85], t(51) = -6.40, p <.001, d 
= .89), ‘suspect’ condition (M = -1.17, 95% CI [-1.53, -.79], t(46) = -6.64, p <.001, d 
= .97), and the null condition (M = -1.21, 95% CI [-1.62, -.79], t(51) = -5.83, p <.001, 
d = .81). Since there were outliers in each condition, the conventional analyses were 
replicated using robust equivalents based on trimmed means. A robust one-way 
ANOVA showed a non-significant effect of condition, F(2, 58.88) = .04, p = .96, ξ 
= .04. As above, robust one-sample analyses were performed by calculating the 95% 
confidence intervals for the trimmed means. In each condition, these analyses 
indicated significant decreases in ratings of source reliability: in the ‘certain’ 
condition, Mtrimmed = -1.18, 95% CI [-1.53, -.86], p <.001; in the ‘suspect’ condition, 
Mtrimmed = -1.18, 95% CI -1.47, -.87],  p < .001; and in the null condition, Mtrimmed = -
1.11, 95% CI [-1.55, -.74], p <.001.  
Figure 7.4 shows the descriptive data for the manipulation check, which 
suggested that ‘suspect’ was, indeed, rated as considerably weaker than ‘am certain’ 
and an unmodified assertion. There was little difference between ‘am certain’ and 
the unmodified assertion.  
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Figure 7.4. Mean claim strength; error bars are standard error 
A one-way within-subjects ANOVA (with Greenhouse-Geisser correction) 
supported this picture. There was a significant effect of word, F(1.76, 264.27) = 
115.5, p < .001, partial η2 = .44. Pairwise comparisons were performed with the 
Bonferoni adjustment for multiple comparisons. ‘Suspect’ was rated on average 3.13 
(95% CI[2.53, 3.74]) lower than ‘certain’, which difference was significant (p <.001). 
‘Suspect’ was rated on average 2.78 (95% CI [2.20, 3.36]) lower than the 
unmodified assertion, which difference was also significant (p <.001). ‘Am certain’ 
was rated on average .35 (95% CI[-.79, .09]) higher than the unmodified assertion; 
this difference was not significant (p =.16).  These analyses did not require 
confirmation with robust methods.  
7.3.3 Discussion 
Experiment 7.3 replicated the effects of Experiments 7.1 and 7.2 while 
demonstrating that participants were, indeed, sensitive to the difference in strength of 
the hedges. These data are further evidence that hedging with propositional attitudes 
does not protect a source’s reputation when making unexpected claims.  
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7.4 Experiment 7.4: Shield Hedges  
 The preceding three experiments raise doubts about speakers’ ability to 
protect their reputation: even hedged claims produced a decrease in perceived source 
reliability, a finding which is problematic for McCready’s (2014) account. 
Nevertheless, McCready distinguishes between hedging with propositional attitudes 
and shield hedging, that is, hedging with phrases such as ‘I might be wrong, but…’ 
On his account, propositional attitudes directly weaken the propositional content, 
whereas shield hedges do not; they merely frame it. It is worth testing, then, whether 
shield hedges are more effective at protecting reputation, operationally defined as 
source reliability.  
7.4.1 Methods 
Participants. 128 participants completed web surveys, the same selection 
criteria having been used. The data were retained for 124 participants (71 female, 1 
non-binary; average age 38.36) who passed the manipulation check and a sincerity 
question (see Procedure). As above, this sample size gave us high power (.8) to 
detect a medium-sized effect. 
Materials. The materials used the same claims as in the previous experiments. 
In this experiment, there were two conditions: a shield-hedged condition, in which 
claims were preceded by ‘I might be wrong, but…’; and a null condition, in which 
claims were presented as unhedged assertions.  
Procedure. The procedure was also identical to that of Experiment 7.3 except 
for a modification to the memory test. Since the hedge phrase was more complex, 
only the recognition task was used. All participants passed this test.  
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7.4.2 Results  
Figure 7.5 reports the descriptive data by condition. There is no evidence that 
hedging protected sources’ reputations. Indeed, reliability ratings are lower in the 
hedged than in the unhedged condition.  
  
Figure 7.5. Mean change scores by condition; error bars are standard error 
To correct for multiple comparisons, inferential tests used the significance 
level p =.008. A between-subjects t-test (equal variances assumed) showed a non-
significant difference between the conditions, M = -.23, 95% CI [-.67, .21], t(123) = 
-1.04, p =.30, d =.18. One-sample t-tests confirmed that the hedged condition (M = -
1.04, 95% CI [-1.30, -.77], t(66) = -7.89, p <.001, d = .96) and unhedged condition 
(M = -.81, 95% CI [-1.17, -.44], t(57) = -4.43, p <.001, d = .58) both showed 
significant decreases in perceived reliability. The presence of outliers justified the 
use of supporting robust analyses. A robust between-subjects t-test showed a non-
significant difference in 20% trimmed means, t(65,96) = 1.15, p = .26, ξ = .15. 
Robust equivalents of one-sample t-tests were performed by estimating the 95% CI 
intervals on the trimmed means using the percentile bootstrap method. The hedged 
condition showed a significant decrease in source reliability, Mtrimmed = -1.01, 95% 
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CI [-1.31, -.72], p <.001, as did the unhedged condition, Mtrimmed = -.73, 95% CI [-
1.12, -.36], p <.001.  
Figure 7.6 shows the descriptive data for the manipulation check. The ratings 
for ‘I might be wrong, but’ are comparable to those of ‘suspect’ and substantially 
lower than the unhedged control.  
  
Figure 7.6. Mean claim strength (manipulation check); error bars are standard error 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction) showed a significant effect of word, F(2.18, 270.03) =  109.33, p <.001, 
partial η2= .47. Pairwise comparisons were performed with a Bonferroni correction 
for multiple comparisons. ‘Certain’ was rated on average 2.83 higher than ‘suspect’ 
(p <.001); only .08 higher than the unhedged claim (p =1); and 3.14 higher than ‘I 
might have been wrong, but…’ (p < .001). The unhedged claim was rated on average 
2.75 higher than ‘suspect’ (p <.001) and 3.06 higher than ‘I might have been wrong, 
but’ (p <.001). ‘Suspect’ was rated on average .31 higher than ‘I might be wrong (p 
= .55). These analyses did not require confirmation with robust methods.   
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7.4.3 Discussion  
The data above offered no evidence for a protective effect of shield hedging; 
in both conditions, there was a significant decrease in perceived reliability. This 
finding adds further evidence against McCready’s (2014) account and, given the 
theoretical centrality of shield hedging, is still more problematic.  
 
7.5 General Discussion  
We receive much of our information about the world through the testimony 
of other people. We do not seem to accept such information uncritically; rather, we 
are vigilant to the reliability of the source and the content of the messages we receive. 
There is a tension between this vigilance and the trust putatively required for 
cooperative communication (McCready, 2014). How can we make assertions, 
lacking full justification, without fatally undermining our reputations and, 
consequently, trust? This chapter has explored one plausible way in which this 
tension can be resolved: hedging, with propositional attitudes or shield hedges.  
McCready (2014) suggests that speakers are careful to manage their 
reputations, especially in repeated interactions, and that hedging provides an 
important strategy for so doing. Although this account is intuitively appealing, and 
forms part of an impressive theory of communication, the present data suggest that 
hedging is not enough for reputation management. Possibly, other types of hedging 
might be more effective, but it is hard to imagine a design which would make 
hedging much more prominent than above. Future work should nevertheless examine 
this possibility. Such work should also examine whether hedging might work in 
contexts where the choice of hedge is clearly contrastive. In Experiment 7.2, 
participants were specifically alerted to the propositional attitudes, but had nothing 
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to compare the particular propositional attitude to. Hedging may, in fact, rely on 
pragmatic inference. Take, for instance, the following:  
Bob: Looks like it’ll rain tomorrow.  
Sandy: Are you sure? 
Bob: Well, I suspect it will.  
In this context, Bob may be taken to be implicating that he is not sure: that he only 
has sufficient confidence to use ‘suspect’ (Horn, 1989; Levinson, 2000; Van Der 
Auwera, 1996; Verstraete, 2005). But if hedging works only in a context where there 
is a clear pragmatic component, it presumably plays less of a role in justifying and 
maintaining cooperation, since pragmatics is typically taken to be the result of 
cooperation, not a precondition for it.  
There are at least two ways to explore whether hedging relies on pragmatics. 
One is to develop materials such as the example dialogue above, where a demand for 
certainty is met with a hedged claim. Another is to switch to oral presentation. It 
seems intuitively likely that speakers can hedge more successfully by using 
contrastive stress on the hedge, such as ‘I SUSPECT that Valium is one of the best 
remedies for a severe cough’. Contrastive stress draws attention to a set of 
alternatives - here, alternatives to the verb ‘suspect’ – and may thereby prompt a 
modal scalar implicature to ‘not certain’. Since it is natural to read capitalised text 
with contrastive stress, participants may have generated their own contrastive stress 
in Experiments 7.2 and 7.3, which used capitalisation as an attentional cue. 
Contrastive stress is not, however, obligatory with visual presentation; only oral 
presentation would make this stress pattern unambiguous.  
Other aspects of the design might also have contributed to the lack of an 
effect: in particular, how the design operationalized unexpectedness and reliability. 
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The unexpected claims could simply have been too unexpected to be blocked; with 
more moderate claims, hedging could have been more successful. While this point 
argues for replication with new materials, the unexpected claims were not wildly 
implausible. They were implausible but could, nevertheless, have proved true, as 
previous data show. The most appropriate comparison is with the corresponding 
condition in Experiment 6.2. There, the prior mean for unexpected claims was 4.29 
on a scale from 0 to 10. Turning to reliability, the dependent measure was worded as 
‘How reliable do you find [source]?’ This wording is rather abstract; more specific 
wordings could be used, asking people about trust, likability, and so on. While 
decomposing reliability in this way might uncover an effect, McCready’s (2014) 
account does not make predictions on this level. Neither design feature, then, seems 
to seriously compromise the results.  
The data above may seem surprising in light of findings in other areas. The 
first of these is research into verbal probability expressions: modal adjectives, such 
as ‘impossible’, ‘possibly’, ‘likely’ and ‘certain’. Such terms feature in standardized 
lexicons expressing risks around climate change (Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 2009). 
One feature of verbal probability expressions is that they have directionality 
independently of their associated probability. That is, some words suggest event 
occurrence, while others suggest non-occurrence. For example, although ‘some 
possibility’ and ‘quite uncertain’ are given similar numerical interpretations, 
significantly more participants prefer an operation described as having ‘some 
possibility’ of success to one whose success is ‘quite uncertain’ (Teigen & Brun, 
1999). Thanks to their directionality, verbal probability expressions have subtle 
effects on reputation. Teigen (1988) presented participants with predictions couched 
in verbal probability expressions with different directionality: one expert predicted a 
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rise in crude oil prices by saying ‘It is possible that oil prices will reach $20 in 
October’, another by saying ‘It is not quite certain that oil prices will reach $20 in 
October’. Participants were then told that oil reached $20. Even though participants 
thought the first expert had a lower probability in mind, they decided that he was 
more right than the second expert (for discussion, see Teigen & Brun, 1999).  
The question naturally arises of whether directionality is essential to hedging. 
If so, then McCready’s (2014) account may be correct in spirit but wrong in detail: 
that is, hedging may be a crucial mechanism, but only hedging with propositional 
attitudes which have negative directionality. Certainly, the present studies used 
propositional attitudes with positive directionality. One test for directionality is to 
think of (or ask participants for) continuations: so, for example, to complete the 
sentence ‘It’s possible that X because…’, we would add a reason for occurrence; but 
to complete the sentence ‘I’m not completely certain that X because….’, we would 
add a reason for non-occurrence. Both ‘suspect’ and ‘am certain’ suggest occurrence. 
The shield hedge is more complicated: the sentence ‘I might be wrong, because…’ 
invites reasons for wrongness, but the phrase ‘I might be wrong, but…’ seems to 
override this directionality. Future work could manipulate directionality in hedging 
with propositional attitudes. However, if such hedging is to play a role in justifying 
cooperation, an account would also need to show that directionality is a semantic, 
rather than pragmatic, phenomenon. As we have already seen, it is circular reasoning 
to say that pragmatic inference is a precondition for pragmatics.  
At first blush, there is also tension with a second area of existing research: 
work on plausible deniability and indirect speech (J. J. Lee & Pinker, 2010; Pinker, 
Nowak, & Lee, 2008). According to this research, a strategic speaker can choose to 
make indirect speech acts when it is unclear whether a context is one of cooperation 
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or conflict. In particular, a strategic speaker can enable a cooperative hearer to act 
favourably and prevent an uncooperative hearer from acting antagonistically. 
Imagine, for example, a motorist stopped by a police officer and given a ticket. The 
motorist wishes to avoid a ticket by offering a bribe. A bribe would be accepted by a 
dishonest police officer, but would lead to arrest by an honest police officer. One 
option is to offer a bribe through an indirect speech act, such as ‘Gee, officer, is there 
some way we could take care of the ticket here?’ (Lee & Pinker, 2010; Pinker, 
Nowak, & Lee, 2008). This utterance would allow a dishonest officer to recognize 
and accept the bribe, but prevents an honest officer from having clear evidence for 
an arrest. There is experimental evidence that indirectness is sensitive to such pay-
off structures (Lee & Pinker, 2010).  
There is reason, however, to doubt that this tension is real. Plausible 
deniability may indeed be a significant motivator of indirect speech, but its effects 
do not depend on reputation management. Take the case of the motorist above, who 
uses an indirect speech act to offer a bribe. While the motorist may well have done 
enough to avoid being arrested, s/he is likely to suffer reputational damage. Indeed, 
such manoeuvring can be transparent and can itself cause reputational damage 
without undermining its ultimate strategic objective.  
As we have seen, evidential language might yet allow reputation 
management but through a pragmatic mechanism: direct comparison with a set of 
alternative expressions, giving rise to a scalar implicature. But how might evidential 
language be interpreted without this kind of comparison or, indeed, if the proposed 
pragmatic mechanism does not exist? We can again draw a comparison with verbal 
probability expressions. Verbal probability expressions have uses beyond expressing 
probabilities. Bonnefon and Villejoubert (2006) showed that verbal probability 
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expressions can be used to convey bad news tactfully. They had participants read the 
sentence, ‘The doctor tells you, you will possibly suffer from insomnia [deafness] 
soon’ and elicited membership functions from participants.61 Participants understood 
‘possibly’ as indicating higher probabilities with deafness than insomnia. Moreover, 
some 60% of participants indicated that the doctor was being tactful not uncertain. 
Bonnefon and Villejoubert argue that apparent severity biases can result from 
participants perceiving an utterance as a face-threatening act: that is, as an act that 
threatens someone’s desire for autonomy (their negative face) or their desire for 
connection with others (their positive face) (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Holtgraves, 
2002). On Bonnefon and Villejoubert’s account, verbal probability expressions can 
serve as face-management devices: they allow a speaker to acknowledge, and lessen 
the impact of, a face-threatening act.  
This politeness account can be extended to the present data. Participants may 
have understood at least some of the claims as advice: most plausibly, advice to use 
valium, buy an oven, bet on a horse, or attend a nightclub. Participants might take 
this advice to threaten their negative face: advice is not far removed from requests, 
offers, compliments, and so on, which are typically taken to threaten negative face 
(for discussion, see Holtgraves, 2002). For this suggestion to have traction, though, it 
needs empirical support. The simplest method would be a straightforward survey, in 
the manner of Bonnefon and Villejoubert (2006), asking participants why the 
speaker used the propositional attitudes in question. Although a polite source could 
                                                
 
61 In membership-function studies, participants see a number line representing the 
probability range [0,1]. The line picks out numbers at even intervals across the range, 
different studies selecting different intervals. Participants are asked to rate how well each 
number corresponds to a verbal probability expression. These data allow a membership 
function to be calculated which can be interpreted as representing the meaning of the 
expression.  
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seem cooperative, helpful, and so on – hence, in some sense, reliable - they may 
nevertheless not appear reliable in the sense of being a source of true information.  It 
could be instructive, therefore, to manipulate the social setting and, with it, the 
plausibility of face-management strategies.   
7.5.1 Conclusions 
The discussion above is not promising for McCready’s (2014) account of 
hedging: two principal methods do not block downward revisions of source 
reliability. What impact do these findings have for pragmatic theory? Three 
possibilities present themselves. Firstly, reliability is truly a precondition for 
extended cooperation and pragmatics. In this case, when sources make unexpected 
claims and become increasingly unreliable, hearers should be less inclined to 
cooperate and draw pragmatic inferences. If sources wish to manage their reputation, 
they may have to take more drastic measures, such as presenting only messages they 
think their audience will expect, or doing substantial groundwork to change the 
audience’s expectations, for instance, through extensive argumentation. Secondly, 
reliability is, indeed, a precondition for extended cooperation and pragmatics, but 
hearers are epistemically vigilant only some of the time. Unless hearers are given 
cause for concern, they may simply accept the information they receive. Thirdly, 
reliability is not a precondition for extended cooperation and pragmatics. Hearers 
may well need to adopt an initial stance of trust. But even when they come to judge a 
source highly unreliable, they commit the effort to understand the source’s claims, 
withholding only their acceptance.  
Each option above is plausible. It will take a larger research project to decide 
between the possibilities. Such a project would need to engage with contexts where 
pragmatics might proceed without trust and cooperation, such as legal cases or 
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personal conflicts (J. Goodwin, 2001). For present purposes, though, the data and 
discussion serve to underline the close relationship between pragmatics and 
testimony, hence between pragmatics, sources and rationality.  
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8 General Discussion 
This thesis has introduced a triangular scheme for the relationship between 
rationality, pragmatics, and sources. Throughout, it has argued for close connections 
between the components, and suggested that the study of any one component 
benefits from considering the others too. This chapter will recapitulate the main 
findings, will interpret them further, and will develop a more detailed account of the 
relationship between the components. In so doing, it will return to themes from 
Chapter 1, in particular to argumentation, which will serve as a test case for 
understanding the relationship between rationality and pragmatics.  
8.1 The Experimental Data Recapitulated 
8.1.1 Conditionals and Testimony 
A large section of this thesis has looked at how we change our belief when 
we encounter a testimonial conditional: that is, a conditional uttered by a source of 
partial reliability. Testimonial conditionals show the close relationship between all 
three components; previous chapters have highlighted the link between pragmatics 
and sources, since the experiments focus on the role of source information in simple 
pragmatic contexts.  
Chapters 2 to 4 reported a series of experiments focusing on belief change 
from the assertion of a conditional by single or multiple sources and by sources that 
were low or high in expertise. The data offered new insight into belief change from 
conditionals. Chapter 2 reported a set of experiments in which participants 
responded using point values. These data suggested that belief change is localized to 
the conditional probability. Chapter 3 reported experiments which replicated these 
effects, allowing participants to respond with intervals. These data suggested 
localized belief change in the form of an increase in the conditional probability and a 
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narrowing of the intervals. Throughout, the studies showed a diminishing return of 
multiple sources, which is to say that there were significant increases from null to 
single conditions but not from single to multiple conditions. Chapter 4 explored this 
issue further, and found suggestive – but qualified – evidence that multiple 
independent assertions were enough to cause a significant increase. A more robust 
finding in Chapter 4 was that prior belief mattered: experiments showed that the 
probability of the antecedent increased when its prior probability was low, and 
decreased somewhat or stayed flat if it was high; the same pattern was found for the 
probability of the consequent.  
The data above have broad relevance for theories of the meaning of the 
conditional and, consequently, for theories of conditional reasoning. The data 
concern, that is, the interpretation of the premises in conditional reasoning tasks. The 
data are not straightforwardly accommodated by any individual theory. Chapters 2 
and 3 suggested that belief in the antecedent did not change; Chapter 4 suggested 
that such belief could indeed shift, depending on the prior probability. But both of 
these points contradict the material-conditional and Kullback-Leibler theories of the 
conditional, according to which, on learning a conditional, the probability of the 
antecedent should always decrease. The data are weakly consistent with the 
suppositional theory of the conditional. The theory takes assertion to imply that the 
conditional probability is high, and can readily be extended to allow the conditional 
probability to be sensitive to source reliability (Stevenson & Over, 2001). However, 
the theory makes no predictions about the probability of the antecedent or the 
probability of the consequent. One way to extend the theory is to use Bayesian belief 
networks, graphical models which capture probabilistic relationships among random 
variables. These networks can be construed as representing the meaning of the 
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conditional: the meaning is the potential for belief change across the network. These 
networks can recreate the experimental data to some extent, but the relevant patterns 
depend on conditions which are not obviously met and whose realism is questionable. 
Chapter 4 tentatively suggested a pragmatic account, and argued for further, more 
psycholinguistic studies to ascertain what is semantic and what is pragmatic.  
The data in Chapters 2 to 4 are a step towards developing normative 
testimonial models for conditionals. The empirical data from pragmatic contexts can 
help to constrain such models. For developing normative accounts, one problem has 
been a lack of consensus on the meaning of the conditional. Meaning has been 
approached obliquely by the present studies, which have considered the beliefs that a 
hearer is prepared to revise. More data is, of course, necessary. But, knowing about 
these beliefs, we can consider whether it is rational to revise them and, if so, in 
which direction.  
8.1.2 Utility Conditionals 
Chapter 5 also studied conditionals, but this time from the point of goal 
framing. Its findings bear on the link between pragmatics and rationality. The 
experiments in Chapter 5 treated goal frames as arguments from consequences; their 
strength was taken to depend on the utilities and the probabilities. Experiments tested 
the role of utilities. The data supported such a role, though in an unanticipated way. 
Experiment 5.1 showed that, contrary to initial predictions, the positive frame was 
more persuasive, and this resulted in part from an unexpected assignment of utilities. 
Many participants assigned positive utilities to the negated actions (‘taking mildly 
unpleasant medicine’ or ‘undergoing painful surgery’); with this utility assignment, 
the negative frames are ineffective arguments, because the positive utility of the 
antecedent balances out the negative utility of the consequent. Experiment 5.2 
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replicated these data with different ways of measuring convincingness and utility. 
There was further evidence that negated unpleasant actions were assigned positive 
utility. Negated positive consequents were, conversely, assigned disutility. 
Experiment 5.3 addressed the ambiguity in the negated consequents: that a risk not 
decreasing could mean either the risk increasing or not changing. The experiment 
compared the rewordings ‘the risk will increase’, ‘the risk will stay the same’, and 
‘the risk will not change.’ The data suggested that participants understood ‘not 
decreasing’ to mean increasing, further casting doubt on the general convincingness 
of negative frames.  
 Chapter 5 offered various arguments for the closeness of pragmatics and 
rationality, both explicit and implicit. Firstly, the chapter stressed the closeness of 
speech-act theory and persuasion; persuasion fits neatly into the category of 
perlocutionary effects, an issue we will return to below. Secondly, the chapter 
showed that utilities are crucial to theories of both pragmatics and argumentation. 
Thirdly, the chapter derived initial predictions from the theory of utility conditionals, 
which applies to both pragmatics and argumentation. Fourthly, and most 
substantively, the data were interpreted as showing a complex interaction between 
pragmatics and utilities. The crucial phenomenon was negation. Negation targeted 
the action (antecedent) or consequence (consequent), but also placed focus on the 
fact that expectations had been violated: it was in some way expected that the hearer 
should take the action. A subtler explanation applies to the consequence: in the 
experiments, no clear expectations arose for the ‘not change’ wording; hence, the 
utility was not reliably different from ‘stay the same’. This negation-and-
expectations account makes sense of the utility assignments. However, the 
explanation does not sit well with existing studies which suggest that utilities are 
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used to generate pragmatic inferences, not vice versa. Chapter 5 suggested a 
complex process whereby basic pragmatic processes prompt utility assignments, 
reasoning on which generates subsequent pragmatic inferences.  
8.1.3 Testimony and Source Reliability  
Chapter 6 explored how people respond to information from partially reliable 
sources. As such, it focused on the link between sources and rationality.  The chapter 
found evidence for epistemic vigilance: people were sensitive to both the content of 
claims and the reliability of the source. These types of information also interacted: 
expected claims increased reliability, and unexpected claims decreased it; reliable 
sources increased belief, and unreliable sources decreased it. This last effect was the 
most striking: sources could be anti-reliable. This epistemic vigilance is intuitively 
appealing. The data also bear on the relationship between sources and pragmatics, by 
emphasizing the difference between comprehension and acceptance, and by raising 
questions about how such vigilance impacts on extended cooperation and pragmatics, 
if pragmatics requires trust to proceed.  
8.1.4 Evidential Language  
Finally, Chapter 7 explored this tension between epistemic vigilance and 
pragmatics. The experiments explored McCready’s (2014) theory that speakers 
manage their reputations with hedging, so that they can preserve the cooperation 
necessary for pragmatics. The experiments found no evidence that hedging with 
propositional attitudes or with shield hedging provided any protection for sources 
making unexpected claims. Sources making such claims suffered robust decreases in 
their source reliability. These data cast doubt on a role for hedging in justifying 
pragmatic inferences. Chapter 7 discussed various possibilities: that speakers use 
more dramatic means to protect their reputations, such as avoiding making 
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unexpected claims; that hearers are only sometimes epistemically vigilant; and that 
pragmatics does not, in fact, rely on trust and cooperation.  
Having summarized the experimental data, we can turn to common themes 
across the studies, and to a deeper analysis of the links between rationality, 
pragmatics, and sources.  
8.2 Redefining the relationships 
In the course of this thesis, we have considered how to define 
communication62, and how the definition may help to understand the relationships 
among the triangular scheme of pragmatics, rationality and sources. This definition 
serves as a springboard for the discussion below. Let us return, then, to the definition 
of communication from Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995):  
Informative Intention: to inform the audience of something.  
Communicative Intention: to inform the audience of one’s informative 
intention.  
To recapitulate the discussion in Chapter 6, communication occurs if either intention 
is fulfilled. Communication occurs if only the informative intention is fulfilled, 
through presentation of direct evidence. For instance, the speaker can point to a state 
of the world or provide a logical argument; the audience can, in principle, change 
their belief in the intended way without recognizing the intention. Communication 
also occurs if only the communicative intention is fulfilled, through the clear 
signalling of an informative intention which is recognized by the audience but not 
                                                
 
62 Since, on this definition, communication is fundamentally pragmatic, I slip, in this 
section, between talking about communication and talking about pragmatics. Treating 
communication in this way is not wholly unproblematic. It seems to follow, for instance, 
that pragmatically naïve young children – or those with pragmatic dysfunction – are not 
capable of genuine communication. I set aside this topic here. For discussion, and a possible 
solution, see Breheny (2006).    
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fulfilled. For instance, an audience understands an obvious lie but does not believe it. 
Finally, communication occurs if both intentions are fulfilled: in this case, the 
audience recognizes the speaker’s intention and also changes their belief in the 
intended way.  
With this definition, it becomes clearer why communication and more 
traditional rational behaviour are so closely related. We can see this most clearly 
with two examples: the relationships between communication and testimony and 
between communication and argumentation. Take, first, the relationship between 
communication and testimony. If only the informative intention is fulfilled, then 
communication occurs but of a type that does not fit the definition of testimony. As 
long as the communicative intention is fulfilled, then there is testimony; and if both 
intentions are fulfilled then there is successful testimony. Successful testimony is 
pragmatics (communication) with epistemic authority (for discussion, see Sperber et 
al., 2010). To put matters differently, there is a distinction between comprehending 
(fulfilling only the communicative intention) and accepting (fulfilling both 
intentions). At least in principle, the two diverge and it is possible to treat testimony 
critically. 
How does this distinction between comprehension and acceptance map onto 
the empirical data in this thesis? There is indirect evidence of this distinction in 
Chapters 2 to 4: ratings were significantly lower for inexpert than expert sources, 
and were not at ceiling for expert sources. In other words, there was presumably a 
gap between comprehension and belief. More direct evidence would result from 
adapting the paradigm to ask about the speaker’s beliefs or their intended meaning, 
that is, what the speaker wanted the hearer to believe. But there is more direct 
evidence of the distinction in Chapter 6, where participants clearly understood 
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claims without accepting them; indeed, they understood claims, and revised their 
belief away from the claimed state of affairs. The evidence – both indirect and direct 
– suggests critical faculties which are distinct from pragmatics.  
At first blush, this apparent scepticism does not sit well with other data on 
belief fixation. This tension needs resolving. As we have seen throughout this thesis, 
experimental work suggests that people conform to a Spinozan model of belief 
fixation: when a hearer entertains a proposition, by default they passively accept it; 
they can then optionally either actively endorse or actively reject the proposition (D. 
T. Gilbert et al., 1990, 1993; Mandelbaum, 2014). That is, it takes extra work to 
assess a proposition critically; doing so is optional and the process is prone to 
disruption. Supporting evidence comes from Gilbert and et al.’s (1990, 1993) 
experiments in which cognitive load caused false information to be misremembered 
as true. Other evidence comes from belief-perseverance tasks and response biases in 
personality questionnaires (Mandelbaum, 2014). There are, yet, defenders of more 
objective belief fixation (Hasson et al., 2005), and it is clearly possible for people to 
treat claims sceptically (see, for example, Chapters 2 to 4 and 6). However, the 
possibility arises that, in early processing, comprehension and acceptance are one 
and the same, and that acceptance simply collapses into comprehension. More data is 
needed to explore this possibility for the data in Chapters 2 to 4 and 6, as there are 
clear implications for processing measures: for instance, sceptical responses should 
take longer, and should be less likely under cognitive load.  
The definition above also offers insight into the relationship between 
pragmatics and argumentation. Communication, as we have seen, can be successful 
if only the informative intention is fulfilled, by providing direct evidence that 
something is the case. For example, someone could show an audience a photograph 
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of a particular person attending a party and thereby inform the audience of the fact. 
But, for present purposes, a more interesting case is an argument: a speaker can lay 
out an argument to inform a hearer of a proposition, the conclusion. The hearer can 
accept the proposition without recognizing the communicative intention behind it. Of 
course, the hearer might also recognize this communicative intention but need not. In 
many cases, it might prove practically impossible to show whether a proposition is 
accepted because of the argument or because of the communicative intention.  
This definition of communication allows us to understand the relationship 
between pragmatics and rationality somewhat better. But still greater understanding 
will come from a deeper of analysis of pragmatics and of a behaviour which seems 
uncontroversially about rationality: namely argumentation.  
8.2.1 Pragmatic intrusion into argumentation  
The study of argumentation shows intimate connections with pragmatics. The 
connection can be seen pre-theoretically in the following example conversation from 
Collins and Hahn (2016), patterned after the analyses in Clark (2013): 
A: John looks grumpy. 
B: He hasn't had breakfast, so he is starving. 
(3) [John] hasn't had breakfast, so [John] is starving. 
(4) [John] hasn't had breakfast [today], so [John] is starving. 
(5) [John] hasn't had breakfast [today], so [John] is [very hungry]. 
(6) [B believes that][John] hasn't had breakfast [today], so [John] is [very 
hungry].  
(7) [B believes that John looks grumpy because (or so B believes)[John] 
hasn't had breakfast [today], so [John] is [very hungry].  
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This apparently simple conversation is underpinned by a series of inferences to an 
implicature, sentence (7). Something like these inferences presumably occurs in a 
hearer’s head when understanding implicatures. These inferences look much like a 
rational argument.   
The connection between pragmatics and argumentation has been 
acknowledged for some time in argumentation theory. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
argumentation theory took a social turn, starting with the work of Toulmin (1958), 
such that argumentation research came to focus on how people use propositions to 
achieve a goal. This social turn paralleled the turn, in philosophy of language, 
towards the use of language, which gave birth to natural-language pragmatics. In 
argumentation theory, the social turn comprised, in large part, acknowledging that 
argumentation takes place in dialogues. More recent argumentation theory has 
fleshed out the different types of dialogue and their different goals. Table 8.1 shows 
one possible taxonomy of dialogues.  
Table 8.1. Dialogue types according to Walton (2008, p. 8) 
Type of dialogue Initial situation Participant’s goal Goal of dialogue 
Persuasion Conflict of 
opinions 
Persuade other 
party 
Resolve/clarify 
issue 
Inquiry Need for proof Find, verify 
evidence 
Prove (disprove) 
hypothesis 
Negotiation Conflict of 
interests 
Get what you most 
want 
Reasonable 
settlement for both 
Information-
seeking 
Need information Acquire/give new 
information 
Exchange 
information 
Deliberation Dilemma/practical 
choice 
Coordinate goals 
and actions 
Decide best 
available action 
Eristic Personal conflict Verbally hit out at 
opponent 
Reveal deeper 
basis of conflict 
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In an argument, the first challenge, then, is to determine the type of dialogue. This is 
a non-trivial task, relying on various pragmatic and otherwise mentalistic resources. 
The task is not adequately explained in the argumentation literature, although 
dialogue types bear at least a superficial resemblance to scripts or event schemas 
(Groome, 2013; Schank & Abelson, 1977), suggesting an avenue for future research. 
However the task is achieved, identifying the dialogue type is a crucial step for a 
normative analysis: a key standard is the relevance of an argument to its dialogical 
goals; and many errors stem from mistaking the type of dialogue or switching 
between types (Walton, 2008).  
Argumentation theory places considerable emphasis on norms. These norms 
often have a decidedly pragmatic flavour. Take Walton’s (2008) proposals. On his 
account, there are norms for the types of speech act allowed; norms for appropriate 
turn taking in the dialogue; norms for the links between speech acts and 
commitments in the argument; and norms for determining, where appropriate, who 
has won or lost and how the argument should end. Walton also emphasizes 
overarching rules. Participants in arguments must be relevant. They must also be 
cooperative, answering questions, making and accepting commitments that follow 
from their stated positions, and fairly characterizing their opponent’s position. And 
they must provide just enough information to convince, and avoid giving redundant 
information. Strikingly, this paragraph would be perfectly coherent if the word 
‘argument’ were replaced with ‘conversation’ (excepting wins and losses).  
The connection between pragmatics and argumentation is even more explicit 
in the pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation. Here, argumentation is presented 
as ‘normative pragmatics’ (Eemeren & Garssen, 2013). One way of understanding 
this term is that studying arguments is a lot like studying pragmatics. To interpret an 
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argument, a researcher must select only the information relevant to the argument; 
must make explicit any necessary implicit information (e.g. unexpressed premises); 
must re-order the information in a logical form; and must represent the argument in a 
uniform notation (Eemeren & Garssen, 2013). In pragmatics, researchers do not 
typically delete information, but they follow the remaining steps: witness, for 
example, the analysis of the conversation above.  
Although these similarities are suggestive, a more substantive case lies in the 
pragma-dialectic account of argumentation itself (see, e.g., Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
1992, 1995, 2004). Pragma-dialectics is closely related to Walton’s (2008) 
framework, but emphasizes the pragmatic nature of argumentation still further. Like 
Walton, pragma-dialecticians take argumentation to be goal-based: the acceptability 
of an argument is determined by its capacity to achieve its goal. Again like Walton, 
pragma-dialecticians take argument to be an interaction between at least two 
individuals, and to be about resolving differences of opinion between these 
individuals. But on one point they are more explicit: argumentation is a complex 
speech act (see, e.g., Eemeren & Garssen, 2013). This speech-act account requires an 
extension to standard speech-act theory. The standard theory allows for five types of 
speech act: directives, which are attempts to get a hearer to perform an action (e.g. 
requests); assertives, which commit the speaker to the truth of a proposition (e.g. 
assertions); commissives, which commit the speaker to an action (e.g. promises); 
declaratives, which are attempts to change the state of the world through some 
institutional power (e.g. performing a marriage); and expressives, which express a 
psychological state (e.g. thanking or complaining) (Holtgraves, 2002; Searle, 1969). 
An argumentative speech-act theory has to allow speech acts to have dual roles: the 
standard roles above and their role in the ‘higher textual level’, which is to say their 
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role in the argument (Eemeren & Garssen, 2013). An assertive, for instance, lets the 
speaker express their standpoints in the argument; a declarative allows the speaker to 
challenge someone to defend their argument; and a commissive allows the speaker to 
accept or reject a proposed standpoint or argument (Eeemeren & Garssen, 2013).  
Pragma-dialectics echoes Walton’s (2008) approach to norms, but provides a 
more extensive account. The theory integrates pragmatic principles into 
argumentation: in Gricean style, arguers are required to be clear, honest, efficient, 
and to the point (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). But pragma-dialectics offers 
additional norms. For instance,  
Rule 1 (Freedom Rule): Discussants may not prevent each other from 
advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question.  
Rule 2 (Burden of Proof Rule): Discussants who advance a standpoint may 
not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so.  
(Eemeren et al., 2009, pp. 21–22)  
These additional norms are largely procedural: that is, they regulate behaviour 
without engaging with the actual content of an argument. The norms can account for 
some informal fallacies. For instance, Rule 1 prevents threats of force (argumentum 
ad baculum), appeals to compassion (argumentum ad misericordiam) or personal 
attack (argumentum ad hominem) (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1995). Pragma-
dialectic rules are ‘not metaphysically based, but rest on their suitability for doing 
the job for which they are designed’ (Eemeren & Garssen, 2013, p. 518). In other 
words, rules are valid because they work: in general, they help to resolve disputes. 
This is a somewhat weaker rational justification than is often seen in the psychology 
of rationality.  
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Pragma-dialectics has one final component which illustrates the pragmatic – 
or, at least, mentalistic – character of argumentation: strategic manoeuvring. On this 
view, arguers maintain a delicate balance between the reasonableness and 
effectiveness of an argument. Arguers can strategically select topics, adapt their 
arguments to their audience, and adjust their presentation of the argument to 
minimize the ‘disagreement space’ (Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999). This 
manoeuvring allows arguers to smuggle into a particular argument moves which are 
generally unreasonable. For instance, arguers can disguise an ad hominem argument 
so that it appears considerably more reasonable (Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 
2012). Construed broadly, strategic manoeuvring corresponds to presentational 
devices shown to be effective in argumentation, such as explicit marking of 
conclusions, identifying sources, and use of figurative language (O’Keefe, 2012).   
The discussion above shows considerable pragmatic intrusion into 
argumentation theory. The theories in question, however, arguably provide only a 
shallow normative account, a shallowness which could – but, in practice, does not - 
limit the pragmatic intrusion into rationality. The main challenge to these theories is 
that their norms do not have a deep philosophical basis. They contrast starkly with, 
say, the norms of logic or probability theory. If the theories do not engage with the 
actual content of an argument, they also encounter substantial problems. We can 
readily imagine two arguers who follow procedural rules to the letter: in such a case, 
there may be no clear way to decide which argument is better (Hahn & Hornikx, 
2016). It is preferable for a theory of argumentation to deal with the content, as well 
as the procedure, of an argument. But, as the following section will show, there are 
links between such content-based theories and pragmatics. These links are illustrated, 
below, by considering the influence of content-based norms on pragmatic reasoning. 
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8.2.2 Argument in pragmatics  
Pragmatic theories have made concrete suggestions about cognitive 
mechanisms underpinning pragmatics, be they refinements or replacements of 
Gricean maxims (Horn, 1984, 1989, 2004; Levinson, 2000; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). 
Arguably, though, ‘the crucial step between what is said and what is meant has never 
been described’ (Macagno & Walton, 2013, p. 204). To put the point more 
moderately, pragmatic theories have tended to stop short of mentioning specific 
argument forms, preferring abstract statements about reasoning being defeasible (e.g. 
Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Pragmatic theories can gain in specificity by focusing on 
specific forms of argumentation.  
Macagno and Walton (2013) argue that implicature should be treated as 
dialectical argumentation, much in the manner of the argumentation theories 
discussed above. Their account has the following basis. Firstly, Gricean pragmatics 
should be weakened, because regulatory principles are context-dependent. Take, for 
instance, the following court-room exchange, analysed in Goodwin (J. Goodwin, 
2001): 
Q: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr Bronston? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Have you ever? 
A: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.  
In normal conversation, the final answer implies that the speaker had never 
personally had a Swiss bank account. In fact, the speaker had had a Swiss bank 
account, but he was found by the court to have replied truthfully. Such evasions are 
not prohibited in court-room pragmatics (J. Goodwin, 2001; Macagno & Walton, 
2013). Pragmatic principles are, on this view, relative to dialogues – to the very same 
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dialogue types in Table 8.1. Indeed, ‘a type of dialogue…can be considered as a 
normative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments between two 
speech partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequences aimed at moving toward 
the fulfilment of a collective conversational goal’ (Macagno & Walton, 2013, p. 206).  
Dialogues, then, are key to this argumentative account of pragmatics, but 
how do they influence utterance interpretation? Dialogue types provide overarching 
goals which ‘assign a role to each dialectical move’ (Macagno & Walton, 2013, p. 
207) and make available presumptions about the behaviour of dialogue participants – 
presumptions about what behaviours are acceptable in a given dialogue. To borrow 
Macagno and Walton’s example, consider an utterance such as ‘I like eating at 
Gino’s’. The dialogue type directly influences its interpretation. If the dialogue is a 
deliberation about where to eat, then the utterance is a proposal and implicit 
argument (‘We should go to Gino’s, because I like it’). If the dialogue is an 
information-seeking dialogue about local restaurants, then the utterance is a simple 
personal assessment. If the dialogue is eristic (a personal argument), then the 
utterance could be a statement of personal offence (‘Only idiots like eating at 
Gino’s’ – ‘I like eating at Gino’s; are you calling me an idiot?’).  Here, interpretation 
is guided by presumptions about behaviour; whenever there is a clash between 
competing presumptions, dialogue participants must reason their way to an 
explanation of the clash.  
So far, the framework is as abstract as other pragmatic accounts. What makes 
the account more specific is its calling on argumentation schemes. Argumentation 
schemes are patterns of inference which are typically associated with a set of critical 
questions for assessing the strength of particular arguments (see, e.g., Walton et al., 
2008). Macagno and Walton (2013) identify a range of schemes that are particularly 
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relevant, arguing that the schemes are invoked when there is a clash of presumptions. 
Take, for instance, their example: 
Bert: Do you like ice cream? 
Ernie: Is the Pope Catholic?  
Bert’s question sets up the presumption that this an information-seeking dialogue, 
and that Ernie will supply information in return. Ernie, however, responds with 
another question. One possibility is that he is being unreasonable, but this conflicts 
with the presumption that speakers usually are reasonable. More likely, then, is the 
possibility that Ernie’s question is meant as a reply.  Here, Bert can assume that 
Ernie’s question is similar to his own, and can invoke the scheme for arguments 
from analogy (as reported by Macagno & Walton): 
MAJOR PREMISE: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2.  
MINOR PREMISE: Proposition A is true (false) in case C1. 
CONCLUSION: Proposition A is true (false) in case C2.  
Ernie’s question has an obvious (affirmative) answer. Bert may reason, then, that his 
own question has an obvious (affirmative) answer.  
Even simple exchanges can invoke multiple argumentation schemes. Take, 
for instance, a second example from Macagno and Walton (2013).   
A: I am out of petrol.  
B: There is a garage around the corner.  
Speaker A is sharing information, but seems to be violating a presumption of 
information-sharing dialogues: that B is interested in this information. This leads to a 
reinterpretation of the utterance using an argumentation scheme: the appeal to pity 
(here, as cited by Macagno and Walton):  
 Individual x is in distress (is suffering).  
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 If individual y brings about A, it will relieve or help to relieve this distress.  
 Therefore, y ought to bring about A.  
In other words, speaker A is making an appeal to pity – is asking speaker B to help 
him/her in some way. The presumed response to a request for help is an action. 
Speaker B does not respond with an action, but rather with information. Speaker A, 
however, can interpret B’s response using an argumentation scheme for practical 
reasoning (again, as cited by Macagno and Walton):  
 My goal is to bring about A (Goal Premise).  
I reasonably consider on the given information that bringing about at least 
one of [B0, B1,… Bn] is necessary to bring about A (Alternatives Premise). 
I have selected one member Bi as an acceptable, or the most acceptable, 
necessary condition for A (Selection Premise).  
Nothing unchangeable prevents me from bringing about Bi as far as I know 
(Practicality Premise).   
Bringing about A is more acceptable to me than not bringing about Bi  (Side 
Effects Premise).   
Therefore, it is required that I bring about Bi (Conclusion). 
Speaker B, then, is making the implicit argument that Speaker A should get petrol at 
the garage around the corner.  
Macagno and Walton (2013) offer forms of argument that are more specific 
than those usually discussed in the pragmatics literature. But there are problems with 
these argumentation schemes which make them questionable as either normative or 
descriptive accounts. Before considering these problems, it will be useful to see how 
argumentation schemes are supposed to work. Consider a further example from 
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Macagno and Walton and the corresponding argumentation scheme, the Argument 
from Sign (Walton, Macagno, & Reed, 2008, p. 329).   
A: What on earth has happened to the roast beef?  
B: The dog looks very happy  
Implicit Conclusion: The dog has eaten the roast beef.  
Argument from Sign  
A (a finding) is true in this situation. 
B is generally indicated as true when its sign, A, is true  
B is true in this situation  
Critical Questions 
CQ1: What is the strength of the correlation of the sign with the event 
signified? 
CQ2: Are there other events that would more reliably account for the sign?  
Here, the sign is the dog’s happy expression: the critical questions are how strongly 
the dog’s happy expression correlates with eating roast beef, and whether there are 
alternative events which would better explain the dog’s happy expression. The 
answers to the critical questions determine the strength of the argument.  
This argumentative account of pragmatics inherits the difficulties of the 
general approach to argumentation schemes, surveyed by Hahn and Hornikx (2016). 
Firstly, argumentation schemes proliferate: theories differ in the number they include, 
and principled choices do not seem to have been made about the inclusion and 
discreteness of the schemes. Secondly, it is not clear what normative status the 
critical questions have. It is unclear, for instance, what constitutes a successful 
answer and whether successful answers oblige the audience to accept the argument 
(Hahn & Hornikx, 2016; Walton et al., 2008). Relatedly, there is often no clear 
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formal link between the argumentation scheme and the critical questions; their link is 
only intuitive (Hahn & Hornikx, 2016). While the questions could, in principle, be 
added to the arguments as premises, the underlying logic can only be a defeasible 
modus ponens, an argument form which inherits all the defects of classical modus 
ponens, such as licensing highly counter-intuitive arguments in which there is no real 
relationship between the premises and conclusion (Hahn & Hornikx, 2016).  
The defects in argument schemes naturally raise the question of whether 
there are suitable alternatives which could be applied to pragmatics. One such 
alternative is Bayesian Argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). On this approach, 
argumentation is treated as probabilistic inference: at base, it is Bayesian belief 
revision. Bayesian Argumentation, therefore, has a firm normative foundation. 
Arguments are measured by two criteria: their strength, that is, the degree of belief in 
the conclusion; and their force, that is, the amount of belief change brought about. 
This Bayesian approach has led to a reassessment of numerous forms of informal 
argument, and the conclusion that many supposed fallacies are arguments which can, 
in the right circumstances, be strong. There are Bayesian accounts of the argument 
from ignorance (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007), circular reasoning (Hahn & Oaksford, 
2007), the slippery slope argument (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Corner, Hahn, & 
Oaksford, 2011), and the argument from expert opinion (Hahn et al., 2012; Harris et 
al., 2016). Hahn and Hornikx (2016) also offer re-analyses of the argument from 
sign and the argument from popular opinion. Bayesian Argumentation, in sum, 
provides a promising, if largely unexplored (though see Harris et al., 2013), 
approach to pragmatics.  
As we have seen, then, pragmatic explanations can be made more concrete 
through argumentation schemes, which can be re-expressed probabilistically to 
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provide a sure normative foundation. But there is arguably a still deeper connection 
between argumentation and pragmatics: they are both underpinned by relevance (for 
discussion, see Collins & Hahn 2016). Consider, first, argumentation. The quality of 
an argument is, in large part, determined by its relevance to some goal (Walton, 
2003; Walton & Macagno, 2016). That is, a good argument is one which is capable 
of changing beliefs towards that goal (Walton & Macagno, 2016). Walton and 
Macagno give the following example (Walton & Macagno, 2016, p. 526): 
Your friend says that Brand X coffee tastes better than Brand Y. Apparently 
she is ignoring the fact that Brand X is made by a company that also made a 
product that was responsible for thousands of deaths of children in 
undeveloped countries. Therefore, your friend is mistaken.  
The relevance of this argument depends on the goal. If the friend in question is 
merely expressing her personal opinion on the taste, then the counterargument is 
irrelevant: it is not capable of changing beliefs about the coffee’s flavour. A relevant 
counterargument might be to mention a new, improved version of Brand Y which 
might change the friend’s view. However, if the goal is to decide on a coffee to buy, 
then the counterargument is relevant: it is an ethical argument against buying Brand 
X. In more realistic, more complex argumentative discourses, there may be many 
interlinked arguments, each with local goals. Important, in such cases, is the ultimate 
goal, or stasis, of the dialogue and the capacity of each argument to shift belief 
towards achieving that goal (Walton and Macagno, 2016).  
The idea of a stasis has a direct analogue in contemporary semantics and 
pragmatics: the Question Under Discussion, or ‘QUD’ (Roberts, 1996). On this 
account, any discourse raises a set of questions, implicit or explicit, to be addressed. 
These questions are typically viewed as sets of alternatives or competing 
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descriptions of the world (Clifton & Frazier, 2012). The utterances that make up the 
discourse can be tied together by considering how they relate to the overall QUD(s). 
More philosophical treatments suggest that a discourse can raise an extremely large 
number of QUDs, and that these questions are sometimes only identified after the 
fact (Clifton & Frazier, 2012). In contrast, Clifton and Frazier (2012) propose a more 
computationally tractable account, focusing on a limited number of QUDs. On their 
account, QUDs are raised by explicit questions; by assertions with non-actuality 
implicatures (‘He should have left work by now’- so has he?); by focus (‘TOM 
kissed Mary’ – who were the other potential kissers?); by disjunctions; and by 
indefinites (‘I’m going to bet on a horse’ - which one?). Clifton and Frazier used eye 
tracking to find evidence that people expect utterances to address QUDs, and that 
utterances which fail to do so disrupt processing.  
For both concepts – stasis and QUD – relevance is a central issue. Macagno 
and Walton (2016) provide an analysis, for stasis, in terms of ‘profiles of dialogue’: 
graphs which show the structure of complex arguments, and can be used to judge 
whether individual components are relevant to the overall goal. Here, as with 
argumentation schemes, we can give a stronger account by invoking probabilities. 
Probabilities offer various ways of measuring relevance. One such we have seen in 
Chapter 5: the delta-P rule. Another is the difference rule: on this rule, an argument 
is relevant if it increases belief in the conclusion; hence, if P(Conclusion|Evidence) > 
P(Conclusion). This rule links smoothly with Bayesian belief networks. Since these 
graphical devices have well-known formal properties, they are invaluable in 
representing complex relations among random variables, and help to simplify 
calculations. Bayesian belief networks have been applied to simpler arguments and 
testimony, and could readily be extended to complex dialectical arguments. If these 
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methods can be used to represent all the evidence in a complex court case (Kadane & 
Schum, 1996), they can surely be applied to a dialectical argument. These methods 
also allow a dynamic notion of relevance: interventions in the network alter patterns 
of probabilistic dependence, thanks to the axioms of conditional independence (Korb 
& Nicholson, 2011). For instance, take Korb and Nicholson’s (2011, p. 39) example 
of a model in which A (smoking) causes B (cancer) which causes C (shortness of 
breath). To quote:  
If we don’t know whether [a] woman has cancer, but we do find out that she 
is a smoker, that would increase our belief both that she has cancer and that 
she suffers from shortness of breath. However, if we already knew she had 
cancer, then her smoking wouldn’t make any difference to the probability of 
[shortness of breath]. That is, [shortness of breath] is conditionally 
independent of being a smoker given the patient has cancer.  
This flexibility seems highly advantageous.  
Relevance is also an important notion in pragmatics, further emphasizing the 
deep connection with argumentation. Relevance is typically given a rather different 
treatment from that above: Relevance Theory, for instance, treats relevance as a 
trade-off between cognitive effects and processing effort (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). 
Cognitive effects are the strengthening or weakening of assumptions, and the 
derivation or cancellation of conclusions, and so on. In short, these are phenomena 
that could easily be cashed out in probabilistic terms. But it remains to be seen 
whether Relevance Theory can be re-expressed using Bayesian belief networks. As 
we have seen, though, there is certainly a sense in which discourse hangs together. 
Individual discourse moves seem relatable to an ultimate conversational goal in 
much the same way that individual arguments are relatable to an ultimate 
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argumentative goal. Both types of goal will typically be achieved by modifying 
belief. And both types of move – conversational and argumentative – can vary in 
their instrumental rationality: that is, in how likely they are to bring about the 
overarching goal.  
Much as there has been a blurring of the boundaries between pragmatics and 
argumentation, it is important to recognize the distinctions between the two abilities. 
We can see these distinctions at work in the following example argument: ‘If we 
allow gay marriage, then people will want to marry their pets’. Even without context, 
this is clearly a consequentialist argument. The relevant parameters are the utilities 
of the antecedent and consequent and the conditional probability. All else equal, the 
argument is likely to be understood as an argument against gay marriage: the 
(presumed) consensus is that interspecies marriage has disutility. This assignment of 
disutility is enough to interpret the conditional as an argument against gay marriage. 
But an audience might go further and conclude that the arguer considers gay 
marriage to have intrinsic disutility: the arguer is likely to be the kind of person who 
opposes gay marriage irrespective of its effects on interspecies marriage. The 
audience might also conclude that the arguer suspects that the audience considers 
gay marriage to have intrinsic utility: why make the argument if not to change the 
audience’s mind? The assertion of the conditional also implies that the arguer 
considers the conditional probability to be high. In context, there are potentially 
many other cues to these assignments: for instance, the arguer may have a set role in 
a deliberation, or may show emotion through intonation or facial expressions. But 
none of this is enough to make the argument persuasive. For persuasiveness, it is the 
audience’s utility and probability assignments that are key.  
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The preceding discussion has sketched the following picture: pragmatics and 
testimony, and pragmatics and argumentation, use much the same patterns of 
inference, albeit it to slightly different ends. The question naturally arises of whether 
the different abilities rest on the same mechanisms. Here, a variety of methods 
suggest themselves. Clinical research suggests that a variety of developmental, 
psychiatric and acquired disorders disrupt pragmatics, including, for instance, 
autistic spectrum disorder, Williams syndrome, motor neuron disease, multiple 
sclerosis, schizophrenia, traumatic brain injuries, and strokes (Cummings, 2017). If 
pragmatics and argumentation rely on the same mechanisms, then pragmatic 
dysfunction should associate with argumentation dysfunction. A major challenge, 
however, would be to isolate pragmatic dysfunction from other linguistic and 
cognitive deficits which occur in many of the above disorders (Cummings, 2017). A 
related, but more straightforward, approach would to be search for individual 
differences within the normal population. There is scant individual-differences 
research in either pragmatics or argumentation, but there are numerous plausible 
individual-difference variables, such as the communication subscale of the Autism 
Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001; Nieuwland, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010) or scales such as Need For 
Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), Need for Affect (Maio & Esses, 2001), Need 
for Closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), and so on. Such research would offer 
valuable insight into the abilities themselves and their relationship, and help to 
address fundamental questions such as the whether pragmatics is a modular process 
(Cummings, 2017; Sperber & Wilson, 2002).   
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8.2.3 Pragmatics as rational social action  
The triangular scheme sits well with an emerging body of research which 
treats pragmatics as rational social action. This research uses formal mathematical 
tools to model language use in context, and increasingly leads to predictive 
psychological accounts of linguistic phenomena. Much of this research draws on 
game theory. Game-theoretic models of conflict and cooperation have abundant 
applications to meaning. Take, for instance, a simple zero-sum game of perfect 
information: that is, a game in which pay-offs sum to zero - so that in, for example, a 
two player game, one player’s gain is offset by a another’s loss  - and in which each 
player knows all previous events. Imagine a two-player version: one player is the 
verifier, who wins if they can demonstrate that a proposition holds; the other is the 
falsifier, who wins if they can demonstrate that a proposition does not hold. Assume, 
further, that we have a simple tree-adjoining grammar for (a fragment of) English, 
and that we have a simple model which maps English expressions onto entities in the 
model: real-world entities map onto constants; transitive verbs map onto sets; and 
intransitive verbs map onto ordered pairs. English propositions hold if they have 
counterparts in the model. Together, the model and game can be used to reconstruct 
the basics of truth-conditional semantics, building up from atomic sentences to 
negation, other connectives, quantifiers, pronouns, and scope phenomena (R. Clark, 
2011).  
Impressive though this feat may be, it relies on tenuous assumptions: for 
instance, that people have perfect information of previous events, that expressions 
are unambiguous, and that linguistic behaviour relies on conflict (R. Clark, 2011). 
We can reject these assumptions and prefer alternative models which better capture 
pragmatics. For instance, we can turn to games of partial information (R. Clark, 
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2011; Parikh, 2001). These are games in which one player, a speaker, selects a signal 
and another player, a hearer, must select an interpretation of the signal. Signals give 
rise, probabilistically, to different interpretations. These probabilities accommodate 
context. For instance, the word ‘pen’ is ambiguous between a writing instrument and 
an enclosure for animals. These interpretations have different probabilities. But the 
probabilities will change depending on context: at an academic conference, both 
interpretations are possible, but the writing instrument is more likely; at a farm, both 
interpretations are, again, possible, but the animal enclosure is considerably more 
likely than at the conference. Interpretations have utilities: the correct (intended) 
interpretation has utility for both speaker and hearer; the incorrect (unintended) 
interpretation has disutility for both speaker and hearer. These utilities can also 
depend on the signal chosen: more complex signals have lower utilities to encode a 
preference for economy. Speaker and hearer alike make strategic choices to 
maximize their expected utility. Games of partial information can model the 
resolution of lexical ambiguity, responses to garden-path sentences, reference 
assignment for pronouns, politeness behaviours, and typicality effects (R. Clark, 
2011). To some extent, they can also model individual differences, allowing for 
players who prefer rewards and risk misunderstandings to achieve them, and for 
players who prefer certainty and risk expending effort unnecessarily (R. Clark, 2011).  
A more recent alternative arises from an attempt to address problems with the 
use of standard game theory to explain decision making in social contexts: the theory 
of Virtual Bargaining (Misyak & Chater, 2014; Misyak, Melkonyan, Zeitoun, & 
Chater, 2014). Typically, standard game-theoretic explanations are based on Nash 
equilibria (Misyak & Chater, 2014; Misyak et al., 2014): an equilibrium arises when 
players have each selected a strategy, and no player will benefit from unilaterally 
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changing strategy. In some games, there is more than one equilibrium; in others, at 
least some real-world players systematically choose non-equilibria. For instance, 
some players of the Prisoner’s Dilemma will choose to cooperate, even though the 
only equilibrium is for both players to defect (Misyak & Chater, 2014). A theory of 
social decision making needs to predict choices in both cases. Virtual Bargaining 
holds that decision makers will choose the option they would have chosen in explicit 
negotiation with other players. Although this research is primarily theoretical thus 
far, initial data are consistent with the theory (Misyak & Chater, 2014). The theory is 
rich in potential applications: for present purposes, most relevantly to language, 
communication, and reasoning (Misyak et al., 2014).   
Both Game Theory and Virtual Bargaining allow us to explore cooperation 
and conflict in pragmatics and argumentation. Understanding how far cooperation is 
necessary, and conflict is possible, is an important goal in light of the discussion 
above. Traditional theory has assumed that pragmatics is fundamentally cooperative; 
but pragmatics can clearly happen in non-cooperative situations such as personal 
arguments. Conversely, we might assume that argumentation is fundamentally about 
conflict – about resolving differences of opinion, with one side winning. But 
argumentation theory increasingly stresses that some kind of cooperation is essential 
for resolving disputes. Tools such as Game Theory and Virtual Bargaining should 
allow us to develop theories of what we need to cooperate on and how far we can be 
in conflict while still successfully inferring meanings and resolving disputes.  
A related body of research also treats pragmatics as rational social action, and 
has produced testable psychological accounts of pragmatics. This research uses 
Bayesian cognitive modelling, the main focus being a model known as the Rational 
Speech Act Model (henceforth, ‘RSA’ model) (e.g. Frank & Goodman, 2012; 
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Goodman & Frank, 2016; Goodman & Lassiter, in press; Goodman & Stuhlmüller, 
2013). This research allows us to further reconsider the relationship between 
pragmatics and sources. The RSA model builds on the work of Grice in viewing 
talking as ‘a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational, behaviour’ (Grice, 
1975, p. 47). The model treats pragmatics as inference under uncertainty: uncertainty 
about speakers’ intentions and beliefs, the purpose of discourse, word meanings, and 
so on (Goodman & Frank, 2016). On this view, pragmatics is recursive inference, 
defined in the following way. Listeners (L) infer the state of the world, w, given a 
speaker’s (S) utterance, u, using Bayes’ rule:  
PL(w | u) ∝ PS(u |w)P(w)  
Listeners assume that a speaker is more or less rational and has ‘chosen her 
utterances in proportion to the utility she expects to gain’ (Goodman & Frank, 2016): 
PS(u | w) ∝ exp(αU(u;w))  
α, here, is a parameter which captures how rational a speaker is. A speaker’s utility 
depends on providing help to the listener: it depends on how likely a literal listener is 
to infer the state of the world:  
U(u;w) = logPLit(w | u)  
This reference to the literal speaker prevents an infinite recursion. Finally, the literal 
listener also performs Bayesian updating, assuming that the literal meaning of the 
utterance is true:  
PLit(w | u) ∝ δ [u](w)P (w)  
The literal meaning is provided by a truth-functional semantics.  
By formalizing pragmatic inference in this way, the RSA model can make 
specific predictions about experimental tasks. Experimental evidence provides 
increasing support for the model and its variants. The basic model fares well with 
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referential communication tasks (Frank & Goodman, 2012). It can be supplemented 
with more elaborate utility functions which assign, for instance, disutility to 
production effort (Goodman & Frank, 2016); these more elaborate models can 
capture participants’ sensitivity to production costs (Bergen, Goodman, & Levy, 
2012). Forms of the model can also capture speakers’ knowledge, and can accurately 
predict, in context, when people will derive scalar inferences (Goodman & 
Stuhlmüller, 2013). A parameter can also be added to the model to capture 
uncertainty about the speaker. The model thus allows joint inference, and can 
thereby accurately predict participants’ behaviour with hyperbole; irony; simple 
metaphors (Goodman & Frank, 2016); vague predicates, such as ‘tall’ (Lassiter & 
Goodman, 2015); and embedded implicatures (Bergen, Levy, & Goodman, 2016). 
Thus far, the RSA approach applies at the level of individual utterances; a fuller 
account will need to consider wider discourse (Goodman & Frank, 2016). Plausibly, 
though, the RSA model could be used alongside the Bayes nets approach suggested 
above.  
It is central to the RSA model that speakers are more or less rational, an 
assumption which is also implicit in Macagno and Walton’s (2013) argumentative 
pragmatics. This assumption highlights the link between pragmatics and sources. 
There is reason to doubt that speakers are always rational, since they often depart 
from ideal behaviour at least when they are under time pressure and cognitive 
demands (Goodman & Frank, 2016). More work is needed to test this assumption 
and, as we have seen previously, to test what happens to pragmatic inference when 
speakers are perceived as irrational, unreliable or untrustworthy. But the RSA 
approach raises the prospect of a model which can integrate information about 
speakers. The model can currently integrate information about speakers’ perceived 
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knowledge. It could profitably be extended to include information about speakers’ 
past behaviours, personalities, and so on, much as Hilton (1995) suggested in his 
Attributional Model of pragmatic inference. If this can be done with a simple set of 
equations, then agent-based modelling could be used to explore the rationality of 
such behaviours on a population-wide level.  
These new modelling methods – both game-theoretic and Bayesian – 
encourage a new specificity to pragmatic theories and potentially also to theories of 
argumentation. The methods also offer rich prospects for understanding the 
relationship between rationality, pragmatics, and sources. As these models are 
developed further and tested empirically, they should help to inform the large 
literature on the psychology of rationality, allowing us to interpret better 
participants’ behaviours in experimental tasks.  
8.3 Conclusions 
This thesis has highlighted the complex interlocking of rationality, 
pragmatics, and sources. It has argued – through literature reviews, conceptual work, 
and experimentation – that these components are inseparable. The General 
Discussion has argued that pragmatics is rational behaviour: pragmatics draws on the 
same inference forms and broader argument forms as other rational behaviours, 
albeit to slightly different ends. And pragmatic theories are shot through with 
assumptions about sources. The triangular scheme is completed by the link between 
sources and rationality. People are sensitive to source information and can treat other 
people’s claims sceptically. Questions remain about how rational this behaviour is, 
on a population level and across time. This thesis has suggested numerous avenues 
for future research. Recent developments permit a new unification of research on 
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rationality, pragmatics, and sources. In such research, it will be important, when 
focusing on any one component, to keep the others in the back of one’s mind.  
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